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Abstract 
What difference do the characteristics of innovative policies make? Do certain characteristics render 
such policies more adoptable? And do they condition the weight of other factors that explain policy 
innovation? Thus far, these questions have received little attention in research. In addressing them, 
this study focusses on characteristics that are inherent to the design of the particular policy innovation, 
including its designated beneficiaries, degree of intervention, complexity and implementation costs. 
Based on event history analyses of Swiss cantonal public health policies, it tests various hypotheses on 
the direct and indirect effects of policy design characteristics on the likelihood that states innovate. Its 
findings confirm that policy design characteristics matter for innovation decisions. Specifically, it shows 
that governments go by peer states’ previous adoptions of the policy at stake when deciding on 
complex and expensive innovative policies, but do not rely on such cues for decisions on simple and 
low-cost innovations. 
Because of certain empirical constraints that this study faces further research is called for to convey a 
more comprehensive picture of the impact of policy design characteristics on innovation. 
Zusammenfassung 
Welche Bedeutung haben die Merkmale innovativer Policies? Führen bestimmte Merkmale dazu, dass 
solche Policies eher angenommen werden? Beeinflussen sie ferner die Relevanz anderer Faktoren, die 
Politikinnovation erklären? Diese Fragen sind bislang wenig erforscht worden. Um sie zu beantworten, 
richtet diese Studie ihr Augenmerk auf Merkmale, die sich aus dem Design der jeweiligen Innovation 
ergeben: die Begünstigten, den Eingriffsgrad, die Komplexität und die Vollzugskosten. 
Auf der Grundlage von Ereignisdatenanalysen zu Public-Health Policies der Schweizer Kantone werden 
verschiedene Hypothesen zu den direkten und indirekten Auswirkungen von Merkmalen des Policy-
Designs auf die Innovationswahrscheinlichkeit getestet. Die Ergebnisse bestätigen, dass die Merkmale 
des Policy-Designs einen Einfluss auf Innovationsentscheidungen haben. Konkret zeigt sich, dass sich 
Regierungen bei Entscheidungen über komplexe und teure innovative Policies – anders als bei 
Entscheidungen über Innovationen, die ein einfaches Design mit geringen Kosten verbinden – von 
früheren Annahmen der betreffenden Policy durch andere Staaten aus ihrem Vergleichsumfeld leiten 
lassen. 
Aufgrund bestimmter empirischer Grenzen, an die diese Studie stösst, sind weitere Untersuchungen 
notwendig, um ein vollständigeres Bild dazu zu vermitteln, wie sich Merkmale des Policy-Designs auf 
Innovation auswirken.  
  
ii 
Contents 
 
1 Introduction: Policy Innovation, Diffusion and the Characteristics of Innovative Policies ............. 1 
2 State of the Art: Research on Policy Innovation and Diffusion ....................................................... 5 
 The Backbone of Current Research: The Core Concepts of Policy Innovation and Diffusion and 
Berry and Berry’s Unified Model ......................................................................................................... 5 
 Tour d’Horizon: Advances in Research on Policy Innovation and Diffusion in Federal States 
since the 1990s .................................................................................................................................... 8 
 Policy Characteristics and Types in Empirical Innovation and Diffusion Research ............... 20 
 Tobacco Control Policies: What Insights from Policy Innovation and Diffusion Research? .. 24 
3 Theoretical Argument: Policy Design, Innovation and Diffusion .................................................. 34 
 Framework of Analysis and Conceptual Issues ..................................................................... 34 
 The Impact of Policy Characteristics on Innovation Decisions: Hypotheses ......................... 39 
 Specification and Measurement of Policy Design Characteristics ........................................ 42 
4 The Policy Field Studied: Public Health Policy in Switzerland ....................................................... 46 
 Description of the Policy Field ............................................................................................... 47 
 Selection of Policies ............................................................................................................... 57 
 Specification and Measurement of Core Concepts in the Context of the Policy Field ......... 60 
5 Policy Portraits: Content, Characteristics, Context and Diffusion ................................................. 70 
 Ban on Tobacco Billboard Advertising ................................................................................... 70 
 Ban on Tobacco Sales to Children and Adolescents .............................................................. 76 
 Alcohol Sales Restrictions ...................................................................................................... 81 
 Breast Cancer Screening Programmes .................................................................................. 86 
 Restaurant Food Nutrition Labelling ..................................................................................... 92 
6 Statistical Methods and Data ........................................................................................................ 99 
 Event History Analysis: Logic and Application to the Present Research Endeavour ............. 99 
 Feeding the Models: Categories of Variables, Data Sources and Data Processing ............. 103 
7 Explaining the Adoption of Individual Cantonal Public Health Policies....................................... 115 
 Ban on Tobacco Billboard Advertising ................................................................................. 115 
 Ban on Tobacco Sales to Children and Adolescents ............................................................ 120 
 Breast Cancer Screening Programmes ................................................................................ 122 
 Restaurant Food Nutrition Labelling ................................................................................... 127 
 Summary: The Determinants of Four Cantonal Public Health Policies ............................... 130 
8 Disentangling the Effects of Policy Characteristics on Innovation and Diffusion........................ 131 
 Empirical Constraints to Hypothesis Testing ....................................................................... 132 
 Standardised Single Event Models: Evidence on the Indirect Effects of Policy Characteristics
 133 
 Multiple Events Models: Evidence on the Direct and Indirect Effects of Policy Characteristics
 135 
 Evidence on the Effects of Policy Characteristics: Summary and Appraisal........................ 142 
9 Policy Design, Innovation and Diffusion: Conclusion .................................................................. 144 
10 References ............................................................................................................................... 147 
11 Appendix .................................................................................................................................. 164 
iii 
List of Tables 
Table 1: Policy innovation and diffusion research on tobacco control policies .................................... 26 
Table 2: Degree of intervention: dimensions and operational definitions ........................................... 43 
Table 3: Complexity: dimensions and operational definitions .............................................................. 44 
Table 4: Realms of federal competencies in public health and corresponding constitutional provisions
 ............................................................................................................................................................... 47 
Table 5: Fields of cantonal activities in public health as defined by cantonal health acts .................... 50 
Table 6: Cantonal department in charge of health (including public health) ....................................... 52 
Table 7: Regional conferences within the Swiss Conference of the Cantonal Ministers of Public Health
 ............................................................................................................................................................... 56 
Table 8: Types of point-source diffusion effects considered: operational definitions and expected 
effects .................................................................................................................................................... 68 
Table 9: Ban on tobacco billboard advertising: components of the policy design ............................... 73 
Table 10: Ban on tobacco billboard advertising: characteristics of the policy design .......................... 74 
Table 11: Federal tobacco advertising restrictions ............................................................................... 75 
Table 12: Ban on tobacco billboard advertising: coding of point-source diffusion variables, 2000-2013
 ............................................................................................................................................................... 76 
Table 13: Ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents: components of the policy design ......... 79 
Table 14: Ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents: characteristics of the policy design ...... 80 
Table 15: Ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents: coding of point-source diffusion variables, 
2005-2013 ............................................................................................................................................. 81 
Table 16: Restriction on alcohol sales at petrol stations and ban on takeout alcohol sales at night: 
components of the policy designs ......................................................................................................... 83 
Table 17: Restriction on alcohol sales at petrol stations and ban on takeout alcohol sales at night: 
characteristics of the policy designs ...................................................................................................... 84 
Table 18: Federal alcohol sales restrictions .......................................................................................... 84 
Table 19: Alcohol sales restrictions: coding of point-source diffusion variables, 1998/2004-2013 ..... 86 
Table 20: Cantonal breast cancer screening programmes: delineations of the direct target group .... 88 
Table 21: Breast cancer screening programmes: components of the policy design............................. 89 
Table 22: Breast cancer screening programmes: characteristics of the policy design ......................... 90 
Table 23: Breast cancer screening programmes: coding of point-source diffusion variables, 1993-2013
 ............................................................................................................................................................... 92 
Table 24: Fourchette verte: sublabels ................................................................................................... 95 
Table 25: Fourchette verte: components of the policy design ............................................................. 96 
Table 26: schnitz und drunder: components of the policy design ........................................................ 96 
Table 27: Restaurant food nutrition labelling: characteristics of the policy design .............................. 97 
Table 28: Restaurant food nutrition labelling: coding of point-source diffusion variables, 1993-2013 98 
Table 29: Internal determinants: operational definitions, data sources used and years covered ..... 108 
Table 30: Policy adoption, implementation, diffusion and characteristics: operational definitions, data 
sources used and years covered ......................................................................................................... 111 
Table 31: Ban on tobacco billboard advertising: explanatory factors ................................................. 115 
Table 32: Ban on tobacco billboard advertising: descriptive statistics of variables, 2000-2013 ........ 117 
Table 33: Logit models on the adoption of the ban on tobacco billboard advertising, 2000-2013 .... 119 
Table 34: Ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents: explanatory factors ............................ 121 
Table 35: Ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents: descriptive statistics of variables, 2005-
2013 ..................................................................................................................................................... 121 
Table 36: Logit models on the adoption of the ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents, 2005-
2013 ..................................................................................................................................................... 122 
Table 37: Breast cancer screening programmes: explanatory factors ................................................ 123 
Table 38: Breast cancer screening programmes: descriptive statistics of variables, 1993-2013 ....... 124 
Table 39: Logit models on the adoption of breast cancer screening programmes, 1993-2013 ......... 126 
Table 40: Restaurant food nutrition labelling: explanatory factors .................................................... 128 
iv 
Table 41: Restaurant food nutrition labelling: descriptive statistics of variables, 1993-2013 ............ 128 
Table 42: Logit models on the adoption of restaurant food nutrition labelling, 1993-2013 .............. 129 
Table 43: Summary of design characteristics of the policies studied ................................................. 132 
Table 44: Approach to hypothesis testing ........................................................................................... 133 
Table 45: Average marginal effects on the adoptions of four public health policies ......................... 135 
Table 46: Multiple events models: key explanatory factors ............................................................... 136 
Table 47: Multiple events models: descriptive statistics of variables ................................................. 137 
Table 48: Pooled logit models on the adoption of six public health policies ...................................... 140 
Table 49: Cantonal health acts (as of December 2015) ...................................................................... 164 
Table 50: Ban on tobacco billboard advertising: cantonal legal basis and dates of adoption and of entry 
into force, 2000-2015 .......................................................................................................................... 165 
Table 51: Ban on tobacco billboard advertising: related legislative activities at the federal level, 1990-
2015 ..................................................................................................................................................... 167 
Table 52: Ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents: cantonal legal basis and dates of adoption 
and of entry into force, 2005-2015 ..................................................................................................... 168 
Table 53: Ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents: related legislative activities at the federal 
level, 1990-2015 .................................................................................................................................. 170 
Table 54: Restrictions on alcohol sales at petrol stations: cantonal legal basis and dates of adoption 
and of entry into force, 1998-2015 ..................................................................................................... 171 
Table 55: Ban on takeout alcohol sales at night: cantonal legal basis and dates of adoption and of entry 
into force, 2004-2015 .......................................................................................................................... 171 
Table 56: Breast cancer screening programmes: timing of adoption, type of adoption decision and 
onset of implementation, 1993-2015 ................................................................................................. 172 
Table 57: Restaurant food nutrition labelling: timing of adoption, type of adoption decision and onset 
of implementation, 1993-2014 ........................................................................................................... 172 
Table 58: Standardised logit models on the adoption of four individual public health policies ......... 173 
  
v 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Spectrum of dependent variables ............................................................................................ 9 
Figure 2: Diffusion channels and diffusion mechanisms ....................................................................... 13 
Figure 3: Direct impact of policy characteristics on adoption ............................................................... 34 
Figure 4: Indirect impact of policy characteristics on adoption ............................................................ 35 
Figure 5: Framework of analysis: impact of policy characteristics on adoption ................................... 36 
Figure 6: Policy measures: basic components of their designs ............................................................. 38 
Figure 7: Per capita spending on public health (in CHF, 2010 prices), 1990 and 2012 ......................... 51 
Figure 8: Regional CMPH-conferences .................................................................................................. 66 
Figure 9: Ban on tobacco billboard advertising: pattern of diffusion, 2000 to 2015 ............................ 71 
Figure 10: Ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents: pattern of diffusion, 2005 to 2015 ...... 77 
Figure 11: Minimum age for tobacco purchases by canton, 2015 ........................................................ 78 
Figure 12: Restriction on alcohol sales at petrol stations: pattern of diffusion, 1998 to 2015............. 82 
Figure 13: Breast cancer screening programmes: pattern of diffusion, 1993 to 2015 ......................... 87 
Figure 14: Restaurant food nutrition labelling: pattern of diffusion, 1993 to 2014 ............................. 93 
  
vi 
Abbreviations 
ADHP  Association of Cantonal Delegates for Health Promotion 
AG  Aargau 
AI  Appenzell Innerrhoden 
AR  Appenzell Ausserrhoden 
Art.  Article 
BC  Business Census 
BE  Bern 
BL  Basel-Landschaft 
BS  Basel-Stadt 
CH CONST. Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation 
CHF  Swiss franc 
CI  confidence interval 
CLASS  Conférence latine des affaires sanitaires et sociales 
CMPH   Swiss Conference of the Cantonal Ministers of Public Health 
CPPS   Commission Prévention et Promotion de la Santé 
CS  Council of States 
EHA   event history analysis 
EU  European Union 
FC  Federal Council 
FDC  funded defined-contribution  
FOPH  Federal Office of Public Health 
FR  Fribourg 
FSO  Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
FV  Fourchette verte 
FV-CH  Fédération Fourchette verte Suisse 
GDP  gross domestic product 
GE  Geneva 
GL  Glarus 
GR  Graubünden 
HIV/AIDS Human immunodeficiency virus infection/acquired immune deficiency syndrome  
HMO  health maintenance organisation 
JU  Jura 
LU  Lucerne 
NAIC  National Association of Insurance Commissioners  
NC  National Council 
NDC  notional defined-contribution 
NE  Neuchâtel 
NICER  National Institute for Cancer Epidemiology and Registration 
NPA National Alcohol Programme 
NPT National Tobacco Programme 
NW  Nidwalden 
Obsan  Swiss Health Observatory 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OW  Obwalden 
s&d  schnitz und drunder 
SES  Statistics on Enterprise Structure 
SG  St. Gallen 
SH  Schaffhausen 
SO  Solothurn 
SZ  Schwyz 
TG  Thurgau 
TI  Ticino 
TPF  Tobacco Prevention Fund 
U.S.  United States 
UR  Uri 
VD  Vaud 
vii 
VS  Valais 
WHO FCTC Framework Convention on Tobacco Control of the World Health Organization 
WHO  World Health Organization 
YPLL  years of potential life lost 
ZG  Zug 
ZH  Zurich 
 
1 
1 Introduction: Policy Innovation, Diffusion and the Characteristics of 
Innovative Policies 
Most policy change is incremental, entailing adjustments to existing policies (cf. Lindblom 1958). Yet, 
at times, policy makers innovate. They adopt policies that have something genuinely novel about them 
– be it that they deal with a public problem that so far has been disregarded, bring about a shift in the 
goals pursued in a policy field or mark a new approach to achieving an established policy goal. 
In view of the major departure from past practice that it brings about, policy innovation has intrigued 
political scientists ever since Walker (1969) published his seminal study on the innovativeness of the 
U.S. American states. Innovative policies often spread as different states successively adopt them. 
Explaining the adoptions of innovative policies and the resultant pattern of diffusion is the nucleus of 
policy innovation and diffusion research. Particularly the ways in which the innovation decisions of 
different states are linked to each other have captivated scholars’ interest. 
In accounting for policy innovation, political science research mainly draws on two categories of 
explanatory factors (cf. Berry/Berry 1990, 2007), i.e. internal conditions and interdependent decision 
making. Myriad studies show state-specific political, economic and social conditions, such as the 
ideological preferences of policy makers and citizens or the capacities of political institutions, to affect 
policy adoption (cf. Berry/Berry 2007; Graham et al. 2013). Similarly, there is ample evidence that the 
behaviour of other governments shapes the probability that policy makers innovate. Due to 
mechanisms such as learning, socialisation, competition or coercion, prior policy adoptions by other 
states impact on a government’s innovation decision. Time and again, research has uncovered such 
instances of interdependent decision making (cf. Berry/Berry 2007; Graham et al. 2013). 
In following Mohr’s (1969) model of organisational innovation, Berry and Berry (1990) have argued 
that internal conditions and interdependent decision making may be integrated into a “unified model” 
of policy innovation because the variables in both categories divide into factors that shape the 
motivation to innovate, factors that set up obstacles to innovation and others that reflect resources 
available to overcome such obstacles. Since then, the unified model has turned into the dominant 
approach to analysing policy innovation. As such it has significantly expanded our understanding of the 
variety of internal determinants and the different forms of interdependent decision at work in 
innovation decisions on public policies. 
Notwithstanding the impressive account of existing research, this study argues that an important 
element is missing from the above explanation, i.e. the characteristics of the innovation itself. Policies 
differ in terms of the objectives that they pursue, their contents, the means of intervention that they 
rely on, the groups that they target for benefits and burdens, and the delivery structures that they are 
based on. Policy attributes related to such design elements – as well as other policy characteristics – 
are likely to matter in innovation decisions. Most probably, they affect the motivation and resources 
for, and the obstacles to, innovation just as internal conditions and interdependent decision making 
do. What is more, policy characteristics are also likely to condition to what degree individual internal 
conditions and forms of interdependent decision-making matter in innovation choices. 
That is why a focus on policy characteristics promises important insights on the determinants of policy 
innovation and diffusion. However, despite their enormous explanatory potential, political science 
diffusion research has thus far largely ignored the attributes of innovative policies. Currently, only a 
handful of studies (i.e. Mooney/Lee 1995; Brooks 2007; Nicholson-Crotty 2009; Boushey 2010; 
Makse/Volden 2011) yield empirical evidence on the effects of policy attributes on innovation and 
diffusion. 
2 
Research design 
This study aims to contribute to exploring what difference policy characteristics make for the diffusion 
of innovative policies. It addresses three research questions: 
▪ Do policy characteristics render some innovative policies more adoptable than others? 
▪ Do policy characteristics affect the importance of particular state characteristics (“internal 
determinants”) for the adoption of innovative policies? 
▪ Do policy characteristics condition the weight of interdependent decision making (“diffusion 
effects”) in innovation decisions? 
Scholars have dealt with different types of policy attributes, including characteristics that pertain to 
the nature of the issue (e.g. Gormley 1986) or problem (e.g. Peters/Hoornbeek 2005) that a policy 
addresses. This study focusses on attributes that relate to the specific solution that a policy entails, 
more specifically to its design. It works on the assumption that an innovative policy, as formulated by 
the pioneering state, exhibits specific characteristics that do not change while the policy spreads from 
one jurisdiction to others. Against this backdrop, it asks how such characteristics shape the choices 
made by potential adopters. Depending on the specific set of characteristics that the innovative policy 
entails, are subsequent adoptions more or less likely? Do aspects of the policy design prompt potential 
adopters to factor in the choices made by other governments – rather than responding exclusively to 
domestic forces? And, do characteristics that are integral to the policy design explain to what extent 
certain domestic factors are relevant for the likelihood of policy adoption? 
Specifically, the study looks at four policy design characteristics: designated beneficiaries, degree of 
intervention, complexity and implementation costs. For this set of attributes, various effects on the 
likelihood of policy adoption and on the relevance of particular internal determinants and diffusion 
effects for the likelihood of adoption are conjectured, which are grouped into the following principal 
hypotheses and related sub-hypotheses: 
▪ The Policy Characteristics and Adoption Hypothesis postulates that policy design characteristics 
affect the likelihood that innovative policies are adopted. Concretely, it conjectures that children’s 
policies are more likely to be adopted than policies that target other groups or the population as a 
whole for benefits. Furthermore, it expects policies that entail a low degree of intervention to be 
more likely to be adopted than highly-interventionist ones. Policy innovations that are based on 
simple designs are presumably more likely to be taken up than complex ones and innovative policies 
with low or invisible implementation costs more so than high-cost ones. 
▪ The Policy Characteristics and Internal Determinants Hypothesis expects the relevance of specific 
state characteristics for policy adoption to depend on the design characteristics that the innovative 
policy features. Accordingly, it hypothesises government ideological preferences to be particularly 
relevant for the adoption of highly-interventionist policies, but less so for policies that entail a low 
degree of intervention. Furthermore, it conjectures state policy-making capacity to more strongly 
affect the adoption of complex than of simple policies. The fiscal situation of the state is expected 
to shape decisions on expensive policy innovations, but not on innovative policies with low or 
invisible implementation costs. 
▪ The Policy Characteristics and Diffusion Effects Hypothesis links the former to the relevance of 
interdependent decision making among peer governments (“peer effects”) for policy adoption. It 
suggests previous adoptions of the same policy by peers to hold more weight over the adoption of 
complex than of simple policy innovations. Similarly, it conjectures that peer effects more strongly 
affect the adoption of expensive innovative policies than of policy innovations with low or invisible 
costs. 
3 
As a basis for testing these hypotheses, this study analyses Swiss cantonal policies.1 The Swiss cantons 
lend themselves to studying policy innovation due to their broad jurisdictional and fiscal competencies. 
What is more, Swiss citizens directly elect the members of cantonal governments and also have a direct 
say in cantonal policy making thanks to a wide range of direct-democratic rights. These conditions are 
likely to encourage policy innovation, while the manifold intercantonal networks among policy makers 
and public officials that exist facilitate the exchange of policy ideas and are thus likely to favour the 
diffusion of innovative policies. 
In empirical terms, the analyses focus on cantonal policy making in public health – i.e. in disease 
prevention and health promotion. In line with the Federal Office of Public Health (BAG 2007: 14), 
disease prevention policies are defined as measures that aim at reducing risks for specific diseases, 
while health promotion policies comprise measures designed to strengthen individual or collective 
resources that are important for the preservation and promotion of health, without focussing on a 
particular disease.2 Concretely, policies that aim at tobacco and alcohol prevention, the promotion of 
a healthy nutrition and the prevention of cancer provide the empirical basis for analysing the effects 
of policy attributes. 
Event history analysis is used for that purpose, with the observation period extending from 1993 to 
2013 and data coming from a variety of primary and secondary sources. Due to unforeseen difficulties 
in sampling suitable cantonal disease prevention and health promotion policies, this study cannot 
assess the role of policy design characteristics in innovation decisions as fully as originally intended. 
However, it presents first evidence on the theoretical issues raised above and substantiates its claim 
that policy design characteristics and their impact represent a highly worthwhile avenue for research. 
Outline 
Chapter 2 presents the state of the art in research on policy innovation and diffusion in a federal 
context. Being divided into four subchapters, the first one introduces the core concepts of policy 
innovation and diffusion and outlines the dominant framework of analysis in current scholarship. The 
following subchapters provide a tour d’horizon of research activities since the 1990s, summarise the 
insights from diffusion studies that account for policy attributes and present the findings from diffusion 
research on tobacco prevention policies.3 
Chapter 3 is dedicated to the theoretical argument. It first clarifies the potential links between policy 
characteristics, innovation and diffusion and outlines the conceptual approach. The second subchapter 
presents and substantiates the hypotheses on the effects of policy characteristics on the dynamics of 
policy innovation and diffusion. Chapter 3.3 sets out the specification and operational definitions of 
the policy attributes studied. 
In turning to empirical matters, Chapter 4 portrays public health policy making and implementation in 
Switzerland, before elaborating on the selection of specific policies. Thus, Chapter 4.1 describes the 
                                                          
1 The cantons constitute the second highest state level in Switzerland. They have an intermediate position 
between the federal level (i.e. the Confederation) and the local level (i.e. the municipalities). 
2 For a more detailed definition of disease prevention and health promotion, see the WHO Health Promotion 
Glossary (WHO 1998). In the following chapters, besides “disease prevention” and “health promotion”, the term 
“safety and health” will be used to more clearly differentiate between federal and cantonal competencies in 
public health. Safety and health aims at reducing health hazards that are beyond the control of individuals – 
frequently through regulatory means (BAG 2004: 14). Food, product and environmental safety, occupational 
safety and health as well as the prevention of the transmission of communicable diseases and the management 
of outbreaks of such diseases fall into this domain. In Switzerland, the legislative competencies for safety and 
health largely reside with the Confederation, while the cantons have the main responsibility for all other types 
of public health interventions. 
3 In the other three areas of disease prevention and health promotion covered in this study, i.e. alcohol, healthy 
nutrition and cancer, none or hardly any quantitative studies on policy diffusion exist. 
4 
divisions of competencies and fiscal responsibilities between the Confederation and the cantons and 
the forms of cooperation between the two state levels, points to the significant role of private actors 
in the field and presents the most important institutions of intercantonal exchange and cooperation. 
The following subchapter justifies the choice of cantonal disease prevention and health promotion 
policies as the empirical basis for this study, describes the criteria that guided the selection of policies 
and details the selection procedure as well as the difficulties encountered. Finally, Chapter 4.3 specifies 
the key concepts of “policy adoption” (and “implementation”) and “diffusion” in the context of Swiss 
public health policy making. 
Chapter 5 describes the six policies studied. For each policy, it outlines the following aspects: (1) the 
core content of the policy; (2) the background of policy adoption by the pioneering canton; (3) the 
ensuing pattern of diffusion; (4) variations in policy design across cantons; (5) the general design and 
the characteristics of the policy; (6) the federal and national contexts of cantonal policy adoptions. 
Chapter 6 first presents the method of statistical analysis, i.e. event history analysis, and details the 
modelling choices made. Subsequently, it provides an overview of the variables that figure in the 
various types of event history models estimated as well as the data sources used. Finally, it discusses 
the specification and measurement of internal determinants. A description of data preparation and a 
discussion of data limitations complete this chapter. 
Drawing on single event models, Chapter 7 sets out to explain the adoptions of four policies: ban on 
tobacco billboard advertising, ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents, breast cancer 
screening programmes and restaurant food nutrition labelling.4 After presenting the policy-specific 
results in four individual sub-chapters, Chapter 7.5 summarises the findings across policies. 
Chapter 8 aims at disentangling the impact of the policy design characteristics of interest through the 
estimation of various types of models. The first section discusses the empirical constraints that the 
study faces and outlines the approach to hypothesis testing that it adopts in response to these 
constraints. Chapter 8.2 presents the results of “standardised single event models”. More specifically, 
it models the adoptions of individual policies separately, but uses identical predictors across policies. 
This procedure allows for a comparison of findings across models, thus providing information on the 
second and the third research question raised above. Chapter 8.3 is based on a somewhat different 
approach. Reflecting a multiple events design, the policies of interest are pooled into one model. The 
policy design characteristics of concern are entered as explanatory variables (main effects) and are 
interacted with particular internal determinants and diffusion effects, thus furnishing evidence on all 
three research questions of interest. Chapter 8.4 summarises the results of the statistical analyses. 
Chapter 9 concludes with summarising the evidence that this study provides, before discussing its 
contribution and limitations and suggesting avenues for further research. 
The Appendix provides documentation on relevant cantonal and federal activities.  
Please note that the contents of this study reflect the situation as in 2015, i.e. at the time of its writing.  
                                                          
4 Due to the small number of cantonal adoptions, single event models cannot be estimated on the two alcohol 
sales restrictions that are part of the sample. They are included into the multiple events model in Chapter 8.3, 
though.  
5 
2 State of the Art: Research on Policy Innovation and Diffusion 
This study relates to a large body of research in political science that spans several sub-disciplines, 
including domestic politics (primarily U.S. American politics), comparative politics and international 
relations (Graham et al. 2013). This chapter provides an overview of the state of the art of policy 
diffusion research. The focus rests on research that deals with innovation and diffusion in a federal 
context, but work from the comparative politics and international relations literatures is selectively 
referred to. This chapter pursues three goals: (1) to familiarise the reader with the core concepts of 
the research tradition and the analytical model that is the backbone of current research; (2) to convey 
an idea of the richness of scholarship; and (3) to present pertinent research findings that will be used 
in later chapters for the specification of the models on cantonal policy adoptions. 
Chapter 2 contains four subchapters. The first one introduces the core concepts of policy innovation 
and diffusion and presents Berry and Berry’s unified model (Berry/Berry 1990), which the bulk of 
current scholarship on policy innovation and diffusion in political science is based on. In order to 
illustrate the wealth of research on policy innovation and diffusion in federal states, the second 
subchapter provides a tour d’horizon of research activities since the 1990s, charting developments in 
two areas – the study of dependent variables and of diffusion effects. Chapter 2.3 then summarises 
research on the impact of policy attributes on innovation and diffusion. The last subchapter presents 
insights from diffusion research on antismoking policies, which is the only area of public-health policy-
making that diffusion scholars have extensively studied. 
 The Backbone of Current Research: The Core Concepts of Policy Innovation and 
Diffusion and Berry and Berry’s Unified Model 
Policy innovation and diffusion 
Policy innovation is commonly defined to entail the adoption of any policy that is new to the 
government that introduces it (Berry/Berry 2007: 223). According to this definition, which originates 
in a study by Jack Walker (1969), a policy qualifies as an innovation if it is novel to a particular 
government irrespective of whether, when or how many times that policy has been adopted before 
by other political entities. Policy innovation is thus different from policy invention, i.e. the first 
conception of a unique policy idea (Mohr 1969: 112; Walker 1969: 881). As Berry and Berry (2007: 223; 
original emphasis) succinctly put it, “… a single policy invention can prompt numerous American states 
to innovate, some many years after the others.” 
Policy innovation is also to be distinguished from incremental policy change (cf. Lindblom 1958, 1959). 
While the latter involves the adjustment of existing policies, e.g. the modification of benefit levels of a 
transfer programme, policy innovation leads to the introduction of a new policy (Berry/Berry 2007: 
223). 
With regard to policy diffusion, two different conceptions exist. In the most general sense, we can 
term any pattern of sequential policy adoptions as diffusion (cf. Gray 1973: 1175; Eyestone 1977: 441). 
Diffusion in this sense is synonymous with the dispersion of a policy throughout a political system, be 
it international (e.g. policies spreading from one nation state to others) or national (e.g. policies 
spreading among the constituent states of a federal state). It is mostly early studies on policy diffusion 
(e.g. Walker 1969; Gray 1973) that employ this definition. While exploring a wide variety of aspects, 
these studies share one commonality – they typically treat diffusion as the phenomenon to be 
explained, as the dependent variable (in a broad sense). In Elkins and Simmons’ words, they focus on 
“diffusion-as-outcome” (Elkins/Simmons 2005: 37). 
Recent research, in contrast, is more concerned with explaining governments’ innovation decisions as 
such – rather than the overall pattern of dispersion resulting from these individual decisions. In doing 
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so, it treats diffusion as one specific class of explanatory factors. Scholars in this research strand 
suggest that a government’s decision to adopt an innovation generally is a function of both domestic 
factors (e.g. the need for policy change; political, financial and administrative resources and 
constraints) and interdependent decision making, which factors in the decisions made by earlier 
adopters (Berry/Berry 2007). In deciding about the introduction of an innovative policy, governments 
may have various reasons for paying attention to the policy choices made by their counterparts: they 
might learn from, be socialised by, coerced by or compete with other governments (Braun/Gilardi 
2006; Simmons et al. 2006). As a result, prior policy adoptions may alter the probability that a 
government introduces an innovation. This is what recent scholarship understands by diffusion 
(Elkins/Simmons 2005: 36; Simmons et al. 2006: 787; Braun/Gilardi 2006: 299). Diffusion captures the 
element in domestic policy making that reflects concerns with the decisions made by others – over 
and beyond internal factors that drive policy reform.5 Diffusion thus stands for a certain set of 
independent variables; “diffusion-as-process” (Elkins/Simmons 2005: 37) designates a cause rather 
than an outcome. 
In this study, “diffusion” is used to designate both instances of interdependent decision-making and 
the aggregate pattern of policies spreading across time and space since it is usually clear from the 
context whether the term refers to “diffusion-as-process” or “diffusion-as-outcome”. 
Regardless of the forces at work, policies may spread among jurisdictional units on the same level 
(horizontal diffusion) and/or they may spread bottom-up or top-down between jurisdictional units on 
different levels (vertical diffusion). A policy that spreads directly from one Swiss canton to others is an 
example of horizontal diffusion. In contrast, if a policy is pioneered by, let’s say, the canton of Zurich, 
and then incorporated into federal legislation, with the federal government promoting the adoption 
of that policy by other cantons, this would be an instance of vertical diffusion, combining bottom-up 
and top-down processes. 
The unified model 
During the past 25 years, what Berry and Berry (1990, 2007) term the “unified model” has become the 
norm in research on policy innovation in federal states. In line with the “diffusion-as-process”-
conception, this model, which Berry and Berry first presented in their study on state lottery adoptions 
by the U.S. states (Berry/Berry 1990), includes two main sets of independent variables in explaining 
states’ innovation decisions – internal determinants and diffusion effects.6 
Internal determinants comprise the domestic political, economic and social conditions that affect the 
likelihood of policy adoption. Berry and Berry divide these into three groups (Berry/Berry 1990: 399-
400; 2007: 234-237): conditions that shape the motivation to innovate (MOTIVATIONi,t), such as 
problem severity, ideological preferences of decision makers and proximity of elections; factors that 
reflect the strength of obstacles to innovation (OBSTACLESi,t); and factors that impact on the resources 
to overcome these obstacles (RESOURCESi,t). Resources and obstacles entail both state characteristics 
in the classic sense (e.g. fiscal and government capacity) and domestic conditions that reflect the 
                                                          
5 A pattern of sequential policy adoptions is usually caused by both internal factors and interdependent decision 
making. However, political units may also learn about innovative policies from others, but then decide to adopt 
these for purely domestic reasons (Berry/Berry 2007: 232). Sequential policy adoptions may thus result from 
independent decision making. From the “diffusion-as-outcome” perspective, such instances of adoptions would 
still be considered as “diffusion”. From the point of view of the “diffusion-as-process” strand, however, such 
adoptions present a pattern of policy dispersion that is unrelated to diffusion effects proper. Therefore, Braun 
and Gilardi (2006: 299) use the term “spurious diffusion” for such phenomena. 
6 Both internal determinants and diffusion effects feature prominently in earlier research – as a matter of fact, 
they were spelled out as early as in Walker’s study (1969). Berry and Berry (1990), however, were the first to 
integrate these two categories of explanatory factors into a single theoretical framework that could be tested 
empirically. 
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societal demand for, and opposition to, an innovative policy, e.g. the strength of particular interest 
groups. 
Diffusion effects (EXTERNALi,t) capture the influence that the behaviour of other states exerts on the 
innovation decision of a government. Political science research has identified four foundations of 
interdependent decision making, i.e. four mechanisms of diffusion (cf. Graham et al. 2013: 690). First, 
governments that adopt a new policy face considerable uncertainty as to how well it will address the 
relevant policy issue and what its political repercussions will be. Prior adoptions by other states permit 
decision makers to more reasonably assess the costs and benefits associated with policy innovation 
(Meseguer 2005; Simmons et al. 2006: 795-799). Thus, the search for effective and politically viable 
policy solutions prompts endeavours to take advantage of the experiences of others. Here, innovation 
decisions are interdependent because states learn from each other. 
Governments’ quest for legitimacy and reputational gains may be another force prompting policy 
diffusion (Elkins/Simmons 2005: 39-41; Simmons et al. 2006: 799-801). If an innovative policy finds 
increasing acceptance in a federal system, being adopted by an ever-growing number of states, it might 
come to be seen as a national standard – as the appropriate way of handling a particular policy issue. 
Irrespective of whether decision makers actually favour the innovative policy, they may feel compelled 
to adopt it since falling behind an established practice might put their reputation at risk – both with 
their electorate at home and with their colleagues from other states (cf. Walker 1969: 890-891). This 
diffusion mechanism is termed “socialisation”. 
Further, diffusion effects may also occur because of competition (Simmons et al. 2006: 792-795). The 
introduction of a new policy might produce negative externalities for other governments, which may 
find that they have to adopt a similar policy regardless of their own political preferences. Certain 
economic policies are a case in point: Provided that the constituent units of a federal state enjoy strong 
fiscal and regulatory competencies, they are in a position to compete for mobile capital and tax-payers. 
If a subnational government in a federal system introduces a policy innovation that serves to increase 
the attractiveness of its territory as a business location or place of residence, other states may do the 
same – out of fear that they lose out in the competition for scarce resources otherwise. 
Coercion constitutes the fourth diffusion mechanism (Simmons et al. 2006: 790-791).7 In a federal 
state, governments at lower state levels may be made to adopt a policy innovation by federal 
imposition or inducements. Provided that both the federal government and lower state levels are 
authorised to legislate on a policy issue, the federal government can use its superior competencies to 
mandate states to introduce an innovative policy. If jurisdiction is reserved to the states or the federal 
government does not want to make use of mandates, it may offer financial rewards to the states in 
exchange for adopting the federal level’s preferred policy solution. 
In addition to internal determinants and diffusion effects, the unified model comprises one more group 
of explanatory variables, which represent the relationship between the innovation concerned and 
previous policy choices of the potential adopter (OTHER-POLICIESi,t). Policies adopted before might be 
complementary to, conditions for, or substitutes of the policy of interest and therefore impact on the 
likelihood of policy adoption (Berry/Berry 2007: 238-239). 
As a whole, the unified model has the following form (Berry/Berry 2007: 237): 
ADOPTi,t = f (MOTIVATIONi,t, RESOURCES/OBSTACLESi,t, OTHER-POLICIESi,t, EXTERNALi,t) 
                                                          
7 Some scholars do not regard coercion as a diffusion mechanism (e.g. Elkins/Simmons 2005; Maggetti/Gilardi 
2016). In their view, diffusion is characterised by uncoordinated interdependent decision making. Accordingly, 
neither vertical forms of influence nor horizontal forms of cooperation and joint policy making qualify as diffusion 
(cf. Elkins/Simmons 2005: 35). 
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As many of the independent variables included in the model are susceptible to change over time, the 
correct estimation of their effects requires a longitudinal research design, which reflects when a state 
adopts the policy of interest. Therefore, event history analysis, which models both the occurrence of 
an event and its timing, has become the standard approach to specifying the unified model (cf. Box-
Steffensmeier/Jones 2004: 1). 
More specifically, the above equation breaks the period of observation into discrete time intervals 
(usually years), with the observations being state-years (Berry/Berry 1990: 398). Each state (i) in each 
of the years (t) studied forms one observation. The dependent variable (ADOPTi,t) is the likelihood that 
a state adopts a policy innovation in a given year. While the likelihood of adoption (hazard probability 
in statistical terms) cannot directly be observed, actual adoptions may be used to estimate it. For that 
purpose, the observations are coded 1 in the year of policy adoption and 0 in all previous years. Once 
a state introduces the policy, it drops out of the sample as it is no longer “at risk” of adoption 
(Berry/Berry 1990: 398). 
 Tour d’Horizon: Advances in Research on Policy Innovation and Diffusion in Federal 
States since the 1990s8 
Since its formulation in 1990, numerous scholars have made use of the unified model in order to gain 
a better understanding of the factors that drive state or local innovation choices in diverse policy fields. 
As a result, a myriad of studies exists – Graham et al. (2013: 677) count 189 political science articles in 
American politics for the period 1958 to 2008, with about two thirds of them having been published 
since 1990. And while research on interdependent decision making in a federal context is particularly 
extensive in the U.S., subnational units in other countries, such as the Swiss cantons9, Brazilian cities 
(Borges Sugiyama 2008), English local authorities (Walker et al. 2011), South Korean municipalities 
(Kim 2013) and the German states (Kern et al. 2007), have also been the subject of diffusion research. 
Besides an impressive expansion in terms of policy fields and specific policies studied, research has 
also made significant substantive and methodological advances over the years. In quantitative 
research, most of these advances have taken place within the framework of the unified model. 
Providing a complete overview of policy innovation and diffusion research since the 1990s is beyond 
the scope of this subchapter.10 Rather, the following sections outline the two most important 
developments in empirical research – advances in the study of dependent variables and diffusion 
effects.11 Influential or typical studies are outlined so as to illustrate these advances. 
A wider spectrum of dependent variables 
Berry and Berry’s classic study on U.S. state lotteries (Berry/Berry 1990) centres on policy adoption 
and thus on the decision-making stage of the policy cycle. It uses a dichotomous indicator of policy 
adoption in a given year as the dependent variable. A cursory inspection of the literature shows that a 
substantial share of published work on policy diffusion in federal states similarly focuses on policy 
                                                          
8 There is an extensive body of qualitative research, which mostly adopts a policy transfer perspective (see 
Dolowitz/Marsh 1996), but also entails studies that are framed in policy diffusion terms (e.g. Mossberger 2000; 
Cohen-Vogel/Ingle 2007; Koski 2010; van der Heiden/Strebel 2012). The following account is limited to 
quantitative policy diffusion research. 
9 For policy diffusion research on the Swiss cantons, see: Widmer and Rieder (2003), Schaltegger (2004), Feld 
(2006), Kübler and Widmer (2007), Gilardi and Füglister (2008), Strebel (2011, 2012), Füglister (2012a, 2012b), 
Wasserfallen (2014) and Gilardi and Wasserfallen (2016). 
10 For other reviews, see Berry and Berry (2007), Karch (2007), Graham et al. (2013), and Maggetti and Gilardi 
(2016). 
11 Scholars have also invested a great deal of effort into the study of state characteristics that explain policy 
adoption, which has significantly improved our understanding of the factors that are relevant in different policy 
fields. These advances are not described here. For a literature review up to 2006, see Berry and Berry (2007: 234-
237). Graham et al. (2013: 685-688) also summarise relevant findings. 
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adoption as the phenomenon to be explained. However, as can be seen from Figure 1, the range of 
dependent variables that have been given scholarly attention has significantly broadened since 1990. 
Figure 1: Spectrum of dependent variables 
 
Source: Own classification. 
In Figure 1, seven conceptions of dependent variables (in a broad sense) that correspond to different 
research foci are distinguished. Besides the classic dependent variable of policy adoption12, these 
include the extent of policy adoption, the evolution of policy content, policy emulation, agenda-
setting, the rate of policy diffusion and government innovativeness. 
To begin with, policy diffusion research has recognised that policy adoptions do not need to be singular 
events. Rather, jurisdictions may simultaneously and/or successively adopt multiple variants of the 
same policy or similar types of policies. In order to account for such phenomena, researchers 
substitute the classic binary dependent variable of policy adoption for a count variable that captures 
the number of adoptions in each year. Moreover, this shift in research focus implies that the 
jurisdictions studied do not drop out of the dataset upon first policy adoption, but rather remain in it 
until the end of the observation period. 
Thus, in a study on the determinants of institutional reforms that the Swiss cantons adopted between 
1990 and 2000, Widmer and Rieder (2003) focus on the total number of institutional reforms as well 
as the number of New Public Management reforms. In doing so, they draw on a comprehensive dataset 
on institutional reforms, including reforms that pertain to cantonal administrations, parliaments, 
governments, courts, territories, citizen political rights and intra-cantonal revenue-sharing systems. 
                                                          
12 For a critical discussion of the dependent variable most commonly used in quantitative diffusion research, see 
Strebel and Widmer (2012). The authors argue that the dichotomous measure of policy adoption does not fully 
reflect the nature of diffusion processes – first, because it does not record instances where a policy idea, but not 
the policy itself diffuses, and secondly, because it does not differentiate between instrumental and symbolic 
instances of policy adoption. As an alternative to the binary indicator of policy adoption, Strebel and Widmer 
(2012) suggest a fourfold typology. 
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Boehmke and Witmer (2004), who examine the evolution of agreements between the U.S. states and 
Indian nations on the operation of gaming facilities in the period from 1989 to 2000, also base their 
analyses on a count variable, i.e. the number of agreements concluded in each year. An investigation 
into the factors that influence cantonal support for a federal drug prevention programme by Kübler 
and Widmer (2007) also pursues this line of research. Instead of capturing the adoption of specific 
policies, a count of the number of positive references to the federal programme made in cantonal 
executive, parliamentary and popular decisions on drug policy constitutes the dependent variable. 
Beyond policy adoption, scholars have taken an interest in the evolution of the content of the policies 
that spread. Accordingly, they seek to explain the scope, extensiveness, stringency or similar aspects 
of policies and the evolution of policy content over time, while being particularly interested in the 
interdependent nature of this evolution. Different strands of research share this focus. One of them is 
the literature on competitive pressures in subnational welfare or tax policy making, in particular on 
whether or not interdependent decision-making leads to a race to the bottom.13 In these studies, tax 
or benefit levels are the dependent variables. Another pertinent strand of research is the work on 
policy reinvention. The term “policy reinvention” designates two different phenomena – first, the 
modification of policy content during the diffusion process in the sense that later adopters introduce 
qualitatively different policies from earlier ones (e.g. more stringent policies); and secondly, the intra-
state modification of innovative policies sometime after adoption has occurred (Glick/Hays 1991: 837-
838). Both the study of policy reinvention in the second sense and research on tax and welfare 
competition are effectively associated with a shift in attention from policy innovation to more 
incremental forms of policy change. 
Empirical research on policy reinvention dates back to the early 1990s and includes work on living will 
legislation (Glick/Hays 1991), child abuse reporting, crime victim compensation and public campaign 
funding laws (Hays 1996a, 1996b), abortion regulation (Mooney/Lee 1995) and workplace drug testing 
legislation (Lamothe 2004) in the U.S. states. In general, this body of early research examines both 
across- and within-state reinvention and uses correlational and graphical analyses as a means of 
uncovering the links between timing of adoption and policy content. 
More recent research on policy reinvention, such as the works of Daley and Garand (2005), Kim and 
Jennings (2012) and Karch and Cravens (2014), makes use of statistical methods for cross-sectional 
time-series data that have become available in the meantime. Being interested in the determinants of 
the strength of U.S. state hazard waste site programmes, Daley and Garand (2005) develop an eleven-
point index that compares state programmes to a parallel federal programme and records the number 
of federal programme characteristics that the respective state programme matches. Kim and Jennings 
(2012) look at the evolution of two types of Medicaid managed care programmes between 1991 and 
2000 in the U.S. states, using the percentage of Medicaid beneficiaries covered by each programme 
variant as a measure of programme extensiveness. The inclusion into the model of several variables 
that reflect programme maturity allows for an assessment of the link between timing of innovation 
and programme extensiveness. In addressing the research question of whether the same or different 
factors drive the adoption and the subsequent modification of policies respectively, Karch and Cravens 
(2014) analyse the diffusion and evolution of “Three Strikes and You’re Out Laws” among the U.S. 
states between 1994 and 2012. They estimate separate models for policy adoption and reinvention. A 
dichotomous dependent variable that reflects whether or not a state significantly changed the policy 
in a given year (in the sense of making it less punitive) serves as the dependent variable in the 
reinvention models. 
                                                          
13 Examples of policy diffusion research on tax and welfare competition are Volden (2002), Berry et al. (2003), 
Allard (2004), Bailey and Rom (2004), Berry and Baybeck (2005), Martin (2009), Wasserfallen (2014) and Gilardi 
and Wasserfallen (2016). 
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The third research focus also rests on more incremental forms of policy change, more specifically on 
the adoption or modification of policy components. Yet, instead of recording changes in components 
as such, scholars trace the extent to which a particular state’s policy changes in a given year move its 
policy design closer to those of other states. The degree of convergence of policy designs, i.e. the 
dependent variable, may be termed “emulation” (cf. Volden 2006; Boehmke 2009a; Shipan/Volden 
2014).14 This analytical approach requires a modification of the framework of the unified model in that 
dyad-years replace state-years as observations, with dyads being made up of pairs of states.15 
Developing such a dyadic framework, Volden (2006) studies changes in the Children’s Health Insurance 
Programme as implemented in the U.S. states in the period from 1998 to 2001. In assessing the 
similarity of state programmes, he looks at six dimensions of programme design. The dependent 
variable is coded 1 if most changes that state A (“receiver”) implements in a given year move it closer 
to the programme characteristics of state B (“sender”) and 0 otherwise. 
Subsequent to Volden’s introduction of the dyadic model into the field of American politics, several 
other empirical studies on policy diffusion in federal systems made use of this approach, including 
Füglister (2012a, 2012b) and Shipan and Volden (2014). Building on earlier work by Gilardi and Füglister 
(2008), Füglister (2012a, 2012b) studies the evolution of Swiss cantonal health insurance subsidies 
between 1997 and 2007. Based on a comparison across four dimensions of subsidy policies, cantons 
are recorded as having taken up the policy of another canton if they move towards the latter on at 
least one dimension. Finally, Shipan and Volden (2014) analyse the adoption of 16 elements of laws 
that are to restrict youth access to cigarettes, calculating the number of moves that state A makes 
towards state B as well as the number of moves that it makes away from state B. On this basis, they 
construct two dependent variables – a binary variable that indicates whether state A overall moves 
towards state B and a variable that captures the direction and the extent of movement across the 16 
elements. 
Furthermore, several scholars have moved policy diffusion research from the decision-making stage of 
the policy cycle to the phase of agenda-setting. Instead of, or in addition to, modelling subnational 
policy adoption, they seek to explain the dynamics of policy proposals finding their way onto 
government agendas and pay particular attention to horizontally or vertically interdependent agenda-
setting processes. Studies by Mintrom (1997), Andrews (2000), Karch (2012) and Pacheco and Boushey 
(2014) are examples of this line of research. 
Being motivated by an interest in the influence that policy entrepreneurs exert on agenda-setting and 
decision making, Mintrom (1997) studies the parliamentary consideration and the adoption of school 
choice reforms in the U.S. states between 1987 and 1992. “Consideration”, i.e. the dependent variable 
that taps into agenda-setting, is a binary measure of any specific action that the competent 
parliamentary committee takes on school choice reforms. In his study on U.S. state regulatory reforms 
of the electricity sector between 1993 and 1999, Andrews (2000) analyses, among other dependent 
variables, a specific manifestation of agenda-setting processes, i.e. the inauguration of official studies 
on policy reform. More specifically, he looks at the initiation of the first formal study on pro-market 
reforms of the electricity sector by state public utilities regulatory commissions or by state parliaments. 
The more recent research articles by Karch (2012) and Pacheco and Boushey (2014) focus on bill 
introductions in U.S. state parliaments. Karch (2012), who is interested in the impact of national 
political debates on state agenda-setting, analyses the introduction of embryonic stem cell research 
bills between 1999 and 2008. He models both the probability that a bill is introduced and the number 
of bills introduced. Driven by a research interest in various inter- and intra-governmental influences 
                                                          
14 It is important not to confuse “emulation” in the sense of intended policy convergence with the diffusion 
mechanism of socialisation, which is also sometimes termed “emulation” (e.g. Simmons et al. 2006). 
15 See Gilardi and Füglister (2008) for a practical guide to dyadic event history analysis and Boehmke (2009a) for 
the discussion of a particular concern with the construction of dyadic datasets. 
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on state agenda-setting processes, including national, gubernatorial and neighbouring states’ 
attention to the relevant policy issue, Pacheco and Boushey (2014) study the number of bills on 
tobacco control and vaccine regulation introduced in the U.S. states between 1990 and 2010. 
Finally, there are two strands of research that are different from the research foci outlined above in 
that they study policy innovation and diffusion at highly aggregated levels, based on the analysis of 
large samples of policy innovations. The first one focuses on the temporal pattern of diffusion, 
particularly on the rate at which policies spread. The second one is interested in state innovativeness, 
assuming that some states are inherently more innovative than others. Both strands of research 
connect up to scholarly work that predates the formulation of the unified model and take advantage 
of the fact that more sophisticated statistical methods can nowadays be applied to studying large-scale 
aggregations of policies. 
Being intrigued by the fact that the temporal pattern of diffusion of some policies does not correspond 
to the familiar S-shaped cumulative distribution function16, Nicholson-Crotty (2009) explores the 
impact of two policy attributes, i.e. the salience and the technicality of the policy issue, on the rate of 
diffusion. For that purpose, he draws on a sample of 57 previously studied policies, which spread 
among the U.S. states between 1850 and 2001. The rate of diffusion is measured with a dichotomous 
variable that reflects whether over 50 percent of states adopted the respective policy within the first 
third of the diffusion process. Using a sample of 81 previously studied policies from diverse areas, 
Boushey (2012) applies the insights of punctuated equilibrium theory to explaining temporal variations 
in policy diffusion. He directly models the shape of the cumulative distribution functions, with the 
number of adoptions in each year serving as the dependent variable. 
Regarding state innovativeness, two researchers recently updated Walker’s innovation score for the 
U.S. states (Walker 1969) – Boushey (2010: 99-103) and Boehmke and Skinner (2012). Boushey’s 
innovation index is based on 133 policies; Boehmke and Skinner’s measure of state innovativeness 
draws on 137 policy innovations. Both range from 0 to 1, with larger values reflecting higher levels of 
innovativeness, but differ in the way that they are constructed. After elaborating on the construction 
of these indices, both studies examine variations in state innovativeness over time and explore the 
determinants of innovativeness. 
Study of diffusion channels and mechanisms17 
In explaining the adoption of state lotteries, Berry and Berry (1990) modelled interdependent decision 
making with a neighbour-based diffusion variable. Since then, scholars have significantly extended and 
refined the study of diffusion effects. Broadly speaking, research on how previous policy choices by 
other units shape a government’s innovation decision divides into two strands – the analysis of 
diffusion channels and of diffusion mechanisms. 
Diffusion channels designate the paths along which policies spread; they are a function of the 
communication networks that exist between jurisdictions and the reference groups that potential 
adopters of an innovative policy have (cf. Rogers 2003: 18-20; Berry/Berry 2007: 225). Diffusion 
                                                          
16 When plotting the cumulative number or proportion of adopters against time, an S-shaped curve emerges if a 
few states adopt the policy early in the diffusion process, the number of adopters then steadily rises, before it 
drops off in the final phase. This temporal pattern, which characterises the diffusion of many innovations, has 
been found in diffusion research more generally (Rogers 2003). 
17 For a critical assessment of this body of research, see Volden et al. (2008). The main criticism of the authors is 
that the research designs of most studies do not permit a clear distinction between interdependent policy making 
and instances of spurious diffusion (see also footnote 5). 
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mechanisms encapsulate the rationale for states’ consideration of the behaviour of other jurisdictions 
(Braun/Gilardi 2006: 299). Figure 2 charts diffusion channels and diffusion mechanisms.18 
Prior to fleshing out these diffusion effects and to presenting relevant scholarship, a note on the 
relationship between the two main branches in Figure 2 is due. Diffusion channels and mechanisms 
shed light on different aspects of the same phenomenon. In that sense, channels and mechanisms are 
intrinsically linked – learning, socialisation, competition and coercion unfold through more or less 
institutionalised networks of communication, and conversely, the diffusion of policy innovations 
through national, regional, vertical or isomorphic networks is rooted in particular diffusion 
mechanisms. In other words, channels describe the where and mechanisms the why of diffusion.19 
Figure 2: Diffusion channels and diffusion mechanisms 
 
Source: Own illustration, classifications based on Berry and Berry (2007) and Simmons et al. (2006). 
The distinction between diffusion channels and mechanisms is an analytical division. As such, it is 
helpful in structuring policy innovation and diffusion research and in providing a systematic overview 
                                                          
18 The classification of diffusion channels is based on Berry and Berry (2007). The fifth channel that Berry and 
Berry discuss, i.e. “leader-laggard diffusion”, is not covered here because of the scarcity of relevant empirical 
research. The categorisation of diffusion mechanisms is taken from Simmons et al. (2006), with the second 
mechanism being termed “socialisation” here (instead of “emulation”). While a plethora of terms for describing 
the forces that drive diffusion exist (cf. Graham et al. 2013: 690), several scholars have made the point that these 
descriptions can be subsumed under three or four generic mechanisms (Elkins/Simmons 2005: 38-45; Graham 
et al. 2013: 690-693; Maggetti/Gilardi 2016). 
19 Individual diffusion channels and mechanisms are largely independent of each other. For example, if we look 
at top-down diffusion influences from the federal to state governments, we may come across instances where 
states learn from, are socialized by, or are coerced by the federal government. Coercion is mostly confined to 
the relationship between the federal government and subnational units, though. Since the constituent states in 
a federal system have equal rights, they are generally not subject to coercive pressures from other states. 
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of the literature. But it somewhat simplifies the reality of research. Certainly, some scholars focus on 
particular diffusion channels and other research clearly centres on specific diffusion mechanisms. 
However, many studies broach the issues of diffusion channels and mechanisms in some way – be it 
that particular diffusion mechanisms are specified as the theoretical foundation of the diffusion 
channel of interest (e.g. Tucker et al. 2012); that a particular diffusion channel is identified as the 
location where a specific diffusion mechanism materialises (e.g. Gilardi/Wasserfallen 2016); that 
diffusion mechanisms and channels are simultaneously studied (e.g. Füglister 2012a, 2012b); or that 
diffusion channels are used as a proxy for the diffusion mechanism of interest (e.g. Oakley 2009). 
Moreover, many studies focus on more than one diffusion channel or mechanism. In short, individual 
studies do not always fall neatly into the categories established in Figure 2. In the sections below, 
research contributions are subsumed under the category that they correspond to most closely and, if 
appropriate, may also be referred to more than once. 
As regards diffusion channels, regional, national, vertical and isomorphic forms of interdependent 
policy making can be distuinguished (cf. Berry/ Berry 2007: 226-231). Each of these has been the 
subject of research, with many contributions accounting for more than one channel. 
Regional diffusion effects are certainly the ones most extensively studied. As Berry and Berry (2007: 
228-229) state, two variants of regional models exist – neighbour models and fixed-region models. 
Neighbour-based diffusion posits that the innovation decision of a particular state is related to the 
prior policy choices of the states that it shares a border with. Interdependent decision making is thus 
assumed to be associated with geographic proximity. Generally speaking, the diffusion variables used 
(i.e. the number or proportion of adopters among neighbouring states) absorb such effects without 
revealing the exact nature of communication patterns or diffusion mechanisms at work. 
Neighbour models are prevalent in diffusion research. Here, two examples are provided that haven 
taken the set-up of neighbour-based diffusion studies one step further. In their work on the 
parliamentary attention to, and the adoption of, school choice reforms in the U.S. states, Mintrom and 
Vergari (1998) provide insights on the actual importance of policy networks. Besides the classic 
neighbour-based diffusion effects, they estimate the effect of the use of external policy networks by 
the most important policy entrepreneur in school choice reform in each state. The identification of 
policy entrepreneurs and the measurement of the extent to which the key policy entrepreneur 
networked with external actors in neighbouring and other states are based on a survey among 
educational policy experts in all states. 
Tucker et al. (2012), in turn, do not only demonstrate the existence of interdependent decision making 
among neighbours, but also go to great lengths to specify the forces that drive this diffusion pattern. 
Concretely, they model U.S. state adoptions of a specific type of concealed weapons permit laws 
between 1974 and 2007, with neighbour-based diffusion being one of the key explanatory variables. 
Based on the findings of criminological research, they substantiate why state gun policy making is likely 
to be driven by a concern for the behaviour of neighbouring states. Specifically, they argue that a 
particular state’s adoption of more permissive concealed weapons permit laws prompts criminal 
offenders to shift their activities to surrounding states where their victims are less likely to be armed. 
Hence, neighbouring states that do not allow their citizens to carry concealed weapons run the risk of 
criminal spillover effects. They therefore face a strong incentive to emulate the policy from earlier 
adopters. Besides neighbour-based diffusion, Tucker and his co-authors also account for fixed-region 
diffusion, based on a variable that captures the percentage of adopters in the same census region. 
Similar to neighbour models, fixed-region models hypothesise policies to spread first and foremost 
among geographically proximate subnational units. However, rather than the surrounding states, all 
states in a given region are considered to serve as the reference group of potential adopters. Some 
scholars delineate the regions on the basis of geographic proximity alone, such as the U.S. census 
regions (e.g. Tucker et al. 2012). Other studies focus on regions that are constituted and connected by 
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joint intergovernmental institutions, which facilitate interaction among government officials and may 
provide the basis for the unfolding of diffusion mechanisms such as learning or socialisation. For 
example, Andrews’ (2000) study on electricity industry reforms analyses diffusion effects among the 
North American Electric Reliability Council regions and Daley and Garand (2005) look at regions as 
designated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 
In Switzerland, numerous intercantonal associations of government members, chief public officials and 
technical experts exist, most of which have regional subdivisions (Vatter 2014a: 136-138). Hence, it is 
not surprising that regional diffusion effects figure prominently in diffusion research on the Swiss 
cantons. Thus, Strebel (2011, 2012) models how the share of previous adopters that are members of 
the same regional association of cantonal energy officials impacts on a given canton’s likelihood of 
introducing various energy policy innovations. Being based on a dyadic approach, Füglister (2012a, 
2012b) accounts for fixed-region diffusion effects through a dummy variable that captures joint 
membership of the cantons within a dyad in one of the four regional conferences of public health 
ministers. Gilardi and Wasserfallen (2016) present an interesting case of fixed-region effects in that 
they demonstrate personal income tax rates to be less correlated among cantons that belong to the 
same regional conference of cantonal finance ministers than among other cantons (for the reasons, 
see page 18). 
National diffusion models presume the existence of national communication networks that expose 
state officials to policy ideas from anywhere in the country (over and above geographically proximate 
states) (cf. Berry/Berry 2007: 226). In its simplest form, the specification of national diffusion effects is 
based on a variable that records the number or share of previous adopters nationwide. This 
specification rests on the assumption that states are equally likely to interact with each other and that 
the innovation decision of a potential adopter depends on the number, but not on the characteristics 
of previous adopters (Berry/Berry 2007: 228). 
As Balla (2001) demonstrates, national diffusion models can be modified so as to account for 
differences in interaction and in exposure to stimuli for innovation. His research article centres on the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). The NAIC is an interstate professional 
association that links the insurance regulatory agencies of the U.S. states and that formulates model 
laws and regulations, which are recommended to the states for adoption. In explaining state adoptions 
of a NAIC model act on health maintenance organisations (HMOs), Balla tests the relevance of several 
diffusion variables that pertain to the composition of the NAIC committee that was responsible for 
drafting the HMO model legislation. The diffusion variables he uses capture whether or not the state 
insurance commissioner was a member of the committee in the respective year, in the previous three 
years, or even served as the chair or vice-chair of the committee in the respective year. 
Similar to Balla, Strebel (2011, 2012) analyses what impact the endorsement of intergovernmental 
model regulations has on subnational policy adoptions. He does not focus on the participation, or 
degree of participation, of state officials in particular bodies of the relevant intergovernmental 
organisation, but incorporates into his models a dummy variable for the adoption of model regulations. 
Füglister (2012a, 2012b) also adapts Balla’s work to the Swiss context. Besides accounting for regional 
diffusion, she tests if joint membership of cantonal health ministers in the board of directors of the 
national conference of health ministers increases the likelihood of policy emulation. 
While regional and national diffusion capture phenomena of interdependent policy making among 
jurisdictions on the same state level, vertical diffusion models attend to influences across levels. In 
federal systems, policies may travel upwards, e.g. from cities to states or from states to the federal 
government, as well as downwards from higher to lower state levels. Research on vertical diffusion 
more often deals with top-down than with bottom-up diffusion. 
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Regarding top-down influences from the federal level to the states, scholars have shed light on a range 
of potential factors of influence. These include financial incentives (Allen et al. 2004; Karch 2006; 
Boushey 2012), policy adoption within the federal realm as a way of example-setting (Grossback et al. 
2004), specific statutory provisions that facilitate or impede state policy adoptions (Karch 2006; 
Kim/Jennings 2012), the communication of federal policy preferences (Allen et al. 2004; Kim 2013), 
policy debates (Karch 2012; Pacheco/Boushey 2014; McCann et al. 2015) and stalemate at the federal 
level (Allen et al. 2004).20 In addition, Shipan and Volden (2008) explore the effects of state-level 
influences (specifically of state legislation on the policy issue, including the enactment of pre-emptive 
clauses) on local policy adoptions. 
As regards bottom-up diffusion, Shipan and Volden (2006) study whether local adoptions of 
antismoking policies increase (“snowball effect”) or decrease (“pressure valve effect”) the likelihood 
that state governments adopt such policies. For that purpose, they trace the diffusion of three 
antismoking policies among the U.S. states between 1975 and 2000. Riverstone-Newell (2013), in turn, 
is interested in whether local governments succeed in eliciting policy change at the state level through 
the adoption of bill of rights resolutions, which do not fall under local jurisdiction. 
Finally, isomorphic diffusion assumes that potential adopters look to jurisdictions that are similar in 
terms of relevant characteristics when deciding about policy innovation (Berry/Berry 2007: 230-231). 
Researchers have studied various aspects of similarity between potential and previous adopters, such 
as government ideology, implementation structures, demographics, budgetary situation, problem 
severity, economic structure and language. 
Grossback et al. (2004) emphasise the importance of ideological cues that are inherent in previous 
adoptions. Based on the assumption that potential adopters are uncertain as to where innovative 
policies are located on a liberal-conservative continuum, decision makers are expected to use the 
ideological position of previous adopters as a cue. In order to test this supposition, the authors gauge 
the explanatory power of ideological similarity with regard to U.S. states’ adoptions of lotteries, 
academic bankruptcy laws and sentencing guidelines. In measuring ideological similarity, they 
construct a variable that captures the differences in ideological position between the potential adopter 
and all previous adopters, with the most recent adopter being given the same weight as all other 
adopters. Moreover, for sentencing guidelines, which exist at the federal level and allow for parallel 
federal and state legislation, Grossback and his co-authors model the effect of ideological distance 
between potential state adopters and the federal government. 
Besides ideological diffusion, Strebel (2012) looks at similarities in energy policy implementation 
structures among the Swiss cantons. More specifically, he distinguishes between cantons where the 
responsibility for policy delivery resides with the canton itself and cantons that delegate this task to 
the municipalities. Accordingly, he incorporates a variable that reflects the percentage of previous 
adopters with the same implementation structure into his models on the determinants of cantonal 
adoptions of innovative energy policies. 
Since dyadic approaches to the study of policy diffusion are particularly amenable to the analysis of 
the impact of shared state characteristics (Gilardi/Füglister 2008: 418), several authors in this field 
shed light on isomorphic diffusion processes. In his analysis of policy changes in the Children’s Health 
Insurance Programme, Volden (2006) assesses the effects of political, demographic and budgetary 
similarities among states. As Switzerland is a multilingual country, Kübler and Widmer’s (2007) study 
on cantonal support for federal drug prevention policy and Füglister’s (2012a, 2012b) research on the 
emulation of cantonal health subsidy policies examine shared language as an aspect of similarity. 
Shipan and Volden (2014) account for four aspects of similarity in their explanatory models on the 
adoptions of youth tobacco access provisions: partisan composition of government, government 
                                                          
20 For a more detailed account of this body of research, see Chapter 4.3. 
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ideology, problem severity (i.e. percentage of smokers) and economic structure (i.e. tobacco 
production). 
Apart from uncovering the regional, national, vertical or isomorphic patterns of diffusion, scholars have 
endeavoured to empirically establish the rationales for interdependent decision making, i.e. the 
mechanisms of diffusion (see Chapter 2.1).21 Is it the quest for legitimacy, competitive pressures, the 
search for politically viable and effective policy solutions, coercive influences or some combination of 
these mechanisms that prompt decision makers to take previous policy choices of other jurisdictions 
into account? 
Some scholars have equated evidence on the relevance of particular diffusion channels with the 
operation of specific diffusion mechanisms, such as interpreting regional diffusion patterns as an 
indication of policy learning or socialisation. Instead of insinuating one or another mechanism, other 
research has attempted to explicitly model and test for the operation of diffusion mechanisms (e.g. 
Boehmke/Witmer 2004; Berry/Baybeck 2005; Shipan/Volden 2008). Rather than summarising 
research on diffusion mechanisms in its entirety, the following paragraphs present selected works that 
exemplify recent advances in terms of theoretical reasoning, measurement or research design. 
Regarding learning, recent studies have aimed at substantiating various forms of learning that policy 
makers might engage in, such as learning about the effectiveness of policies or their political viability. 
Starting from the idea that the emulation of successful policies is a clear indication of policy learning, 
Volden (2006), Füglister (2012a, 2012b) and Shipan and Volden (2014), have used measures of policy 
success, which reflect to what extent states accomplish an intended policy outcome, in order to detect 
if policy learning takes place. For instance, in their study on the adoption of youth access laws, Shipan 
and Volden (2014) use two indicators, with lower values indicating more effective policies: the non-
compliance rate in tobacco test purchases (i.e. the share of minors able to buy cigarettes) and the 
smoking prevalence among young people. Based on the assumption that the scores that states attain 
on such variables are related to the policy mix that they implement, the construction of measures of 
policy success for each state and each year and the calculation of relative measures of success for each 
dyad of states provide the basis for examining if more successful policy profiles are more likely to be 
emulated than less successful ones. 
Seljan and Weller (2011) pursue a somewhat different research interest, studying processes of direct-
democratic agenda-setting as the basis for discriminating between learning about policy outcomes 
and about the political viability of policies, respectively. They argue that proposals (initiatives, 
referenda and constitutional amendments) rejected at the ballot box convey information about the 
support for the policies voted on, but not about their effectiveness. In contrast, proposals that are 
passed and hence implemented entail information on both political viability and policy effectiveness. 
Thus, studying the effects that previous rejections of proposals in other jurisdictions – as compared to 
previous endorsements – have on the likelihood of proposals being made in a given state permits a 
better understanding of what type of information diffuses. Seljan and Weller apply this research 
strategy to proposals on tax- and expenditure limits made in the U.S. states between 1970 and 2006. 
In recent years, scholars interested in competition as the force behind policy diffusion have started to 
devise more sophisticated measures of competitive pressures than previous scholarship.22 Berry and 
Baybeck (2005), e.g., use geographic information systems data in measuring the size and location of 
populations that are of concern to decision makers in terms of state competitiveness. As regards the 
                                                          
21 For a meta-analysis of the existing body of empirical research on diffusion mechanisms, see Maggetti and 
Gilardi (2016). The authors point to problems in construct validity, which at present compromise the findings of 
many studies. 
22 Scholars used to employ average benefit or tax levels among neighbouring states as a measure of competitive 
pressures (e.g. Berry et al. 2003; Allard 2004). They thus assumed that states compete with their direct 
neighbours only and that neighbouring states exert even pressures on a given state. 
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first policy that they study, the adoption of lotteries, the population of concern is citizens who might 
buy lottery tickets in neighbouring states and thus contribute to the revenues of these states (rather 
than the revenues of their home state). Accordingly, the authors construct a measure that reflects the 
number of adults who live within reach of lotteries located in neighbouring states, the distance 
between each person’s residence and the nearest lottery in a neighbouring state (being inversely 
factored in) and, as the basis for standardisation, the state’s total adult population. As regards welfare 
benefits, the second policy studied, decision makers are expected to be concerned about poor 
residents of neighbouring states who might relocate to the respective state if it provides higher welfare 
benefits than the residents’ home state and other surrounding states. A variable that reflects the 
number of poor people in neighbouring states, the distances of their residences to the closest 
attractive location in the respective state, the differences in welfare benefit levels and, for the 
purposes of standardisation, the size of the state’s own poor population is created. In explaining state 
lottery adoptions and the evolution of welfare benefits, Berry and Baybeck use the spatial lag 
variables23 thus created both as a substitute for, and in addition to, the classic neighbour-based 
diffusion variable. 
As another example, in his study on contextual variation in cantonal competition for high-income tax 
payers in Switzerland, Wasserfallen (2014) assumes competitive pressures to be negatively related to 
the distances between cantons (as well as positively related to the vicinity of a metropolis, see page 
19). Put differently, cantonal governments are expected to consider those cantons as their strongest 
competitors that residents of the own canton can reach the fastest. So as to capture competitive 
pressures as accurately as possible, he uses data on travel times between more than 3000 locations 
scattered across the 26 cantons, which serve as the basis for calculating the average travel time 
between each pair of cantons. For each canton and each year, the current tax rates of all other cantons 
are weighted with the inverse of the average travel time. The resultant spatial lag variable is used to 
estimate the extent of interdependent decision making on personal income taxes among the Swiss 
cantons between 1990 and 2009. 
As an example of a recent study on socialisation as a diffusion mechanism, Gilardi and Wasserfallen 
(2016) develop and test an argument according to which socialisation may reduce tax competition. 
More specifically, they argue that the regular exchange among Swiss cantonal finance ministers within 
regional intergovernmental organisations promotes the emergence of norms about what constitutes 
the limits of acceptable tax competition. As a consequence, the authors expect tax competition to be 
weaker among cantons that belong to the same regional association than among cantons from 
different regions. As a test of this hypothesis, Gilardi and Wasserfallen estimate the effects of spatial 
lags that reflect the membership of cantons in the same regional conference as opposed to them being 
members of different conferences. While the authors do not measure socialisation directly, they 
substantiate the diffusion mechanism presumed to be at work through information gleaned from 
interviews with cantonal finance ministers. Empirically, their study is based on data on taxation levels 
for 15 income categories between 1990 and 2007. 
With regard to coercive pressures, Shipan and Volden (2008) study an instance of the most explicit 
forms of such pressures, namely the pre-emption of policy innovation. In their article on the diffusion 
of local smoking restrictions and laws that restrict youth access to cigarettes, they account for the fact 
that some U.S. states adopt antismoking legislation that prohibits city-level governments from 
enacting own restrictions. The authors expect that such pre-emptive clauses lower the likelihood that 
large cities adopt antismoking policies. 
                                                          
23 “Spatial lags” is a term from spatial econometric analysis. It captures the weighted average of the values of the 
dependent variable of interest (e.g. policy adoption, benefit levels) among other units (e.g. neighbouring states, 
states in the same region, similar states). Thus, most diffusion variables are spatial lags. 
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More often, scholars study the impact of somewhat milder forms of coercive pressures and focus on 
pressures that intend to encourage (rather than discourage) the adoption of particular policies. In the 
context of the U.S. states, this kind of research centres on federal grant conditions that tie state 
eligibility for earmarked federal funds to some particular state action. For example, in explaining the 
adoption of truth-in-sentencing laws by the U.S. states, Allen et al. (2004) assess the impact of a federal 
grant programme, which conditions the receipt of federal funding for the building and extension of 
correctional facilities on the requirement that states ensure that violent offenders serve no less than 
85 percent of their sentences. 
Thus far, this presentation of research has centred on the independent effects of various diffusion 
channels and mechanisms on policy innovation or on more incremental forms of policy change. 
Besides independent effects, scholars have recently taken an interest in conditional forms of 
interdependent decision making. Such research does not only establish whether the previous policy 
choices of other governments shape policy change in a given state, but also seeks to uncover the 
factors that condition to what extent interdependent decision making occurs. Below, three examples 
of such scholarly work are provided. The first one, McCann et al. (2015), investigates into the 
conditional nature of vertical diffusion, i.e. a particular diffusion channel. The other two examples, 
Martin (2009) and Wasserfallen (2014), tackle the conditionality of competition, i.e. of a particular 
diffusion mechanism. In all three cases, interdependent decision making is contingent upon 
characteristics of the potential adopters of the policies.24 
In their study on state-level adoptions of smoking restrictions in government buildings and in 
restaurants, McCann et al. (2015) analyse whether federal government attention to a policy issue 
increases or decreases the likelihood of state action.25 The authors conjecture that the impact of top-
down influences is contingent upon two adopter characteristics: the degree of professionalism of state 
legislatures and the strength of health interest groups. Specifically, the authors expect that national 
agenda-setting activities increase the likelihood of policy adoption for states with highly professional 
legislatures and strong health organisation lobbies, but decrease it for states where legislative 
professionalism is low and health advocates are weak. 
Martin (2009) is intrigued by the stark differences in levels of cigarette taxation among the U.S. states. 
He starts from the observation that many U.S. states have made use, often repeatedly so, of cigarette 
tax increases as a means of reducing smoking and of consolidating states budgets. In explaining 
differences in state behaviour, he conjectures that the interplay between government ideology and 
tax environment accounts for different levels in taxation. Concretely, the author presumes that only 
left-wing governments regard cigarette taxes as an appropriate means of attaining health and fiscal 
goals. Moreover, since smokers are likely to purchase cigarettes in proximate states if substantial tax 
and thus price differences exist, Martin expects left-wing governments to pass tax increases only if the 
surrounding states have high cigarette taxes. Thus, competitive pressures are expected to condition 
the effects of government ideology (and vice versa). In an analysis of the evolution of cigarette taxes 
among the U.S. states between 1971 and 2006, the presumed conditional nature of interdependent 
policy making on cigarette taxes is tested on the basis of interaction effects that are computed for 
government ideology and three specifications of the diffusion variable of interest (average tax levels 
of neighbouring states, tax levels of neighbouring states weighted according to length of joint borders, 
tax level in the neighbouring state with the lowest tax level). 
As hinted to above, Wasserfallen’s (2014) study on personal income taxes also addresses the issue of 
conditionality in interdependent decision making. More specifically, the author hypothesises that 
subnational units are the more exposed to tax competition, the closer they are located to a metropolis. 
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This is presumably so because subnational units in the vicinity of large cities, which offer 
comprehensive educational, cultural, health and leisure-time facilities, are in a position to attract high-
income tax payers if they charge lower income taxes than the close-by metropolis. Based on the 
assumption that this population group is both highly concerned about differences in tax rates and very 
mobile, subnational units with a high share of affluent residents should be particularly responsive to 
tax changes in surrounding units for the fear of losing this important tax base. In order to test this 
hypothesis, Wasserfallen creates a variable that reflects the degree to which a canton benefits from 
the provision of public goods by the closest metropolis. This spillover variable is derived from 
multiplying metropolitan spending on cultural, educational, health and leisure-time services with the 
inverse of the distance between the respective canton and the metropolis. In a multilevel model, 
Wasserfallen tests the separate effects of the spatial lag variable (see page 18) and the spillover 
variable as well as the interaction between the spatial lag and the spillover variables. 
Before turning to the study of policy attributes in innovation and diffusion research, a final reference 
is warranted, namely to an article by Pacheco (2012). This is because the author provides evidence of 
a force behind policy diffusion that thus far has been hardly discussed in the literature. Specifically, 
Pacheco shows that the adoption of smoking restrictions in restaurants in a given state leads to 
increased public support for that policy in neighbouring states. According to her findings, it is this 
change in public opinion in favour of a particular policy (measured on the basis of survey data) that 
prompts decision makers in neighbouring states to pass the same type of policy. In her models, 
measures of policy learning and competition turn insignificant once a measure of public support for 
the policy is included. That is why Pacheco argues to have found evidence of a different mechanism of 
diffusion, which she calls “social contagion”. While it is debatable whether social contagion truly 
constitutes a diffusion mechanism in its own right or can be subsumed under an already existing 
mechanism, a stronger focus on the societal forces behind diffusion mechanisms seems a promising 
avenue of further research. 
 Policy Characteristics and Types in Empirical Innovation and Diffusion Research26 
As the preceding subchapter has shown, diffusion research has made tremendous progress since the 
formulation of the unified model in 1990. Compared to these advances, the study of what difference 
policy attributes make for the processes of policy innovation and diffusion has been given relatively 
little scholarly attention. Nonetheless, over the past years, a few studies have begun to disentangle 
the effects of particular policy attributes or configurations of policy attributes (i.e. policy types) on 
innovation and diffusion. Below, the findings of each study are detailed. 
Mooney and Lee (1995) study what difference it makes for innovation and diffusion if the issue that 
the policy deals with is a moral rather than an economic one. Defining morality policies as all those 
policies that regulate social norms or that for other reasons provoke strong moral reactions, they 
highlight the larger potential for political conflict inherent in such policies. Morality policies, they point 
out, elicit debates on first principles, on right and wrong, virtue and sin, and thus do not lend 
themselves to compromise, whereas some middle ground can more easily be achieved when economic 
interests are at stake. Moreover, morality issues tend to be highly salient and low in technical 
complexity. Mooney and Lee argue that morality policies should produce patterns of policy adoption 
among the American states that are clearly distinct from those of other policies, provided that Lowi is 
right in that policy determines politics.27 As a test of this supposition, they study various aspects of 
policy innovation and diffusion for one particular morality policy, i.e. abortion regulation reforms. 
Using a single-innovation design, the authors contrast their findings with the evidence of previous 
diffusion research on economic policies so as to be able to answer their research question. They find 
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innovation and diffusion, whether in subnational or national policy making. 
27 This refers to Lowi’s work on policy typologies (Lowi 1964, 1972). 
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that with regard to most aspects of policy diffusion, including the geographical clustering of policy 
adoptions, the speed of diffusion and the expansion of the scope of the policy in the course of diffusion, 
abortion regulation behaves exactly as other policies do. However, the authors discover that the 
morality policy studied does not diffuse as widely as economic policies tend to do, translating into a 
truncation of the cumulative S-curve. Furthermore, they observe that the nature of internal 
determinants that influence state policy adoptions might differ in morality politics. At least with regard 
to abortion regulation, public opinion, interest group strength and electoral security hold decisive sway 
over policy adoption, whereas socio-economic variables prove inconsequential.28 
Brooks (2007) focuses on policy characteristics with a view to determining the relative importance of 
diffusion effects for domestic policy choices. Taking structural pension reforms as the empirical basis, 
she contrasts the spreading of two different reform options that aim at mitigating the increase in 
pension expenditure associated with demographic ageing. Both types of reforms rely on the defined-
contribution principle, stipulating a fixed amount of pension contributions that workers have to pay 
into individual retirement accounts. Thus, both alternatives do away with the defined-benefit logic of 
classic social insurance pension schemes and shift income and longevity risks from the state to the 
individual insured. The first type of structural pension reform, the funded defined-contribution (FDC) 
model, entrusts private pension funds with the management of pension accounts. With the FDC-model 
being fully funded, the level of pension benefits is entirely determined by the sum of individual savings 
and the return on the investment of these savings in the financial market. In the notional defined-
contribution (NDC) model, the second type of structural pension reform, individual pension accounts 
are also established. However, the state is in charge of administration of these accounts, defines the 
interest rate that is applied to pension savings and finances pension benefits on a pay-as-you-go basis. 
Brooks argues that the two reform options differ significantly with regard to sunk costs. For various 
reasons, FDC-reforms are associated with high political and financial costs and are almost impossible 
to reverse: Pension privatisation is a highly visible type of reform and tends to evoke strong political 
protest from those to lose from the reform; the shift to individual pension accounts generates a 
funding gap for existing pension benefits as contributors no longer pay into the old scheme; and the 
establishment of private retirement accounts creates new stakeholders (i.e. the managers of private 
pension funds and the owners of pension accounts), making a later reversal of the reform highly costly 
in political terms. NDC-reforms, Brooks explicates, also involve considerable political and financial 
costs, but much less so than FDC-reforms. With the pension scheme remaining under state control, 
the cost-saving nature of these reforms is far less visible and policy makers are in a position to adjust 
the scheme if required for defusing political conflict. Brooks’ central hypothesis is that the higher the 
sunk costs associated with adopting a particular policy, the more importantly previous policy choices 
by other governments feature in domestic decision making. Accordingly, she expects prior policy 
adoptions to weigh more heavily in decisions to introduce FDC- than NDC-reforms. She tests this 
supposition based on a sample of 71 countries, using a competing risks model for the adoption of 
either FDC- or NDC-pension reforms and including the proportion of peers that have adopted the 
respective reform previously as her main explanatory variable. Peers are defined in socio-cultural 
terms, with Latin America, Spain and Portugal building one reference group, the post-communist 
Eastern and Central European countries another one, and all remaining OECD countries a third group. 
Brooks’ findings reveal that, overall, peer effects are no more important in FDC- than in NDC-reforms. 
However, she finds evidence of conditional diffusion effects: Lower-income countries as well as Latin 
American and Eastern European countries indeed pay attention to the prior policy choices of their 
peers when adopting FDC-reforms, while there are no such diffusion effects for NDC-reforms. 
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22 
Nicholson-Crotty (2009) observes two different temporal patterns of policy diffusion – the gradual 
spreading of policies that manifests in the familiar S-shaped cumulative frequency function and a 
“plateau pattern” produced by policies that spread rapidly at first, before quickly levelling off. He 
conjectures that the first pattern may well reflect policy learning, whereas the latter is more likely to 
result from a situation where policy makers forego policy learning for the benefit of short-term 
electoral gains, which require rapid action rather than the careful analysis of policy effects. 
Given this distinction, Nicholson-Crotty seeks to spell out for which policies learning matters. In 
drawing on Gormley’s (1986) work on regulatory policy making, he identifies salience and technical 
complexity as the policy attributes that condition the nature of policy making and hence the speed of 
diffusion. He suggests that high-salience policies prompt decision makers to take rapid action, thus 
diminishing the importance of learning and producing a pattern of rapid diffusion. In contrast, he 
expects learning to feature the more strongly in adoption decisions, the more technically complex a 
policy is. Technical complexity thus causes policy diffusion to slow down. In terms of specification and 
measurement, Nicholson-Crotty defines salient policies as policies that many citizens know and care 
about, using the number of articles on the policy or the relevant issue area that are published each 
year in the New York Times as an indicator. Complexity, in turn, is conceptualised in terms of the need 
for technical expertise in linking solutions to policy problems. As an operational definition, he uses a 
dichotomous variable that is coded 1 if the policy pertains to the regulation of energy, the 
environment, healthcare, taxation or finances and 0 otherwise. A secondary analysis of 57 previously 
studied policies supports his expectations about the relationship between salience and technical 
complexity and the rates at which policies diffuse. 
Boushey (2010: 62-91) is similarly intrigued by the sharp variations in diffusion dynamics among 
policies. Like Nicholson-Crotty, he associates patterns of gradual diffusion with policy learning. In 
accounting for instances of policy diffusion that clearly diverge from this pattern, Boushey refers to 
the insights of policy equilibrium theory, which emphasises that surges in public attention devoted to 
some policy problem and the ensuing move of the issue from the confines of the relevant political 
subsystem onto the agenda of the broader political system cause policy outbreaks. Such outbreaks 
produce patterns of discontinuous and rapid policy diffusion, he argues. Concerning the effects of 
policy attributes on the dynamics of policy diffusion, Boushey postulates that five attributes impact on 
the pattern and rate of diffusion: issue complexity, salience, fragility,29 type of target group and 
programme costs. 
Specifically, he expects complex policies, costly policies and policies associated with high issue fragility 
to diffuse slowly and salient policies to spread rapidly. Instead of analysing the effects of the five 
attributes separately, he classifies the 72 policies studied into three groups, which represent different 
configurations of these attributes. Economic, environmental and professional regulatory policies, 
which constitute the first category, combine a low level of salience, a high degree of complexity, high 
implementation costs and a high level of issue fragility. According to Boushey, the diffusion of these 
policies should quite closely match an S-shaped cumulative normal curve, taken as indicative of gradual 
policy learning. Social regulatory (i.e. morality) policies, in contrast, are characterised by low technical 
complexity and high issue salience. Boushey argues that this combination of policy attributes should 
accelerate policy diffusion. Similarly, governance policies, i.e. policies that modify the functioning of 
the political system, are presumed to be highly salient and relatively simple. Since governance policies 
usually spread through direct-democratic institutions and incite mass citizen participation in policy 
making, he suspects that governance policies spread even faster than social regulatory policies.30 As a 
                                                          
29 “Issue fragility” denotes the level of organised resistance by societal groups that a policy provokes (Savage 
1985: 117). 
30 Boushey also expects the number of adopters of social regulatory and governance policies to be more limited 
than that of other regulatory policies. In the case of morality policies, the conflict over moral values is likely to 
limit the total number of adopters. For governance policies, the ceiling effect may arise from the importance of 
23 
way of testing for the impact of target groups and the associated levels of issue fragility, Boushey 
distinguishes two further subsamples of policies: child protection policies and professional licencing 
policies. Due to their high salience and the lack of organised opposition, child protection policies are 
selected as prime candidates for swift diffusion. Licencing policies, which tend to be complex, low in 
salience and unpopular with the groups regulated, should diffuse incrementally only. 
In his analyses, he compares the aggregate diffusion curves of each class of policies with a simulated 
normal distribution curve of the same mean and variance. In line with his hypotheses, Boushey finds 
that governance policies deviate the most strongly from the simulated curve and exhibit the fastest 
pace of diffusion, closely followed by social regulatory policies. Economic, professional and 
environmental regulatory policies are found to spread more slowly than policies in the other two 
categories, but they deviate from the simulated curve more strongly than expected, exhibiting a faster 
than expected take-up pattern early in the diffusion process. The rapid take-up of children’s policies 
and the slow spreading of licencing policies attest to the relevance of the type of target group and 
issue fragility, with licencing policies closely following the simulated cumulative distribution function. 
Finally, Makse and Volden (2011) assess the impact of policy attributes on the likelihood of adoption. 
More specifically, they use the typology of innovation attributes that Rogers (2003) devised in his 
eminent study on the diffusion of innovations, i.e. relative advantage, complexity, compatibility, 
observability and trialability. For the purposes of exploring the impact of these generic attributes on 
innovation choices in criminal justice policy making, Makse and Volden define relative advantage as 
the extent to which policy makers perceive a policy as enhancing the effectiveness of the criminal 
justice system. Complexity is specified as a function of the degree to which the goals and likely 
outcomes of a particular policy are clear to policy makers at the time of considering its adoption and 
the level of difficulty associated with translating the policy idea into legislation. Compatibility captures 
the extent to which the passage of the specific policy requires changes in other areas of state 
legislation. Observability is defined as the extent to which legislators in neighbouring states can 
observe the results of the policy, while trialability reflects the degree to which decision makers might 
regard policy implementation on a trial basis as useful. 
In order to measure these attributes, the authors carried out a survey among criminal justice experts 
and asked respondents to rate the policies on each of the above dimensions on a five-point scale. For 
the analyses, they dichotomise the attributes, though. Following Rogers, Makse and Volden expect 
relative advantage, observability, compatibility and trialability to be positively associated with the 
likelihood of policy adoption and complexity to be negatively related to it (which is, in the authors’ 
terms, the “policy attributes hypothesis”). Moreover, Makse and Volden conjecture that some of the 
policy attributes enhance diffusion. They expect policies with a high level of relative advantage, 
compatibility and observability to encourage neighbour-based diffusion (“enhanced spatial diffusion 
hypothesis”) and policy learning (“enhanced learning hypothesis”). For complexity and trialability, they 
expect the opposite effects, i.e. they hypothesise that high levels of complexity and of trialability 
diminish the relevance of neighbour-based diffusion (“diminished spatial diffusion hypothesis”) and of 
learning as a diffusion mechanism (“diminished learning hypothesis”). In testing these hypotheses, the 
authors estimate event history models on pooled data on the adoption of 27 criminal justice policies 
for the period from 1973 to 2002, with policy-state-years constituting the observations (see Chapter 
6.1). So as to assess the hypotheses on the conditional nature of neighbour-based diffusion and policy 
learning, Makse and Volden use a split-sample method that contrasts policies with low and high values 
on each of the attributes. Their results confirm the policy attributes hypothesis, but are mixed as 
regards the conditional hypotheses. 
                                                          
direct-democratic channels of diffusion, since not all U.S. states have direct democracy. He does not test these 
suppositions, though. 
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In summary, we find that existing studies shed light on the effects that policy attributes have on various 
phenomena, including the speed of diffusion (Mooney/Lee 1995; Nicholson-Crotty 2009; Boushey 
2010), the nature of policy reinvention (Mooney/Lee 1995), the internal determinants that drive 
policy adoption (Mooney/Lee 1995), the weight of particular diffusion effects (Brooks 2007; 
Makse/Volden 2011) and the likelihood of policy adoption (Makse/Volden 2011). In terms of study 
designs, Mooney and Lee (1995) examine a single policy innovation, Brooks (2007) looks at two 
variants of a particular innovation, while Nicholson-Crotty (2009), Boushey (2010) and Makse and 
Volden (2011) use multiple-innovations designs, examining between 27 and 72 policies. Furthermore, 
the studies conceptualise policy characteristics somewhat differently. Some focus on distinct policy 
attributes, others on policy types, which embody certain configurations of attributes. Thus, sunk costs 
(Brooks 2007), relative advantage, complexity, compatibility, observability and trialability 
(Makse/Volden 2011) and salience and complexity (Nicholson-Crotty 2009) represent distinct 
attributes, while the distinction between morality and other policies (Mooney/Lee 1995) and the 
classification into social regulatory, governance and state regulatory policies (Boushey 2010) capture 
policy types. Moreover, some scholars frame policy characteristics in terms of the issue that a policy 
addresses, others in terms of the solution that it entails. The works by Mooney and Lee (1995) and 
Nicholson-Crotty (2009) exemplify the first conception; the studies by Brooks (2007) and Makse and 
Volden (2011) are based on the second understanding. Boushey (2010) combines the two conceptions. 
 Tobacco Control Policies: What Insights from Policy Innovation and Diffusion 
Research?31 
Synopsis 
Based on a search in literature databases, eight studies were identified that look at the adoption and 
diffusion of tobacco control policies. Table 1 provides a short synopsis of these works, outlining the 
research interest behind each study, the policies analysed and the research designs used. As becomes 
evident from Table 1, most studies use antismoking policies as the empirical basis for pursuing a more 
general theoretical research interest. Thus, Shipan and Volden (2006) are concerned with the nature 
of bottom-up processes of policy diffusion, whereas McCann et al. (2015) are driven by an interest in 
the impact of federal policy debates on state policy making, i.e. in top-down influences. Shipan and 
Volden (2008) aim at demonstrating ways of disentangling different diffusion mechanisms in empirical 
research. In later work, Shipan and Volden (2014) seek to shed light on the conditional nature of one 
particular diffusion mechanism, examining how learning from successful policies in other states is 
contingent upon political and policy expertise. Pacheco’s (2012) motivation for the analysis of 
antismoking policies is to substantiate a mechanism of diffusion different from those discussed in the 
literature, which she calls “social contagion” (see page 20). Pacheco and Boushey’s joint article (2014) 
is concerned with assessing the relative importance of various intergovernmental influences for state 
agenda-setting. Two of the studies reflect first and foremost a substantive interest in tobacco control 
policies, though: Studlar et al.’s (2011) analysis of the determinants of the comprehensiveness of the 
tobacco control policies that exist in the EU-15-member states and Toshkov’s study (2013) on the 
timing and strictness of smoking restrictions in bars and restaurants in a larger number of European 
countries. 
Table 1 also shows that almost all studies examine one or a small number of related antismoking 
policies. Studlar et al.’s (2011) contribution on the comprehensiveness of tobacco control policy is an 
exception, being based on 16 policies from three areas – advertising, promotion and sponsorship 
restrictions; smoking restrictions in public places; and public education measures. Shipan and Volden’s 
                                                          
31 This section reviews quantitative diffusion studies on antismoking policies, with the exception of cigarette 
taxation (e.g. Fredriksson/Mamun 2008; Martin 2009; Esteller-Moré/Rizzo 2014; Golden et al. 2014). 
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(2014) analysis of youth access laws constitutes a special case inasmuch as the authors use particularly 
fine-grained data on the components of such laws. 
Among the various types of tobacco control policies, smoking restrictions in restaurants receive the 
widest empirical scrutiny, followed by youth access laws and smoking restrictions in government 
buildings. While Studlar et al.’s (2011) index covers restrictions on advertising, promotion and 
sponsorship as well as public education measures, these policies do not seem to have been the subject 
of single-policy studies. 
Regarding the jurisdictions studied, the lion’s share of research work centres on the U.S. states. One 
study analyses local policy making in the U.S. and two studies focus on policies adopted by European 
countries. 
In terms of the dependent variables studied, four of the research contributions seek to explain policy 
adoption. Toshkov (2013) uses the date of policy enactment rather than the date of adoption. Shipan 
and Volden (2014) look at policy emulation, i.e. at whether and to what degree state youth access laws 
become more similar (see Chapter 2.2). Being interested in agenda setting, Pacheco and Boushey 
(2014) use the number of tobacco-related bill introductions as the dependent variable. Studlar et al. 
(2011), in turn, model the comprehensiveness of tobacco control policy, based on a scale that ranges 
from 0 to 34. The scale is constructed by way of counting the weighted number of antismoking policies 
that are in force in the respective country. Specifically, each restriction on tobacco advertising, 
promotion, sponsorship as well as smoking is weighted with 1, while each ban on these activities is 
weighted with 2. Public education measures are mostly coded 2 if present and 0 if absent. Besides 
policy enactment, Toshkov (2013) studies policy stringency, characterising smoking bans in bars and 
restaurants as either non-existent, lax, partial or full. 
What can we learn from these studies on the determinants of the adoption, enactment, emulation and 
comprehensiveness of, and the level of parliamentary decision-making on, tobacco control policies? In 
the following sections, the most relevant findings are reported. 
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Table 1: Policy innovation and diffusion research on tobacco control policies 
Study Research interest Policies studied Dependent variable(s), units of analysis, 
observation period, method of analysis 
Shipan and Volden 
(2006) 
Bottom-up diffusion from local to state level – 
“snowball effect” or “pressure valve effect”? 
 
▪ Smoking restrictions in government 
buildings 
▪ Smoking restrictions in restaurants 
▪ Out-of-pack sales restrictions 
▪ Policy adoption 
▪ U.S. states 
▪ 1975-2000 
▪ Monadic event history analysis 
Shipan and Volden 
(2008) 
Testing various mechanisms of policy 
diffusion – learning, competition among near 
cities, imitation of larger cities, coercion by 
state government 
▪ Smoking restrictions in government 
buildings 
▪ Smoking restrictions in restaurants 
▪ Youth access laws 
▪ Policy adoption 
▪ Large U.S. cities 
▪ 1975-2000 
▪ Monadic event history analysis 
Studlar et al. (2011) Impact of different sets of explanatory 
variables (socioeconomic modernisation, 
interest group structures, institutional 
structures, government ideology, vertical EU-
member-state diffusion) on 
comprehensiveness of tobacco control policy 
▪ Six advertising, promotion and 
sponsorship restrictions: print advertising, 
television advertising, sponsorship, point-
of-sale advertising, minimum age for 
purchase, minimum pack size 
▪ Five smoking restrictions in public places: 
airlines, workplaces, government 
facilities, restaurants, bars 
▪ Five public education measures: major 
government reports, strategic plan, 
health warning labels, media campaign, 
cessation services 
▪ Policy comprehensiveness 
▪ EU-15-member states 
▪ 1986-2007 
▪ Pooled cross-sectional time-series 
analysis 
Pacheco (2012) Interdependence of public support for policy 
as an alternative force behind diffusion 
among neighbouring states 
▪ Smoking restrictions in restaurants 
 
▪ Policy adoption 
▪ U.S. states 
▪ 1990-2007 
▪ Monadic event history analysis 
Toshkov (2013) Determinants of timing of enactment and 
strictness of smoking restrictions, in particular 
impact of various measures of government 
ideology 
▪ Smoking restrictions in bars and 
restaurants 
 
▪ Policy enactment; policy strictness 
▪ 29 European countries 
▪ 2003-2011 
▪ Monadic event history analysis; cross-
sectional analysis 
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Table 1: Policy innovation and diffusion research on tobacco control policies (continued) 
Study Research interest Policies studied Dependent variable(s), units of analysis, 
observation period, method of analysis 
Shipan and Volden 
(2014) 
Learning from policy success – contingency of 
learning on political expertise (legislative 
professionalism) and policy expertise (local 
policy experimentation) 
▪ 16 components of youth access laws: age 
requirements, youth penalties, free 
distribution restrictions, vending machine 
restrictions, out-of-pack sales restrictions, 
ID requirements, sign-posting 
requirements, vendor licencing 
requirements, vendor penalties, location 
restrictions, education and awareness 
activities, behind-the-counter sales 
requirements, delivery and shipping 
restrictions, task force authorisation, 
random inspections, bidi restrictions 
▪ Policy emulation; degree of policy 
emulation 
▪ U.S. states 
▪ 1992/1997-2002 
▪ Dyadic event history analysis 
Pacheco and Boushey 
(2014) 
Determinants of state-level agenda setting in 
public health (tobacco and vaccines), in 
particular impact of intergovernmental 
influences (federal, neighbour-based and 
gubernatorial agenda-setting activities) 
▪ Tobacco and health legislation 
▪ (Vaccine regulations) 
▪ Bill introduction 
▪ U.S. states 
▪ 1990-2010 
▪ Event count analysis 
McCann et al. (2015) Effect of federal-level agenda-setting 
activities on state-level policy adoptions – 
contingency of top-down influences on 
legislative professionalism and health 
advocacy 
▪ Smoking restrictions in government 
buildings 
▪ Smoking restrictions in restaurants 
▪ Policy adoption 
▪ U.S. states 
▪ 1975-2000 
▪ Monadic event history analysis 
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Internal determinants 
Regarding the influence of internal determinants, the explanatory factors examined may be divided 
into the following seven categories: problem severity, government ideology, citizen ideology, policy 
making capacity, producer pressures, interest-group pressures and public support for the policy.32 
To begin with, diffusion scholars hypothesise that states are the more likely to debate and adopt 
antismoking policies, the more severe related public health problems are. In testing this supposition, 
existing studies look at three indicators: percentage of smokers, smoking-attributable mortality rate 
and proportion of government expenditure spent on health. The first variable focuses on the 
prevalence of the behaviour that is harmful to health, while the second variable reflects the most 
severe health outcome associated with that behaviour.33 The third indicator reflects a different 
conceptualisation of problems in health policy, referring to the burden of financing public healthcare 
systems. High levels of health spending may spur the adoption of cost-saving policies. The prevention 
of tobacco-related diseases possibly contributes to the containment of health spending. As regards the 
prevalence of smoking, Pacheco and Boushey (2014) find a positive impact on the number of tobacco-
related bills introduced in U.S. state parliaments. The estimated effects of the other two variables, i.e. 
smoking-related deaths and health spending, on agenda-setting and policy adoption are either 
inconsistent across models or studies, insignificant or even run counter to expectation. All in all, the 
evidence on the impact of problem severity is inconclusive – we do not know to what extent smoking-
related health problems or cost-induced pressures motivate the adoption of tobacco control policies. 
Regarding ideological preferences, leftist governments are expected to be more likely to table and to 
adopt antismoking policies and consequently to have more comprehensive tobacco control policy 
regimes. For the purpose of assessing the impact of ideological preferences, both ratings of the 
ideological positions of the members of governments and parliaments by experts and measures that 
reflect the partisan composition of state institutions are used. In the U.S. context, several studies find 
government liberalism, as rated by interest-group representatives, to encourage the adoption of 
tobacco control policies. In contrast, the partisan composition of state institutions, which measures 
such as “Unified Democrats”, “Unified Republicans” or “Democratic strength” capture, appears to have 
little explanatory power. Out-of-pack sales restrictions are an exception to this pattern: They turn out 
to be less likely to be adopted by unified Republican governments, while the rating-based measure of 
government ideology does not reach significance (Shipan/Volden 2006). 
In European policy making, Toshkov (2013) finds no effect of government ideology on the likelihood 
that the EU-15-member states enact smoking restrictions in bars and restaurants, irrespective of 
whether the ideological orientations of cabinets are measured on an economic left-to-right, a social 
liberal-to-authoritarian or a pro-to-anti EU continuum. Similarly, according to Studlar et al. (2011), 
countries with leftist governments have no more comprehensive tobacco control policies than those 
with rightist governments. Shipan and Volden (2008) use per capita government spending as a proxy 
for the liberalism of local governments. In their model on learning, the variable exhibits a significant 
positive effect on the adoption of the three antismoking policies studied, but in the models on 
competition, imitation and coercion it is insignificant. 
In sum, findings differ across jurisdictions – liberal U.S. state governments seem to be more likely to 
adopt antismoking restrictions than their conservative counterparts, while such differences are not 
observed for European countries or U.S. cities. It is also somewhat puzzling that government ideology 
is found to affect policy adoption (Shipan/Volden 2006; McCann et al. 2015), but not agenda-setting 
in the U.S. states (Pacheco/Boushey 2014). At present, it is not clear to what degree these differences 
                                                          
32 Citizen ideology is not discussed below since it is addressed by two studies only. 
33 Since smokers are assumed to be opposed to tobacco regulation, the percentage of smokers may also serve 
as a proxy measure of the degree of popular opposition to antismoking policies. That is what most scholars use 
the variable for (see page 32). 
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in findings are due to actual variations in the importance of government ideology across jurisdictions, 
policies and stages of the policy process as opposed to differences in measurement and model 
specification. 
Further, strong policy-making capacities of the legislative and executive branches of government are 
conjectured to enhance the introduction, adoption, emulation and scope of antismoking policies. As a 
measure of the capacities of state legislatures, scholars use an index of legislative professionalism that 
captures three dimensions: session length, staff resources and compensation of legislators.34 Executive 
policy-making capacities are measured through a number of proxy variables: Studlar et al. (2011) and 
Pacheco and Boushey (2014) use the percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) spent on health 
and per-capita health expenditure respectively as proxies for the resources of health administrations, 
while Shipan and Volden (2008) draw on city size and a dummy for mayor-council forms of government 
as proxies for local policy-making capacities. 
The results on the impact of legislative professionalism are variegated: Pacheco and Boushey (2014) 
find that more professional state legislatures introduce more tobacco-related bills. Other research 
shows that legislative professionalism by itself does not affect policy adoption (Shipan/Volden 2006; 
McCann et al. 2015) or even lowers the probability of policy emulation (Shipan/Volden 2014). At the 
same time, legislative professionalism is found to condition certain diffusion effects. Thus, Shipan and 
Volden (2006) observe the impact of local-level smoking restrictions in government buildings and 
restaurants on state legislation to be contingent upon the professionalism of state legislatures. In 
states with professional parliaments, a “snowball effect” materialises, i.e. local policy making 
encourages policy adoption at the state level. In contrast, states that have parliaments with a low 
degree of professionalism experience a “pressure-valve effect”, i.e. local adoptions of smoking 
restrictions in public places decrease the likelihood of state governments engaging in such legislation. 
Moreover, state legislatures are found to be the more likely to learn from successful states (Shipan/ 
Volden 2014) and to respond to national policy debates with own legislation (McCann et al. 2015), the 
more professional they are. 
Regarding the proxy measures of policy-making capacities, Shipan and Volden (2008) observe, as 
expected, a negative impact of mayor-council forms of government and a positive effect of city size. 
Health expenditure turns out to be positively associated with the comprehensiveness of European anti-
tobacco policies (Studlar et al. 2011), but to be unrelated to the number of tobacco-related bills 
introduced (Pacheco/Boushey 2014). 
Altogether, the findings suggest that policy-making capacities, in particular the degree of legislative 
professionalism, shape the introduction, adoption, emulation and comprehensiveness of antismoking 
policies – directly and/or indirectly through the enhancement of policy diffusion. 
With regard to producer pressures, the authors of most studies speculate that the tobacco industry is 
capable of mounting opposition to antismoking policies, rendering the introduction of bills or policy 
adoption less likely and tobacco regulation less comprehensive. Scholars use both dummy variables 
and continuous indicators of tobacco production and manufacturing. Studlar et al. (2011) presume 
that policy makers are more concerned about protecting the economic interests of the domestic 
tobacco industry than of international tobacco companies, which have their headquarters elsewhere, 
and thus specify the variables in terms of domestic tobacco production and manufacturing. 
The research findings on the impact of tobacco production turn out to be inconsistent across studies: 
The number of tobacco-related bill introductions is unaffected by whether or not the respective state 
produces tobacco (Pacheco/Boushey 2014). Concerning policy adoption, Shipan and Volden (2006) 
find that tobacco-producing states are less likely to pass smoking restrictions in government buildings 
                                                          
34 All scholars rely on the legislative professionalism index devised by Squire (1992, 2007). 
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and restaurants as well as out-of-pack sales restrictions. McCann et al. (2015) find the same effect for 
restaurant restrictions, but not for government building restrictions.35 Yet, according to Pacheco 
(2012), tobacco production does not decrease the likelihood that smoking restrictions in restaurants 
are adopted. In the European context, Toshkov (2013) observes that tobacco-producing countries are 
less likely to enact smoking restrictions in bars and restaurants. In Studlar et al.’s (2011) analysis, 
domestic tobacco production does not impact on the comprehensiveness of tobacco control policies, 
while tobacco manufacturing is even positively associated with the latter. Shipan and Volden’s (2008) 
findings on local policy adoptions differ by model specification. All in all, the findings across studies are 
not conclusive – tobacco production might or might not shape decision-making on antismoking 
policies. 
In terms of pressures of interest groups that fight for or against antismoking legislation, research 
generally focuses on two groups – health lobbies and tobacco lobbies. In doing so, scholars capture 
two aspects of interest group strength – the numeric strength of health and tobacco lobbyists 
(measured as the share of registered lobbyists who work for health organisations or for the tobacco 
industry respectively) and the perceived influence of these groups (measured on an ordinal scale, i.e. 
lobby listed by politicians and political observers as belonging to the ten most influential interest 
groups, the 20 most influential groups or otherwise). 
With regard to the impact of health organisation strength, the studies yield diverging results: Shipan 
and Volden (2006) find that health organisation strength does not affect the adoption of smoking 
restrictions in government buildings, but is positively related to the passage of smoking restrictions in 
restaurants and of out-of-pack sales restrictions. McCann et al. (2015) confirm the positive impact on 
the passage of smoking restrictions in restaurants. Further, in most models, they also find evidence of 
government building restrictions being more likely to be adopted by states that have influential health 
lobbies. In contrast, Pacheco (2012) detects no such impact on the adoption of smoking bans in 
restaurants. 
Apart from the independent effects of health organisations, scholars have also studied how their 
strength patterns various diffusion effects. Thus, Shipan and Volden (2006) explore whether or not the 
impact of bottom-up diffusion from the local to the state level is contingent upon the influence of 
health lobbyists. In the case of out-of-pack sales restrictions, such a conditional effect exists – in states 
where health advocates are relatively weak, local policy adoptions render state action less likely 
(“pressure-valve effects”). In contrast, states with strong health advocates experience a “snowball 
effect”, i.e. local policy adoptions prompt the state level to legislate itself on out-of-pack sales. Further, 
McCann et al. (2015) test whether or not top-down policy diffusion is contingent upon the number of 
health organisation lobbyists. According to their findings, compared to states with few health 
advocates, states with numerous lobbyists are more likely to be encouraged by national policy debates 
to adopt smoking restrictions in restaurants. 
Regarding the relevance of tobacco lobbies, there is almost uniform evidence that neither the number 
nor the influence of tobacco lobbyists shape the adoption of antismoking policies – with one exception: 
Shipan and Volden (2006) find states with strong tobacco lobbies to be less likely to pass smoking 
restrictions in government buildings.36 
                                                          
35 Shipan and Volden (2006) and McCann et al. (2015) simultaneously test for the effects of tobacco production 
(based on a dummy variable) and the level of tobacco production. In both studies, only the dummy variable 
reaches statistical significance. 
36 Contrary to what would be expected, Shipan and Volden (2008) observe the strength of health advocates at 
the state level to decrease, and government conservatism and the strength of tobacco lobbyists at the state level 
to increase, the likelihood of local policy adoptions. They speculate that this pattern might result from venue-
shopping by health organisations. According to this interpretation, proponents of antismoking policies who face 
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If we turn to agenda-setting, Pacheco and Boushey (2014) conclude that neither health nor tobacco 
interest groups influence the number of tobacco-related bills introduced. Finally, Studlar et al. (2011) 
detect a negative association between the comprehensiveness of tobacco control policy and the 
existence of corporatist interest group systems in the EU-15-member states. 
In all, health organisations seem to encourage the adoption of antismoking policies – directly and/or 
indirectly through the enhancement of policy diffusion. The strength of tobacco lobbyists – beyond the 
impact of producer pressures – does not appear to make much difference for policy making on tobacco 
control policies. 
Finally, scholars expect states to be the more likely to adopt or extend tobacco control policies, the 
more supportive the general public is of such policies. In assessing the influence of citizen pressures, 
only few studies draw on public opinion data, which directly measure policy support. Most research is 
based on proxy variables of various kinds, such as the percentage of smokers (who are assumed to be 
opposed to tobacco legislation) or socio-economic characteristics, such as education, income or 
ethnicity. 
Based on public opinion data, Pacheco (2012) and Toshkov (2013) find strong evidence of the relevance 
of public support: In both studies, smoking restrictions in restaurants are the more likely to be adopted, 
the higher the share of citizens who favour such restrictions. In contrast, the findings on the impact of 
the share of smokers are inconclusive: Results include significant negative effects on the adoption of 
out-of-pack sales restrictions (Shipan/Volden 2006), on the passage of local smoking restrictions and 
local youth access laws (Shipan/Volden 2008) and on the comprehensiveness of tobacco policy (Studlar 
et al. 2011). Other findings, however, indicate that the percentage of smokers makes no difference for 
the adoption of smoking restrictions in restaurants and in government buildings (Shipan/Volden 2006; 
Pacheco 2012; Toshkov 2013; McCann et al. 2015). 
All in all, studies that use public opinion data suggest that the level of public support might shape policy 
making on antismoking policies. Given that the two studies focus on smoking restrictions in restaurants 
exclusively, it would be premature to generalise these results, though. The contradictory findings on 
the most commonly used proxy variable, i.e. the share of smokers, is probably due to the fact that the 
measure taps into problem severity as well. 
Diffusion effects 
As diffusion effects are concerned, we find that research on tobacco control policies addresses the 
entire spectrum of channels and mechanisms, frequently investigating into both the independent 
effects and the conditional nature of policy diffusion. Thus, findings on neighbour-based, top-down, 
bottom-up and isomorphic diffusion as well as on learning, competition, imitation and coercion exist, 
the most important of which are described below. 
Neighbouring states that have previously adopted the same restriction are found to enhance the 
adoption of smoking restrictions in government buildings (Shipan/Volden 2006) and in restaurants 
(Shipan/Volden 2006; McCann et al. 2015) as well as the adoption of out-of-pack sales restrictions 
(Shipan/Volden 2006). Further, Pacheco and Boushey (2014) observe that the level of attention that 
state legislatures devote to tobacco as a public health issue is positively related to similar agenda-
setting activities in neighbouring states. Shipan and Volden (2014), however, do not observe states to 
be more likely to emulate the policy design of neighbouring states than of other states. 
Reflecting differences in policy-making contexts and in research interests among scholars, a range of 
top-down influences are examined across studies. Shipan and Volden (2006) study the passage of the 
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level (Shipan/Volden 2008: 851). 
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Synar Amendment, which is a federal mandate that requires the U.S. states to ensure that minors 
cannot purchase cigarettes. States that do not comply with the amendment risk losing federal funds 
for the prevention and treatment of substance abuse. Shipan and Volden (2006) observe that the Synar 
Amendment encourages the adoption of out-of-pack sales restrictions, but has no impact on the 
passage of smoking restrictions in public places. Since out-of-pack sales restrictions aim at preventing 
youth access to tobacco, this finding makes intuitively sense. 
Two studies examine the effects of federal tobacco and health agenda-setting. Pacheco and Boushey 
(2014) find no evidence that the number of Congressional hearings influences state agenda-setting 
activities. McCann et al. (2015) find no independent effects of national policy debates either; their 
lagged federal activities variable does not reach statistical significance.37 Nonetheless, they observe 
that national agenda-setting shapes state policy adoptions – in states with professional parliaments 
and strong health organisations. Regarding top-down influences in the EU, directives and 
recommendations are found to contribute to the comprehensiveness of tobacco regulation regimes 
(Studlar et al. 2011). 
None of the three studies that test for bottom-up diffusion finds that local policy adoptions overall 
shape the likelihood of state-level adoptions (Shipan/Volden 2006; Shipan/Volden 2014; McCann et al. 
2015). However, as reported before, Shipan and Volden (2006) observe bottom-up diffusion to be 
relevant once legislative professionalism and health organisation strength are taken into account.38 
With regard to smoking restrictions in restaurants, Pacheco’s (2012) findings do not yield a significant 
interaction effect between bottom-up diffusion and legislative professionalism, though. 
Thus, as diffusion channels are concerned, evidence from existing research suggests neighbour-based 
diffusion to be positively associated with the adoption of antismoking policies. Concerning the effects 
of neighbour-based diffusion on agenda-setting, the effects of top-down diffusion on policy adoption 
and policy comprehensiveness and the conditional effects of top-down diffusion on policy adoption, 
researchers also report positive findings. Thus far, each of these aspects has been examined in no more 
than a single study, though. The findings on the impact of bottom-up diffusion are inconclusive for the 
time being. 
Existing studies on tobacco control policies follow two approaches in analysing policy learning: The 
first one specifies policy learning in terms of learning opportunities. It is based on the assumption that 
the higher the number of previous adopters or the larger the share of the population that lives in 
localities that have already adopted the policy, the more opportunities arise for potential adopters to 
learn from previous policy adoptions. According to this line of reasoning, a significant positive effect 
of these diffusion variables indicates policy learning. Shipan and Volden (2008), who suggest this 
approach, find that cities learn from previous adoptions and that larger cities are more likely than 
smaller cities to do so. Pacheco (2012) adopts the same logic. She observes, however, that policy 
learning becomes insignificant once models control for public opinion in favour of the policy, which 
she considers as proof of her social contagion argument. 
The second approach conceives of learning as entailing the adoption of successful policies. Thus, in 
their analysis of state youth access laws, Shipan and Volden (2014) examine if states are particularly 
likely to emulate the policy designs of such states that are more successful in restricting minors’ access 
to cigarettes and in limiting the prevalence of smoking among high school students. The authors find 
evidence of policy learning. Further, they observe that, compared to states with lower levels of 
professional and policy expertise, states with more professional legislatures and with more experience 
                                                          
37 “Current federal activities”, which records Congressional hearings and bills in the same year, is significant, 
though. McCann et al. (2015) interpret this finding as indicating that federal and state governments respond to 
the same pressures (McCann et al. 2015: 13-14). 
38 Shipan and Volden (2014), who use local adoptions as a measure of policy expertise, similarly find that bottom-
up diffusion enhances policy learning. 
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with youth access restrictions at the local level are more likely to learn from successful states. Put 
differently, policy and political expertise are found to enhance policy learning. 
Two studies focus on competition, using similar specifications of the diffusion variable. With regard to 
local policy adoptions of smoking restrictions in public places and of out-of-pack sales restrictions, 
Shipan and Volden (2008) capture competitive pressures through a variable that reflects the ratio of 
the total population of surrounding cities that do not have the respective restriction to the home 
population. Similarly, Pacheco (2012) uses the proportion of the population of neighbouring states that 
is not covered by smoking restrictions in restaurants. Shipan and Volden (2008) observe that 
competitive pressures prompt the adoption of the three antismoking policies and that smaller cities 
are more exposed to such pressures. Pacheco (2012), in contrast, demonstrates that competition no 
longer affects the adoption of smoking restrictions in restaurants when policy support by the public is 
accounted for. 
With regard to coercion, Shipan and Volden (2008) observe that state adoption of antismoking 
legislation that entails pre-emptive clauses on related city-level government action, discourages local 
policy adoption. 
In sum, although studies on anti-smoking policies follow some promising avenues for disentangling 
diffusion mechanisms, they do not yet provide conclusive evidence – at least as far as the relevance of 
learning and competition are concerned. 
Conclusion 
All told, existing research yields relevant insights on the determinants of the introduction, adoption, 
emulation and comprehensiveness of tobacco control policies. Furthermore, researchers have drawn 
on antismoking policies so as to shed light on many important issues in policy diffusion research, such 
as bottom-up and top-down diffusion, diffusion mechanisms at work and contingency of diffusion 
effects. 
Generalising the findings of the present body of research to the factors that drive policy making on 
tobacco-control policies in general, is as yet impossible, though. This is because several dependent 
variables, such as agenda-setting, policy emulation and policy comprehensiveness have been covered 
by no more than one study, non-regulatory tobacco control policies have hardly been examined at all 
and the empirical focus is mainly limited to the U.S. states. However, the existing studies provide a 
valuable basis for specifying the models on cantonal adoptions of antismoking restrictions in later 
chapters. 
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3 Theoretical Argument: Policy Design, Innovation and Diffusion 
Chapter 3 presents the theoretical argument. It serves two purposes: (1) to portray in more depth the 
research interest that guides this study; and (2) to set the stage for the analysis in Chapter 8 by defining 
the phenomena to be explained and the key explanatory variables. It is divided into three subchapters. 
Chapter 3.1 outlines the framework of analysis and clarifies a number of conceptual issues. Specifically, 
it describes the potential links between policy characteristics on the one hand and the likelihood and 
determinants of policy adoption on the other hand, positioning the research questions raised in 
Chapter 1 within this framework. It then discusses the implications that the research focus chosen has 
for the conception of policy diffusion and explains why policy characteristics are defined in terms of 
design characteristics. Finally, it provides a short description of the various components of policy 
designs. Chapter 3.2 presents various hypotheses on the effects of four policy design characteristics: 
designated beneficiaries, degree of intervention, complexity and implementation costs. In doing so, 
the first section focuses on the expected direct effects, while the second one deals with the expected 
indirect effects. Chapter 3.3 elaborates on the design characteristics chosen; it specifies the concepts 
and provides the corresponding operational definitions. 
 Framework of Analysis and Conceptual Issues 
Framework of analysis 
Policy characteristics may shape governmental innovation decisions in various ways. Here, the focus 
rests on the impact of policy attributes on the decision on whether or not to adopt the policy.39 When 
taking the characteristics of a policy as a given, the former may directly influence the likelihood of 
adoption. If so, policy characteristics constitute a force behind policy innovation in their own right, 
over and above internal determinants and diffusion effects. In other words, policy attributes are 
conceived of as a third category of explanatory variables that have an independent effect on the 
probability that a state adopts a policy (see Figure 3).40 For example, other things being equal, one 
might surmise that policies are the more likely to be adopted, the lower their implementation costs 
are. In testing their “policy attributes hypothesis”, Makse and Volden (2011) follow this conception of 
the impact of policy attributes on adoption. More specifically, they show that the relative advantage, 
observability, compatibility and trialability of innovative criminal justice policies encourage their 
adoption, while complexity discourages it (see page 23). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
39 Policy characteristics may also have an effect on the substance of the innovation decision: Depending on the 
specific set of characteristics that the original policy entails, states may be more or less likely to reinvent the 
policy, to retain the idea, but to devise a different policy design (“principle diffusion”, see the next section), or to 
introduce the policy on a trial basis first (pilot testing, see Chapter 4.3). These aspects are not analysed in this 
study. 
40 For the ease of presentation, Figure 3 subsumes a potential adopter’s previous policy choices (i.e. the adoption 
of policies that are complementary to, substitutes for, or prerequisites of the policy of interest – see Chapter 2.1) 
under “internal determinants” here. After all, they are specific to each jurisdiction. 
Internal determinants 
Diffusion effects 
Policy characteristics 
Policy adoption 
Figure 3: Direct impact of policy characteristics on adoption 
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Policy characteristics may also moderate the influence of internal determinants and/or diffusion 
effects on policy adoption, thus affecting innovation decisions indirectly. Thus, policy attributes may 
determine to what extent particular state characteristics shape policy adoption. For example, the fiscal 
situation of a state might be quite decisive for innovation decisions on costly policies, but less relevant 
in the case of low-cost policies. Mooney and Lee (1995) report one pertinent finding: The adoption of 
abortion regulation, a morality policy, turns out to be driven by a set of internal determinants that is 
different from those behind economic policies (see Chapter 2.3). Policy characteristics may also 
condition diffusion effects, shaping the weight of particular channels or mechanisms. Brooks (2007) 
makes this point. She demonstrates that previous peer adoptions render pension reforms with high 
sunk costs by Latin American, Eastern European and low-income countries more likely. In contrast, 
pension reforms with lower sunk costs are not shaped by interdependent decision making among 
similar countries (see Chapter 2.3). Likewise, Makse and Volden (2011) analyse the interactions 
between relative advantage, observability, compatibility, complexity and trialability on the one hand 
and neighbour-based diffusion and policy learning on the other hand (see Chapter 2.3). 
While Makse and Volden (2011) focus on the strength of one particular mechanism (policy learning), 
it is likely that policy attributes more generally condition what type or types of diffusion mechanisms 
are at work. This is probably most obvious for competition: Only policies that are perceived as giving 
adopters a clear edge over non-adopters are likely to set off competitive diffusion dynamics. But the 
supposition might hold for other diffusion mechanisms as well. For example, policy learning might be 
prompted by costly or complex policies, while decision makers might be less likely to be influenced by 
socialisation when it comes to deciding on such policies. Nicholson-Crotty (2009) and Boushey (2010) 
use this kind of reasoning in substantiating their arguments, but do not empirically study the link 
between policy characteristics and diffusion mechanisms. To my knowledge, thus far no study exists 
that explores how policy characteristics trigger one rather than another diffusion mechanism. Figure 4 
summarises the discussion on how the characteristics that an innovative policy entails may indirectly 
affect its adoption – by means of conditioning the importance of particular internal determinants 
and/or diffusion effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This study seeks to shed light on both the direct and the indirect influences that policy characteristics 
may exert on adoption. Among the research questions that were formulated in Chapter 1 and that are 
recapitulated below, the first one relates to the potential direct effects of policy characteristics and 
the following two refer to their possible indirect impact: 
▪ Do certain policy characteristics render some innovative policies more adoptable than others? 
▪ Do policy characteristics affect the importance of certain internal determinants for the adoption of 
innovative policies? 
▪ Do policy characteristics condition the weight of diffusion effects in innovation decisions? 
The framework of analysis that the study is based on is shown in Figure 5. 
Internal determinants 
Policy characteristics 
Diffusion effects 
 
Policy adoption 
Figure 4: Indirect impact of policy characteristics on adoption 
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Policy diffusion, characteristics and designs: conceptual issues 
The way that the above research questions are formulated has implications for the conception of 
diffusion (in the sense of diffusion-as-outcome) and policy characteristics. So as to determine the 
explanatory potential of policy characteristics, a clear conceptual differentiation between policy 
characteristics on the one hand and internal determinants and diffusion effects on the other hand is 
needed.41 Besides, owing to the causal logic inherent in the research questions, policy characteristics 
need to antedate innovation decisions and be exogenous to them. 
As regards the conception of policy diffusion, the concern of this study rests with “model diffusion” 
(Weyland 2006: 17-18). Model diffusion reflects a situation where states adopt a policy model from 
elsewhere and replicate both the basic idea of the model and the specific design used to put the idea 
into practice. Model diffusion occurs when states emulate a compact solution to a public problem from 
earlier adopters, with adjustments to the template being limited to minor aspects. Thus, in the case of 
model diffusion, decision makers decide on whether or not to adopt a distinct policy solution with a 
given set of attributes. The attributes of the innovative policy predate policy adoption and might thus 
fashion adoption decisions.42 
But policies do not need to spread in such a compact way. Weyland (2006: 17-18) refers to “principle 
diffusion” to designate an alternative form of diffusion. Here, decision makers embrace a policy idea 
that another state has formulated. Yet, in implementing this principle, they devise a policy design that 
is quite different from the one that the earlier adopter uses. In this case, successive adoptions of the 
same principle are likely to produce policies with quite diverse characteristics. What is more, the 
attributes of innovative policies do not antedate adoption decisions, but are manufactured in their 
course. Under these circumstances, posing the above research questions does not make sense since 
the causal logic of policy attributes having a direct or indirect impact on the likelihood of adoption is 
not applicable. Put differently, the research questions raised are based on a “policies determine 
politics”-logic (cf. Lowi 1972: 299), which model diffusion is compatible with. Principle diffusion, in 
contrast, follows a “politics determines policies”-logic. Hence, the study will concentrate on instances 
of model diffusion. 
In Downs and Mohr’s (1976: 702-704) terminology, characteristics that do not vary with the adopting 
unit are “primary innovation attributes” (as opposed to “secondary innovation attributes”, which 
                                                          
41 This is an analytical distinction. Empirically, internal determinants, diffusion effects and policy attributes are 
intertwined. As an example, the provision of federal government funding for a particular policy (i.e. a top-down 
diffusion influence) is intended to reduce the implementation costs of that policy (i.e. a policy characteristic). 
42 It is debatable whether or not policy characteristics predate the adoption decision of the first state in a federal 
system. Secondary sources do not always reveal where from the first sub-national adopter obtained the idea for 
the innovation. In the Swiss context, many instances exist where the respective canton did not invent the policy, 
but emulated the practice of a jurisdiction outside Switzerland or followed the recommendation of an 
international organisation. 
Internal determinants 
Policy characteristics 
Diffusion effects 
 
Policy adoption 
Figure 5: Framework of analysis: impact of policy characteristics on adoption 
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differ across units considering adoption). In order to ensure that policy attributes are clearly distinct 
from state characteristics and diffusion effects and are constant across adoptions, the former are 
specified in terms of primary attributes. Characteristics that reflect the basic design of the policy fulfil 
this criterion since they remain intact during model diffusion. Therefore, attributes that are inherent 
in the design of the policy might be considered an obvious choice for disentangling the effects of policy 
attributes on adoption. This is the main reason why this study focusses on policy design characteristics. 
Since such a conception of policy attributes ties in with policy solutions rather than issues, this study 
is more closely related to the works of Brooks (2007), Boushey (2010) and Makse and Volden (2011) 
than to Mooney and Lee (1995) and Nicholson-Crotty (2009) (see Chapter 2.3). It does not negate the 
relevance of policy attributes that pertain to the issue area (e.g. issue salience, issue complexity, 
morality vs. economic policy). But it is based on the assumption that the solutions that decision makers 
can choose from within a particular issue area differ considerably in terms of their characteristics and 
that these differences are relevant. This is the second reason for examining the impact of policy design 
characteristics.43 
In short, this study rests upon the assumption that policy innovations entail a number of integral 
characteristics. The latter emanate from the basic design of the policy and remain constant across 
adoptions. Thus, although later adopters possibly alter some features of the design, it is essentially the 
same policy that spreads (or, fails to spread).44 In focusing on characteristics that are linked to the 
design of a policy, this study draws on a research strand within policy analysis that has recognised for 
a long time that public policies consist of a number of basic elements (Schneider/Sidney 2009: 104).45 
In order to systematically describe the designs of the policies studied and derive the characteristics of 
interest (as will be done in Chapter 5), policy designs are disaggregated into five components, i.e. the 
objective, the tool, the action content, the target group(-s) and the delivery system of the policy (see 
Figure 6 on the next page).46 The objective is linked to the public problem that the policy addresses; it 
captures the change in societal condition that it is to bring about (cf. Birkland 2001: 153). The policy 
tool or instrument is the actual means used to accomplish the objective; it encapsulates some 
technique of social intervention that policy makers apply (Windhoff-Héritier 1987: 27). Governments 
can choose from a large variety of policy instruments.47 Action content stands for the actual content 
of the policy tool, i.e. the type of behaviour that the direct target group is expected to engage in or 
refrain from (cf. Vedung 1998: 32). Policies target the behaviour of particular groups, with some 
addressing direct targets exclusively and others also embracing indirect targets. Direct target groups 
consist of the direct addressees of regulatory norms, financial incentives, information and the like. 
Indirect target groups are composed of individuals whose behaviour, well-being or similar the policy 
                                                          
43 Besides conceptual reasons, practical considerations suggest the choice of policy characteristics that are 
invariant across adopters and over time. Otherwise, policy characteristics would need to be measured for each 
adopter and time period separately. 
44 This might be considered a fairly strong assumption. However, as Chapter 5 shows, for the actual sample of 
policies, the design characteristics selected for study remained largely stable across adoptions. 
45 For recent reviews of this literature, see Sidney (2007) and Howlett and Lejano (2013). 
46 This analytical division is based on elements from Birkland (2001: 153), Vedung (1998: 34) and Salamon (2002: 
20). 
47 The systematic study of the choice and consequences of policy instruments has been one of the main foci of 
the policy design literature (Howlett/Lejano 2013: 363). Thus, several attempts at compiling complete lists of 
policy tools available to governments exist, e.g. Kirschen’s scheme of 63 economic instruments (Kirschen 1964 
cited in Vedung 1998: 53-55) or Salamon’s distinction of 15 tools of government (Salamon 2002: 39). Scholars 
also have devised policy typologies that highlight a certain characteristic of policy instruments and group the 
latter into a limited number of categories. Hood’s “NATO”-model, which is based on the governing resource that 
the instrument uses (nodality, authority, treasure, organisation) (Hood 1983; Hood/ Margetts 2007) exemplifies 
this approach. Vedung’s taxonomy of “carrots”, “sticks” and “sermon” (regulation, economic means, 
information), which captures the degree of authoritative force that is entailed in a policy tool (Vedung 1998), is 
another example. 
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seeks to influence, without directly manipulating it. Finally, the delivery system is made up of the set 
of organisations that implement the policy (Salamon 2002: 20). 
As an illustration of these components: A ban on smoking in restaurants aims at reducing the health 
risks resulting from exposure to second-hand smoke. It is based on a regulatory tool, the action content 
of which is that smoking is forbidden in restaurants (or is restricted to a smoker’s room). As such, it 
pertains to the behaviour of smokers (the direct target group), while restaurant staff and clients, who 
are expected to benefit from less exposure to passive smoking, are the indirect target group. State 
agencies, such as commercial or labour inspectorates, typically enforce the policy and thus constitute 
the delivery system. 
As a final note, from Figure 6 it becomes apparent that the study looks at the design of the most distinct 
manifestations of public policies, i.e. policy measures. As the smallest units of public policy, policy 
measures are embedded into more comprehensive policy programmes and, at an even higher level of 
abstraction, policy fields (Howlett 2009: 75). In principle, policy programmes (e.g. tobacco prevention 
programmes) can be the objects of investigation of diffusion studies, too. Since programmes usually 
join together several measures, they offer more opportunities for modification to policy makers than 
individual measures do. Hence, heterogeneous designs across jurisdictions may result. That is why a 
focus on policy measures is more suitable for ensuring that the diffusion of the “same” policy is 
analysed. In selecting the policies to be studied (see Chapter 4.2), programmes will therefore be 
disaggregated into individual measures. Yet, if two or more policy measures are intrinsically tied to 
each other through vertical or horizontal packaging and are always adopted in a package, they will be 
analysed together.48 
Figure 6: Policy measures: basic components of their designs 
 
  
                                                          
48 Horizontal packaging means that two or more connected instruments are directed at the same target group, 
while vertical packaging captures situations where one instrument is designed to effect the implementation of 
another (Bemelmans-Videc/Vedung 1998: 257-258). 
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 The Impact of Policy Characteristics on Innovation Decisions: Hypotheses 
Hypotheses on the direct effects of policy characteristics 
Do certain characteristics influence the adoptability of innovative policies? The Policy Characteristics 
and Adoption Hypothesis answers this question in the affirmative. Formulated in general terms in H 
1.0, it is translated into four specific and testable sub-hypotheses: 
H 1.0: Characteristics inherent to the design of innovative policies affect the likelihood of policy 
adoption. 
H 1.1: Innovative policies that target children for benefits (“children’s policies”) are more likely to be 
adopted than other policies. 
H 1.2: Innovative policies that entail a low-degree of intervention are more likely to be adopted than 
highly-interventionist ones. 
H 1.3:  Innovative policies that are based on a simple design are more likely to be adopted than those 
with a complex design. 
H 1.4: Innovative policies that involve low or invisible implementation costs are more likely to be 
adopted than high-cost policies. 
Hypothesis H 1.1 is based on the assumption that the adoption of children’s policies entails clear 
political benefits for decision makers. Children carry positive social constructions (Schneider/Ingram 
1993: 336). Regardless of the particular field, for policies that explicitly confer benefits on children and 
adolescents, the chances of being adopted are likely to be high. Boushey’s (2010) findings on the rapid 
pattern of diffusion of child protection policies support H 1.1 (see page 22). 
In the area of public health, several factors are likely to strengthen the appeal of children’s policies, 
including that the health of children and adolescents is particularly vulnerable and that intervention 
early in the life course is deemed especially effective. With policies that protect that age group from 
health hazards being considered as both legitimate and effective, policy makers tend to support them. 
Relating to Berry and Berry’s (1990, 2007) unified model (cf. page 6), the designated beneficiaries of 
the policy are surmised to affect the motivation to innovate. Presumably, the design of the policy needs 
to clearly designate children and adolescents as the beneficiaries for this effect to occur. Policies that 
target children and adolescents among other groups are not expected to be more likely to be adopted. 
As Schneider and Ingram (1990: 513) point out, “(...) public policy almost always attempts to get people 
to do things they might not otherwise do; or it enables people to do things they might not have done 
otherwise.” In pushing for behavioural change, policies necessarily intervene into the private lives or 
economic sphere of the group directly targeted.49 In public health, policies aim at behavioural change 
among various types of target groups, such as private individuals, professionals (e.g. teachers, medical 
practitioners) and businesses so as to prevent individuals from health risks and to promote their health. 
Policies differ in terms of how interventionist they are, though. Some policies leave the direct target 
group more choice than others in complying with the intended change. Moreover, depending on the 
policy content, the behaviour targeted for change may be more or less relevant to the direct target 
group. Innovative policies may be expected to elicit the more political opposition, the more 
interventionist they are. Therefore, highly interventionist policies are likely to entail considerable 
political risks for policy makers. Presumably, the latter do not want to provoke strong societal 
resistance, let alone experience that an innovation that they sponsor is defeated during the decision-
making process. Probably, they are thus less inclined to support highly interventionist policies. In terms 
                                                          
49 Sometimes, policies ultimately aim at bringing about behavioural change among an indirect target group. In 
assessing the degree of intervention, this study focuses on the intervention that aims at the direct target group. 
Since it is the group that is most immediately affected by the policy, it is more likely than the indirect target group 
to mount political opposition if the policy compromises its interests. 
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of Berry and Berry’s (1990, 2007) model, the degree of intervention that an innovation entails is likely 
to affect the motivation to innovate. For these reasons, H 1.2 hypothesises the likelihood of adoption 
to be lower for highly interventionist policy innovations than for innovations with a low degree of 
intervention. Boushey’s (2010) observation that issue fragility slows down the diffusion of innovative 
policies (see page 23) suggests that H 1.2 captures a relevant aspect of policy designs. 
In order to be able to decide about the adoption of a policy innovation pioneered elsewhere, policy-
makers need to understand what the innovation is about and whether it would work at home. Thus, 
those in charge of policy formulation have to be able to specify and flesh out the major components 
of the policy design, demonstrate its technical feasibility and substantiate how it will accomplish its 
objective. When it comes to complex policies, these activities require sound technocratic analysis, to 
be carried out by public officials or other policy experts who wield policy-specific expertise and have 
sufficient time resources (cf. Boushey 2010). Given that public administrations and parliaments have 
limited resources, policy innovations that entail a less complex design are more likely to be adopted 
(H 1.3). In referring to Berry and Berry’s (1990, 2007) framework, complexity is likely to constitute an 
obstacle to innovation.50 
Government budgets are limited and have to be divided among manifold rival purposes. Policy 
innovations that necessitate substantial (and visible) government spending on implementation may 
cause a reallocation of means within or among departments or may contribute to governments levying 
higher taxes or increasing their revenues from other sources. The reallocation of resources, either 
within government or between government and society at large, is likely to elicit political conflict. 
Framing it in terms of Berry and Berry’s (1990, 2007) model, high and visible implementation costs are 
expected to constitute an obstacle to, and thus to lower the chances of, innovation. Besides preventing 
adoption during executive or parliamentary decision-making processes, in several cantons political 
forces that oppose a costly policy wield an additional instrument – they can subject it to a financial 
referendum, calling on cost-conscious voters to reject the innovation. In sum, policy innovations that 
are associated with low or invisible implementation costs are more likely to be adopted than their 
high-cost counterparts (H 1.4). 
Hypotheses on the indirect effects of policy characteristics 
As outlined before, policy characteristics are also likely to condition to what extent particular internal 
determinants and forms of interdependent decision-making shape governments’ innovation decisions. 
The Policy Characteristics and Internal Determinants Hypothesis (H 2.0) and the Policy Characteristics 
and Diffusion Effects Hypothesis (H 3.0) reflect these expectations. 
In formulating more specific hypotheses on the impact on internal determinants, this study draws on 
the fact that three of the policy design characteristics examined “mirror” state characteristics that 
regularly feature in policy diffusion research. The sub-hypotheses fleshed out below expect policy 
design characteristics to condition how important the corresponding state characteristic is. 
H 2.0:  Characteristics inherent to the design of innovative policies affect the importance of 
particular internal determinants for policy adoption. 
H 2.1: Ideological preferences more strongly affect the likelihood of adoption of highly interventionist 
innovative policies than of policies with a low degree of intervention. 
H 2.2: State policy-making capacity more strongly affects the likelihood of adoption of complex than 
of simple innovative policies. 
H 2.3: The fiscal situation of the state affects the likelihood of adoption of innovative policies that 
entail high implementation costs, but not of policies with low or invisible costs. 
                                                          
50 This is likely to be particularly true for those Swiss cantons where administrative structures specialised on 
public health are rudimentary and parliaments have a low degree of professionalization (see Chapter 4.1). 
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As the corresponding internal determinant, ideological preferences mirror the policy characteristic 
“degree of intervention”. Leftist politicians generally deem the state to be responsible for securing the 
welfare of society, including public health. They favour state intervention and do not eschew highly 
interventionist policies. Centrist and rightist parties typically assign the ultimate responsibility for most 
welfare issues, including public health, to the individual. They are less supportive of state intervention 
in general and in particular dislike highly interventionist measures. Ideological preferences are thus 
expected to have a stronger impact on the adoption of highly than of less interventionist policies (H 
2.1). 
The state characteristic “policy-making capacity” can be considered to match the policy characteristic 
“complexity”. As described before, assessing policy innovations that are based on a complex design 
requires a substantial investment of policy expertise and time by administrative agencies and/or 
legislators. Weighing the adoption of policies with simple designs, in contrast, is much less resource-
intensive. Against this backdrop, policy-making capacity is hypothesised to more strongly affect the 
adoption of complex than of simple policies (H 2.2). 
The fiscal situation of the state may be characterised as the counterpart to the policy design 
characteristic of implementation costs. Policies with high implementation costs may affect the balance 
of state revenues and spending, whereas policies with low or invisible costs hardly bear on government 
budgets. Hence, the fiscal situation of governments is likely to shape innovation decisions on the 
former type of policies, but not on the latter (H 2.3). 
As the Policy Characteristics and Diffusion Effects Hypothesis is concerned, two specific and testable 
hypotheses are derived.  
H 3.0:  Characteristics inherent to the design of innovative policies affect the importance of previous 
policy choices by peer governments (“peer effects”) for policy adoption. 
H 3.1: Peer effects more strongly affect the adoption of innovative policies that are associated with 
high implementation costs than of policies with low or invisible costs. 
H 3.2:  Peer effects more strongly affect the adoption of complex than of simple innovative policies. 
Similar to Brooks’ (2007) argument, the political stakes in innovation decisions are assumed to be 
particularly high if policies are associated with high implementation costs. As expensive policies require 
a sizable commitment of state financial resources, decision makers are likely to want to have some 
proof that the policy “works”. Instances of successful implementation by earlier adopters provide such 
cues. In situations where strong nation-wide communication networks among state officials are 
lacking, the even dissemination of policy experiences of previous adopters among the constituent units 
of a federal system is unlikely to occur. Rather, policy makers are likely to look to peer governments 
for relevant information, with peers being understood as governments that share institutionalised links 
of communication. 
In short, high implementation costs pose an incentive to learn from the experiences of others and 
decision makers are likely to make use of relatively easily accessible information. Presumably, this 
constellation triggers interdependent decision making among peers. In contrast, decision makers 
probably act more independently when deciding about inexpensive policies because they entail little 
budgetary risks. Thus, H 3.1 postulates peer effects to be more relevant in innovation decisions on 
high- than on low-cost policies.  
Moreover, interdependent decision making is likely to play a more prominent part in decisions on 
complex than on less complex innovative policies (H 3.2). Previous policy adoptions provide decision 
makers with the opportunity to learn from other governments on how to put a policy into practice. In 
the case of simple policies, governments do not need to rely on the policy-specific expertise that earlier 
adopters have gained. However, if policy formulation and implementation are highly complex, such 
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exchange is likely to significantly lower the barriers, and thus to encourage, policy innovation. For the 
same reasons detailed in the paragraphs above, H 3.2 is framed in terms of peer effects. 
 Specification and Measurement of Policy Design Characteristics 
Designated beneficiaries 
According to this characteristic, policies divide into two groups: children’s health policies vs. other 
policies. The first group comprises policies that are specifically designed to promote the health of 
children and adolescents or to protect this age group from health risks and diseases. The second group 
entails public health policies that target other groups or the population as a whole for benefits. In order 
to qualify as a children’s health policy, the design of the respective policy needs to clearly identify 
children and/or adolescents as the intended beneficiaries. In other words, children and/or adolescents 
need to be the direct or the indirect target group of the policy. 
Degree of intervention 
Depending on the type of target group, degree of intervention captures the extent to which a policy 
intervenes into the private lives or professional/business activities of the members of that group. For 
the purposes of this study, it is specified as a function of two aspects of policy designs – the 
coerciveness of the policy tool and the intrusiveness of the action content. 
Coerciveness reflects the level of choice that the direct target group has in complying with the 
behavioural change intended by the policy. Thus, coerciveness “[…] measures the extent to which a 
tool restricts individual or group behavior as opposed to merely encouraging or discouraging it.” 
(Salamon 2002: 25). It corresponds to the level of authoritative force that policy makers are willing to 
use to make the direct target group comply with their intentions (Vedung 1998: 34-35). 
Coerciveness can be understood as a gradual concept. For the sake of conceptual clarity and ease of 
measurement, four levels are distinguished here (see Table 2 on the next page):51 Highly coercive 
policies prescribe what the direct target group has to do or must not do. An enforcement system is 
usually provided for; hence, the targets of highly coercive policies are given little choice on whether or 
not to comply with the intentions of policy makers. Governments use the maximum level of 
authoritative force that is available to them. Policies that are designed to reduce the occurrence of a 
particular behaviour through the imposition of financial disincentives or the modification of the 
environment in a way that makes some actions more difficult52 entail an upper medium level of 
coercion. While the direct target group does not have to act in line with the objective of the policy, 
non-compliance has a clearly visible price or is rendered difficult through a change in structural 
settings. Policy makers exercise a substantial level of authoritative force. Policies that are classified as 
entailing a lower medium level of coercion aim at eliciting certain types of behaviour through granting 
financial incentives, providing services or changing the environment in a way that fosters the intended 
behaviour. Again, the direct target group does not have to comply with government intentions. But 
those who fail to do so forego the benefits that the policy provides. In adopting such policies, decision 
makers exercise a fairly low level of authoritative force. Finally, policies with a low level of coercion 
provide actors with information or knowledge that encourages or discourages a certain type of 
behaviour. The direct target group is free whether or not to comply with the intentions of policy-
makers.53 Decision makers use a minimum of authoritative force. 
                                                          
51 This classification is based on Vedung’s (1998) threefold typology of policy instruments, which distinguishes 
regulations, economic means and information. It splits up Vedung’s second category into economic means that 
reward, respectively punish, certain types of behaviour. 
52 The latter aspect is taken from 6 et al. (2010: 434) and Weaver (2014: 252). 
53 This holds as long as policy makers shy away from indoctrination. 
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Coerciveness on its own does not sufficiently capture the degree to which a policy intervenes into the 
private lives, professional or business activities of the direct target group. Besides the level of choice 
that the direct target group has in complying with the behavioural change intended by the policy, the 
relevance of the behaviour that is targeted for change and the degree of change required are likely to 
be essential as well. The resultant level of intrusion follows from the action content of the policy. For 
instance, a total ban on tobacco advertising is more intrusive than a prohibition of tobacco advertising 
in the proximity of schoolyards (but equally coercive). Such aspects are encapsulated in the concept of 
intrusiveness.54 
As pointed out above, two aspects are relevant in assessing the level of intrusion: the type of behaviour 
targeted for change and the scope of change. In thinking about the first aspect, i.e. the behavioural 
importance of the action content of the policy, several aspects come to mind. For example, does the 
policy interfere with an everyday activity or routine or does it affect a relatively marginal aspect of 
people’s lives or professional or business activities? Does it compromise essential personal, 
professional or economic values or interests (such as autonomy, physical and psychological integrity, 
profitability) or does it affect less important goods? For individual policies, it is often intuitive on how 
to answer these questions. But the specification of this aspect of intrusiveness in a way that is 
applicable to all sorts of policies is less straightforward. Particularly if policies target groups that are 
quite different from each other, it is far from evident how to compare the behavioural importance of 
action content. For example, how do the levels of intrusion of a smoking restriction targeted at 
individuals and a restriction on tobacco sales targeted at retail businesses compare to each other? 
These conceptual difficulties render intrusiveness more elusive than coerciveness. No universally 
applicable operational definition of intrusiveness can be presented here. Fortunately, however, the six 
public health policies analysed in this study likewise address economic actors (see Chapter 5) and affect 
activities that are important to these actors (such as the production, provision, advertising or sale of a 
manufactured good or service). As this aspect is constant across policies, the specification of 
intrusiveness can focus on the second relevant aspect, i.e. the degree of behavioural change (here, 
change in economic activity) that the policy intends to bring about. The below gradation of the scope 
of change and hence the level of intrusion (see lower part of Table 2) is based on the assumption that 
policies that intend to restrict or suppress a behaviour are more intrusive than policies that aim at an 
adjustment of behaviour. In total, four levels of intrusion are distinguished (see Table 2).  
Table 2: Degree of intervention: dimensions and operational definitions 
Dimension Values 
Coerciveness ▪ Low: Policy provides target group with information or knowledge 
▪ Lower medium: Policy entails financial incentives, services or in-kind benefits or 
changes structural setting in a way that facilitates behaviour 
▪ Upper medium: Policy imposes financial disincentives or changes structural setting in 
a way that impedes behaviour 
▪ High: Policy prescribes what target group has to do or must not do and enforces 
compliance 
Intrusiveness ▪ Low: Policy aims for loosely-defined adjustment of behaviour 
▪ Lower medium: Policy aims for clearly-defined adjustment of behaviour 
▪ Upper medium: Policy aims for restriction of behaviour 
▪ High: Policy aims for elimination of behaviour 
                                                          
54 In the theoretical and empirical literature, intrusiveness and coerciveness are often used to denote very similar 
concepts; some authors use the terms interchangeably (e.g. Weaver 2014). Definitions of intrusiveness can be 
found in some empirical studies: Intrusiveness is defined in terms of the interference of the policy with the 
personal living conditions of the target group (Widmer et al. 2000: 27-28), the professional identity, respect and 
daily routines of regulatees (Gormley 1991: 79), or the scope of change in economic practices that the policy 
instrument requires (Monpetit/Coleman 1999: 696). 
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Based on the specific values that the policies studied attain on the dimensions of coerciveness and 
intrusiveness, Chapter 5 groups the former into two categories: highly interventionist policies score 
“upper medium” or higher on both dimensions; policies with a low degree of intervention comprise 
all other policies.55 
Complexity 
Policy designs are complex if understanding them and assembling the necessary components require 
a substantial investment of technical expertise and time. In assessing complexity, three dimensions are 
taken into account: scope, calibration and automaticity (see Table 3 below). 
Scope captures whether the policy innovation consists of one or several measures. As discussed before, 
the policies selected may consist of more than one measure in the case of horizontal or vertical 
packaging (see page 38). Policies that comprise more than one measure are inherently more complex 
since public officials, specialised legislators or external professional experts who are involved in policy 
analysis and formulation have to understand the different logics of intervention and how the measures 
relate to each other. The demands on defining the delivery system are also higher, as usually more 
than one implementing institution is required. 
Calibration taps into the degree to which the action content of the policy is differentiated, e.g. in order 
to tailor it to specific needs, conditions or the like within the target group(s). The more calibrated the 
policy, the more technical in nature it is. The formulation of highly calibrated policies requires more 
technical expertise and time, given that a number of questions of detail need to be settled and the 
pros and cons of different design variants need to be weighed. 
Finally, policy designs may provide for more or less automatic delivery systems. According to Salamon 
(2002: 32), “[a]utomaticity measures the extent to which a tool utilizes an existing administrative 
structure to produce its effect rather than having to create its own special administrative apparatus.” 
For the purposes of this study, automaticity is understood in terms of whether the policy is delivered 
by structures that predate policy adoption as opposed to structures that have to be set up because of 
policy adoption. Policy analysis and formulation are clearly less complex if those involved do not have 
to ponder on what type of delivery system to set up. 
For scope and calibration three discrete values (low, medium and high), for automaticity two values 
(low, high) are distinguished (see Table 3 for operational definitions). Overall, policies are characterised 
as either simple or complex. 56 More concretely, policies that register at the upper end on at least one 
dimension or as medium on at least two dimensions are classified as complex, whereas all other 
policies are coded as being simple. 
Table 3: Complexity: dimensions and operational definitions 
Dimension Values 
Scope Narrow: Policy consists of one measure 
Medium: Policy consists of two measures  
Wide: Policy consists of more than two measures 
Calibration Low: Action content is undifferentiated 
Medium: Action content is somewhat differentiated 
High: Action content is highly differentiated 
Automaticity High: Delivery system already exists 
Low: Delivery system has to be created (at least in parts) 
                                                          
55 This two-fold classification was chosen because of the limited number of policies studied. With a larger sample 
of policies given it might be preferable to differentiate between more than two levels of degree of intervention 
since this would hold more analytical leverage. 
56 In the case of a larger sample of policies a finer gradation might be worthwhile (see footnote above). 
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Through the provision of technical assistance, the pioneering canton, another early adopter, the 
federal government or some other institution can lower the technical expertise and time that later 
adopters need to invest into policy analysis and formulation. Diffusion agencies may even turn the 
policy into a standardised, ready-made solution.57 Technical assistance may thus render formulating 
the policy less demanding. However, this does not affect the inherent quality of the innovation, which 
is complex due to its design features. Rather, the provision of technical assistance represents a vertical 
or horizontal form of interdependent decision making, which explanatory models need to separately 
account for (see Chapter 4.3). 
Implementation costs 
Implementation costs capture the financial means that cantons have to allocate for policy delivery, as 
disclosed in financing plans or cantonal budgets. Implementation costs, as defined here, reflect the 
visible costs of policy delivery; they do not cover costs that budgeting processes do not disclose (cf. 
Salamon 2002: 35).58 
Costs may vary over time, e.g. between phases of pilot testing and full implementation (see Chapter 
4.3). Assuming that policy makers are more concerned about the level of recurrent government 
spending that an innovative policy necessitates than about initial funding, implementation costs are 
defined as mature policy costs, i.e. costs incurred once the policy is fully established. Admittedly, 
implementation costs are not identical across jurisdictions as particulars of policy designs and other 
cost-relevant factors vary across (potential) adopters. However, as the basic components of the policy 
design are the most important parameters of implementation costs and as they are assumed to be 
stable across adoptions (cf. page 36), costs can be assumed to be largely comparable. For the purposes 
of this study, policies are characterised as entailing either low/invisible or high costs.59 The threshold 
for this distinction is set at CHF 50 000.60 
The federal government or other national organisations may cover some of the costs that states incur 
in adopting an innovative policy. Such organisations act as ‘diffusion agencies’, with financial incentives 
being one means of influence that such agencies can make use of. Again, the availability of external 
funding does not affect the properties of an innovative policy as such, but represents a diffusion effect. 
Hence, costs are to be specified in terms of the full costs budgeted for policy implementation, while 
financial top-down influences need to be taken into account separately (see Chapter 4.3).  
                                                          
57 The efforts of Fédération Fourchette verte Suisse at defining standardised restaurant food nutrition labels for 
various categories of catering facilities are an example of this strategy (see Chapter 5.5). 
58 For example, the costs of implementing an individual regulatory measure are hardly visible from government 
budgets or financing plans unless the policy is associated with the creation of a new administrative unit or the 
expansion of an existing one. 
59 This two-fold classification is motivated by the same considerations as laid out in footnote 57. 
60 In principle, implementation costs should be standardised to the cost level incurred by a canton with an 
average population size and adjusted for inflation. Yet, for the policies studied, the classification into the two 
categories is evident from the level of gross spending. Hence, the unstandardized values will be reported. 
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4 The Policy Field Studied: Public Health Policy in Switzerland 
Throughout the past two decades, numerous federal, cantonal and municipal policy-making activities 
in Switzerland centred on public health, often entailing processes of policy innovation and diffusion. In 
fiscal terms, public health is of relatively minor importance when compared to the entire health 
system, though. As in other OECD countries, public health accounts for a small fraction of total health 
expenditure, while the lion’s share of health spending is allocated to curative care (OECD/WHO 2011: 
40, 42). Thus, the share of total Swiss health expenditure spent on safety and health, disease and 
accident prevention and health promotion fluctuated between 2.6 percent in 1995 and 2.1 percent in 
2012, while the absolute level of spending rose from CHF 937.9 million to 1451.5 million in the same 
period of time (BFS 2014).61 
Chapter 4.1 portrays the policy field, discusses the selection of the policies studied and describes the 
specification and measurement of core concepts in the context of Swiss public health policy making. It 
is divided into three subchapters. The first one outlines public health policy making and 
implementation in Switzerland.62 In doing so, it first details the competencies, fields of activity and 
most important state and parastatal actors63 at the federal, and then, at the cantonal level.64 Next, the 
significant role of private actors in the policy field is highlighted. The subsequent sections focus on 
forms of cooperation in policy making between the Confederation and the cantons, summarise federal 
and cantonal fiscal responsibilities and present the most important institutions of intercantonal 
exchange and cooperation. Unless otherwise noted, Chapter 4.1 portrays the situation as of 2015. 
Occasionally, important changes over time are outlined, but it is beyond the scope of this subchapter 
to fully trace developments in the policy field since the 1990s. 
The second subchapter outlines why cantonal policy making in the fields of disease prevention and 
health promotion was chosen as the field of study, before presenting the criteria that guided the 
selection of policies. Next, the selection procedure that was used and the difficulties encountered in 
identifying suitable policies are described. At last, it lists the policies selected. 
Chapter 4.3 then specifies the core concepts of “policy adoption”, “policy implementation” and 
“diffusion” in the light of Swiss public health policy making and provides the operational definitions of 
these concepts. 
                                                          
61 These figures underestimate the level of expenditure on public health somewhat, though. This is because at 
the federal level they cover only expenses financed by general tax revenues. Thus, the expenses for medical 
prevention under obligatory health insurance and the spending on alcohol, tobacco and accident prevention by 
the Swiss Alcohol Board, Tobacco Prevention Fund and Swiss Council for Accident Prevention respectively are 
not included (BAG 2007: 29). 
62 For a description of the division of responsibilities in the field of health policy as a whole, see OECD/WHO 
(2011: 34) and Kocher (2010). 
63 The term “parastatal” is used to designate public-law or private-law organisations that do not belong to the 
central public administration, but were set up by the state and mandated to deliver particular public services. 
64 The Swiss municipalities also carry out important tasks in public health as many cantons delegate policy 
implementation in certain areas to the lowest state level. Since the explanatory models of cantonal policy 
innovation that will be estimated later on do not take processes of bottom-up diffusion into account, municipal 
activities in public health will only be briefly mentioned in Chapter 4.1. 
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 Description of the Policy Field65 
Federal competencies, fields of activity and actors66 
In line with the principle of cantonal autonomy, federal policy making in public health (as in any other 
policy field) is confined to tasks that the federal constitution explicitly assigns to the Confederation. 
Table 4 lists the constitutional provisions that delineate federal competencies in safety and health, 
disease prevention, accident prevention and health promotion. As becomes evident, federal 
jurisdiction extends to a sizable range of public health issues. Federal competencies in safety and 
health are particularly extensive, covering product safety, occupational safety and health, the safety 
of natural and built environments, and human safety in biomedicine. Regarding prevention, the federal 
government is tasked with preventing communicable diseases as well as non-communicable diseases 
that are prevalent or malignant. Within its jurisdiction over obligatory health insurance, the federal 
level decides on what preventive medical measures are included in the package of insurance benefits. 
Given its regulatory competencies for accident insurance, the Confederation legislates on occupational 
and non-occupational accidents. The prevention of alcohol- and tobacco-related health problems also 
falls within federal jurisdiction. Art. 105 of the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation (CH 
CONST.) specifically requires the federal level to combat the harmful effects of alcohol consumption. 
Furthermore, the Confederation has the right to levy taxes on tobacco, distilled alcohol and beer. 
Concerning health promotion, it is responsible for the promotion of sports. 
Table 4: Realms of federal competencies in public health and corresponding constitutional provisions67 
▪ General: protection of health (Art. 118 1 CH CONST.) 
▪ Product safety: regulation of foodstuffs, therapeutic products, narcotics, organisms, chemicals and 
items that may be harmful to health (Art. 118 2a CH CONST.); protection against ionising radiation 
(Art. 118 2c CH CONST.); consumer protection (Art. 97 1 CH CONST.) 
▪ Occupational safety and health: protection of employees (Art. 110 1a CH CONST.); regulation of 
accident insurance (Art. 117 CH CONST.) 
▪ Safety of the natural environment: environmental protection (Art. 74 CH CONST.); water protection 
(Art. 76 CH CONST.); forest protection (Art. 77 CH CONST.); protection against misuse of non-human 
gene technology (Art. 120 CH CONST.) 
▪ Safety of the built environment: regulation of road transport (Art. 82 1 CH CONST.); railway and other 
means of transport (Art. 87 CH CONST.); nuclear energy (Art. 90 CH CONST.); transport of energy (Art. 
91 CH CONST.) 
▪ Human safety in biomedicine: regulation of research on human beings (Art. 118b CH CONST.); 
protection against the abuse of reproductive medicine and gene technology (Art. 119 CH CONST.); 
regulation of organ, tissue and cell transplantation (Art. 119a CH CONST.) 
▪ Disease and accident prevention: regulation of health insurance and accident insurance (Art. 117 CH 
CONST.); abatement of communicable, widespread or particularly dangerous human diseases (Art. 
118 2b CH CONST.) 
▪ Alcohol and tobacco control: alcohol legislation (Art. 105 CH CONST.); excise taxes on tobacco, 
spirituous beverages and beer (Art. 131 1a-c CH CONST.) 
▪ Health promotion: sports promotion (Art. 68 CH CONST.) 
Source: Own compilation based on the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation (Bundesversammlung 
2016a). 
                                                          
65 Public health policy is defined to embrace the areas of disease prevention, health promotion and safety and 
health. According to this delineation, it does not include curative care, i.e. the treatment of diseases. 
66 Besides the designations in the four national languages (French, German, Italian and Romansh), English titles 
exist for many Swiss political institutions at the national level. If available, existing names in English are made use 
of throughout this and later chapters. Otherwise, own translations are used. In the latter case, the official 
designation in German and/or French is added when the English title is used for the first time. 
67 The Swiss constitution is divided into articles, some of which are subdivided into paragraphs. Paragraphs, in 
turn, may use letters to list matters of fact. In the short notation used here, the first figure designates the article 
and the second (if applicable) the paragraph. 
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In all of these areas of federal jurisdiction, except for widespread or particularly dangerous non-
communicable diseases, fairly encompassing federal laws and ordinances have been passed (BAG 
2007: 16-18; Bundesrat 2009b: 7083-7085). Besides substantive regulatory norms, the pertinent laws 
encompass provisions that define the particular tasks of the Confederation (and the cantons) in more 
detail than the federal constitution does. Such provisions allow the federal level to devise public health 
measures that are based on means of intervention other than regulation, such as the provision of 
information to the public, the commissioning of research on public health topics and the granting of 
financial contributions to private organisations that are active in the areas of disease prevention and 
health promotion (BAG 2007: 16; for details, see BAG 2007: Anhang I-5-Anhang I-7).68 
Regarding the governmental actors involved in public health policy making and implementation at the 
federal level, the Federal Council (i.e. the federal government) and the heads of the different federal 
departments (in particular the Federal Department of Home Affairs) define the fundamental goals of 
public health policy. Such strategic decisions manifest themselves in the legislature planning and the 
annual goals of the Federal Council and the annual goals of the departments and federal offices. Due 
to popular initiatives and referenda, the Swiss people also shape the direction of public health policy, 
at least selectively. For example, in November 2008, the Swiss people voted against the liberalisation 
of the consumption, and cultivation for personal use, of cannabis and thus decided on the course of 
action in drug policy (BK 2015). As another key actor, the federal parliament69 has to endorse legislative 
change in public health. With the exception of earmarked funds and the financial means raised for 
disease prevention and health promotion through social insurance contributions, the federal 
parliament also determines the level of federal funding available for public health. Further, due to their 
oversight of the federal administration, the National Council and the Council of States can influence 
policy implementation to some extent. 
Several administrative bodies at the federal level are responsible for the implementation of federal 
laws and ordinances on public health, including the formulation of concrete disease prevention and 
health promotion measures. These administrative agencies divide into federal offices (i.e. the main 
divisions of federal departments) and public- or private-law units outside the central administration 
(BAG 2007: 6-7). Within the federal administration, the Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH) is the 
leading actor (Achtermann/Berset 2006a: 54).70 The second category of administrative units includes, 
among others, the Swiss Alcohol Board, the Federal Coordination Commission for Occupational Safety, 
the Road Safety Fund, the health insurance funds, the Swiss Council for Accident Prevention, the Swiss 
Accident Insurance Fund, Health Promotion Switzerland and the Tobacco Prevention Fund (BAG 2007: 
19-21). Furthermore, several executive commissions that are composed of professional experts from 
outside the federal administration provide the Federal Council and the departments with technical 
expertise on public health (e.g. the Swiss Federal Commission for Sexual Health). It is important to note 
though that the federal administration plays a limited role in the implementation of federal public 
health (and most other) policies, with the greater part of implementation activities being assigned to 
the cantons and to private actors. 
                                                          
68 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to summarise the wealth of actual policy measures at the federal level. 
For a very informative compilation of federal activities up to 2006, see Achtermann and Berset (2006b: 149-176). 
Current information is available on the websites of federal offices and other administrative units that are in 
charge of federal public health policies. 
69 The Federal Assembly (the national parliament) consists of two chambers: the National Council (NC), which 
comprises 200 members and represents the Swiss people, and the Council of States (CS), which represents the 
cantons and has 46 members. 
70 Other important offices are the Federal Food Safety and Veterinary Office, the Federal Social Insurance Office, 
the Federal Office of Sport, the Federal Roads Office and the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs. 
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Cantonal competencies, fields of activity and actors 
For several reasons, the cantons enjoy wide competencies in public health. First, because of the 
principles of cantonal sovereignty and autonomy, jurisdiction resides with the cantons whenever it is 
not explicitly assigned to the federal level and the cantons are free to decide on what tasks they want 
to fulfil within their realms of jurisdiction (Art. 3, 42, 43 CH CONST.). Despite the expansion of federal 
responsibilities over the years, the cantons retain broad policy-making competencies in public health 
– in particular in the areas of non-communicable diseases, mental-health problems and health 
promotion (BAG 2007: 6). Secondly, the cantons may pass own legislation even in those areas that fall 
within federal jurisdiction – provided that the federal government has not yet enacted exhaustive 
legislation on the issue and that cantonal regulations do not counteract existing federal provisions. To 
give an example, the Federal Supreme Court, i.e. Switzerland’s highest court, confirmed in 2002 that 
the canton of Geneva was authorised to restrict billboard advertising on alcohol and tobacco even 
though certain types of federal alcohol and tobacco advertising restrictions existed (Tribunal fédéral 
2002). Thirdly, federal laws often delegate implementation to the cantons. For example, in the area of 
safety and health, cantons are responsible for food safety inspections and toxin controls, precaution 
against hazardous incidents, radiation protection, biological safety, environmental protection, 
workplace safety and the prevention of occupational accidents and diseases (Kocher 2010: 138). This 
functional division of tasks between the federal government and the cantons, with the former 
providing for the legal framework and the latter being in charge of implementation 
(Vollzugsföderalismus), prevails in many policy fields. Importantly, implementation is often not limited 
to the execution of clearly specified federal rules, but permits the cantons to adapt federal legislation 
to their own needs (Vatter 2014a: 133). Put differently, cantonal implementation may involve devising 
own policy solutions within the federal legal framework.71 
Besides the federal provisions that delineate cantonal responsibilities for public health, as entailed in 
the federal constitution and laws, all cantons possess own legal foundations that define goals, 
responsibilities, fields of activity and particular policies in safety and health, disease prevention, 
accident prevention and health promotion. So as to identify the tasks that the Swiss cantons fulfil in 
public health, it is instructive to peruse the relevant sections of cantonal health acts (see Table 49 in 
the Appendix). Table 5 on the next page lists the fields of activity that are specified in these acts. When 
consulting this list, it is important to keep in mind that the relevant sections in cantonal health acts 
differ starkly in terms of the level of detail provided. Some health acts mention almost all of the areas 
listed in Table 5, while others specify a few fields of activity only. Further, the cantons usually do not 
carry out all of the tasks on their own, but delegate some of them to their municipalities. Activities 
typically assigned to municipalities include school medical and dental services, advisory services to new 
parents and sanitary police. However, there is considerable variation among cantons in terms of the 
scope and types of tasks delegated. Nevertheless, what is apparent from the list is that the Swiss 
cantons have extensive responsibilities for public health. 
Due to differences in financial and administrative resources and in policy priorities, the level of actual 
cantonal activities in public health varies markedly. Some cantons are nowadays active in most of the 
areas listed in Table 5. Others confine themselves to a small number of issues in disease prevention 
and health promotion, besides assuming their responsibilities for safety and health. Most cantons fall 
somewhere in between these poles. Further, in the various fields of activity, the scope of cantonal 
policies may range from individual measures to comprehensive programmes that address multiple 
target groups and settings. It is also worth mentioning that Table 5 lists current cantonal tasks.72 
                                                          
71 Research on interdependent forms of cantonal policy making on health insurance subsidies illustrates the room 
for manoeuvre that cantons have in implementing federal legislation (Füglister 2012a, 2012b). 
72 Within the last 30 years, cantonal activities in public health have undergone considerable change. Until the 
1980s, the cantons had focussed on sanitary measures and the abatement of communicable diseases, the 
alleviation of alcohol-related problems and the provision of school medical services, with many of these activities 
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Table 5: Fields of cantonal activities in public health as defined by cantonal health acts 
▪ Prevention of addiction (alcohol, tobacco, illicit drugs, other addictions); provision of addiction 
counselling services; restrictions on the consumption and sale of, and advertising for, psychoactive 
substances; youth protection 
▪ Provision of school medical and school dental services; school health education; safety and health, 
disease prevention and health promotion in schools and childcare facilities 
▪ Sanitary police – hygiene controls and measures (public places and buildings; restaurants, retail outlets 
and industrial facilities; public swimming pools and similar recreational facilities; dwellings); safety of 
drinking water; sewage water disposal and waste disposal; food safety and toxin controls; safe (and 
dignified) handling of dead bodies and burial of the dead 
▪ Promotion of prenatal and perinatal health; promotion of maternal health; provision of advisory 
services to parents, in particular to expecting parents and parents of infants and small children 
▪ Prevention of communicable diseases, including vaccination campaigns and programmes 
▪ Prevention of non-communicable diseases; prevention of prevalent and serious diseases 
▪ Early diagnosis of risk factors and diseases 
▪ Prevention of accidents 
▪ Prevention of physical violence 
▪ Prevention of mental health disorders; promotion of mental health 
▪ Occupational safety and health; prevention of occupational diseases and accidents; health promotion 
at the workplace; occupational hygiene 
▪ Promotion of sexual health; promotion of sexual self-determination (in particular of adolescents and 
young adults); assistance to family planning 
▪ Disease prevention and health promotion for the elderly 
▪ Environmental safety; building safety 
▪ Promotion of sports; promotion of a healthy nutrition 
Sources: Own compilation based on analysis of cantonal health acts (see Table 49 in the Appendix). 
In short, there is considerable variation in public health policies – by canton, by issue area and over 
time. Since comprehensive compilations of cantonal activities (past or present) are lacking (see 
Chapter 4.2), it is impossible to fully portray or compare cantonal activities. At least, figures on public 
health expenditure convey an idea about the fiscal scope of cantonal activities and trends over time. 
Figure 7 on the next page depicts per capita spending on public health for the 26 cantons in 1990 and 
2012. The data combine cantonal and municipal spending in four categories: alcohol and drug 
prevention, disease control, school medical services and food safety controls (SRS 2014: 61-62). 
Because of differences in cantonal accounting systems, these figures have to be interpreted with some 
caution.73 However, an overall trend towards increased spending on public health between 1990 and 
2012 is clearly visible. 
                                                          
dating back to the early 20th century (Achtermann/Berset 2006a: 22-23). In the 1980s, in response to federal 
HIV and drug policies and the New Public Health paradigm promoted by the WHO and the United Nations, the 
first cantons began to shift their attention to behavioural risk factors to health and to factors essential for the 
preservation of health. Other cantons followed suit in the 1990s and 2000s. As a consequence, cantons extended 
their activities in disease prevention and health promotion to such areas as cancer, HIV/AIDS, sexual health, the 
prevention of addiction, healthy nutrition, physical exercise, mental health, health promotion at the workplace 
and health promotion for the elderly (Achtermann/Berset 2006a: 22-27). 
73 The financial statistics data are based on a harmonised accounting model. They are compiled by the 
municipalities and the cantons and edited by the Federal Finance Administration. Data on total revenue and 
spending should be fairly comparable. However, the comparability of data disaggregated by function (such as 
public health) is somewhat compromised since not all cantons and municipalities code the data according to the 
pre-determined nomenclature (EFV 2011: 63; BAG 2007: 29). 
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Figure 7: Per capita spending on public health (in CHF, 2010 prices), 1990 and 2012 
 
Source: Own calculation based on data from the Federal Finance Administration (EFV 2015a). 
As regards the relevant actors at the cantonal level, cantonal governments define the policy priorities 
in public health policy making. Nowadays, most cantons include specific public health goals in the 
overall legislature planning. In a few cantons, such goals feature in departmental planning instead 
(VBGF 2010: 14). For more elaborate planning purposes, some cantons formulate comprehensive plans 
on disease prevention and health promotion, which define the strategic direction for the entire policy 
field. More limited planning instruments that focus on specific issue areas (e.g. addiction) or target 
groups (e.g. the elderly) are more common, though. In several cantons, executive commissions for 
prevention and health promotion or for particular issues (e.g. addiction) have an important role in 
drafting such plans and more generally in advising cantonal governments on strategic and operational 
issues.74 Specialised administrative units and/or external organisations are also often involved in 
preparing the strategic decisions made by cantonal governments. 
Cantonal parliaments set an important parameter of public health policy making, i.e. the budgetary 
resources available for safety and health, prevention and health promotion policies. Further, they are 
in a position to adopt new or change existing cantonal acts (provided that such changes are not 
rejected by the people in an obligatory or facultative referendum).75 Hence, cantonal parliaments are 
the most important actors when it comes to the adoption of public health policies that are enshrined 
in legislation. Overall, however, parliaments tend to play a less important role in cantonal than in 
federal public health policy making. This is because various institutional factors restrict the policy-
making capacities of cantonal parliaments. These factors include the popular election and hence the 
distinct legitimacy of cantonal governments, the low degree of professionalization of most cantonal 
parliaments as contrasted with the sizable resources of many cantonal administrations, and the 
strongly developed institutions of direct democracy at the cantonal level (Vatter 2014b). As a result, 
executive dominance is more pronounced at the cantonal than at the federal level. 
Regarding public health, cantonal governments tend to have a particularly strong position in disease 
prevention and health promotion. Based on their right to issue ordinances, they can often adopt such 
policies on their own (within the budgetary limits defined by parliament). At the same time, direct-
democratic rights, which are more extensive at the cantonal than at the federal level, restrict 
traditional parliamentary competencies. Thus, legislative initiatives and facultative and obligatory 
referenda give the people a say on legislative change. For example, in several cantons, initiatives and 
referenda on smoking restrictions in restaurants were held during the past decade. Financial referenda 
allow citizens to restrict cantonal spending, e.g. by rejecting costly public health policies. The relative 
powers of the executive, the legislature and the people vary between cantons, though. In cantons with 
                                                          
74 The composition and size of such commissions differ between cantons. Besides representatives of various 
administrative units that are responsible for public health, they often comprise professional experts from the 
field and may also include representatives of the municipalities and members of cantonal parliaments. 
75 Appenzell-Innerrhoden and Glarus are an exception – in these cantons, the cantonal parliaments draft 
legislation, but only the people’s assemblies are authorised to enact legislative change. 
0
50
100
150
AG AI AR BE BL BS FR GE GL GR JU LU NE NWOW SG SH SO SZ TG TI UR VD VS ZG ZH
1990 2012
52 
more professionalized parliaments and less extensive direct-democratic rights (e.g. GE), parliaments 
are more powerful (Vatter 2014b: 255). 
Similar to the federal level, competencies for public health cut across the institutional boundaries of 
departments and subordinate units of cantonal administrations.76 Thus, various departments are 
responsible for the formulation and implementation of public health policies. In all cantons, the 
department that is in charge of health also holds the primary responsibility for public health. Since 
educational facilities are an important setting for cantonal public health policies, departments of 
education are another important actor in policy making and implementation. As the cantons differ 
substantially in terms of departmental structures and official designations do not always reveal to what 
department the responsibility for health is assigned, Table 6 lists the respective department in charge 
of health. 
Table 6: Cantonal department in charge of health (including public health) 
Type of department Cantons 
Department of health AR, BS, SG, ZG, ZH 
Department of health and social affairs AG, AI, BE, FR, LU, NW, TI, VD 
Department of finance and health GL, NE 
Department of health and economic affairs BL 
Department of justice, security and health GR 
Department of employment, social affairs and health GE 
Department of health, social affairs, personnel and municipalities JU 
Department of health, social affairs and the environment UR 
Department of health, social affairs and culture VS 
Department of home affairs  SH, SO, SZ 
Department of finance OW 
Department of finance and social affairs TG 
Sources: Own compilation based on cantonal websites. 
Various subordinate administrative units are typically involved in fulfilling the more routine tasks in 
the implementation of public health policies – within both the department responsible for health and 
other departments. To name just the most important ones, health, school, social security, economic 
affairs and labour offices, medical services and the police deliver, oversee the delivery and enforce 
public health policies. Again, cantonal structures differ considerably. Below, a few aspects will be 
highlighted, without describing cantonal structures in full detail. 
All cantons have offices, divisions, subdivisions or positions that are charged with the prevention of 
communicable diseases and the provision of drug, food, product, water and environmental safety as 
well as biosafety.77 Medical services under the direction of cantonal health officers are responsible for 
the abatement of communicable diseases (VKS 2015),78 while cantonal pharmacists are to ensure drug 
safety (KAV 2015). Laboratories that are headed by cantonal chemists carry out inspections, controls 
and analyses that are to ensure food, product, water, environmental and biosafety (VKCS 2015). In 
doing so, these cantonal units implement relevant federal acts. Further, in all cantons, labour 
                                                          
76 The Swiss cantons use different designations for their administrative units. For example, some cantons term 
the main units of administration “departments”, whereas other cantons designate them as “directorates”. For 
reasons of comparability, generic terms are used here. Hence, the term “departments” is used to designate the 
organisational units that constitute the highest level of cantonal administrations, i.e. the units that are headed 
by ministers. “Offices” stands for the administrative units that are directly subordinate to departments, whereas 
“divisions” and “subdivisions” refer to administrative structures within cantonal offices. The term “position” is 
used for the smallest organisational units. 
77 Several smaller cantons run joint institutions, in particular joint laboratories for food and product safety. 
78 In some cantons, medical services also direct or supervise school medical services and/or are responsible for 
non-medical measures in disease prevention and health promotion (VKS 2015). 
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inspectorates exist, which ensure compliance with federal occupational safety and health regulations 
(IVA 2015). In short, cantonal health officers, chemists, pharmacists and labour inspectors take care of 
preventive medicine and safety and health at the cantonal level. 
Regarding the implementation of health promotion and non-medical disease prevention policies, all 
cantons have designated a delegate, who coordinates cantonal activities and represents the canton in 
the Association of Cantonal Delegates for Health Promotion (ADHP) (Vereinigung der kantonalen 
Beauftragten für Gesundheitsförderung in der Schweiz/Association suisse des responsables cantonaux 
pour la promotion de la santé) (VBGF 2015). 
Likewise, in drug policy, a delegate for drug-related issues coordinates cantonal activities. Jointly these 
delegates form the Conference of Cantonal Delegates for Drug-Related Issues (Konferenz der 
Kantonalen Beauftragten für Suchtfragen/Conférence des délégués cantonaux aux problèmes des 
addictions) (SODK 2018). 
Apart from that, cantonal administrative structures are quite diverse.79 First, regarding the second 
highest level of cantonal administrations, the overall responsibility for health promotion and disease 
prevention mostly resides with cantonal health or similar offices. St. Gallen is the only canton that has 
an office for prevention (Amt für Gesundheitsvorsorge). In Bern, Nidwalden and Obwalden, the office 
for social affairs is responsible for health promotion and disease prevention, while in Basel-Landschaft 
the general secretariat of the department fulfils that task. Secondly, all cantons rely to some extent on 
public- or private-law organisations outside the central administration for the delivery of health 
promotion and disease prevention measures. Thus, they regularly award performance mandates to 
external organisations as well as subsidise organisations that are active in disease prevention and 
health promotion. Yet, the cantons diverge in terms of the extent to which they make use of external 
bodies. In this respect, the most conspicuous difference is that five cantons (JU, UR, SH, VS, ZH) have 
contracted out health promotion and prevention almost entirely. In those cantons, external 
organisations are mandated to serve as specialised units on health promotion and prevention and to 
implement the lion’s share of cantonal activities.80 Third, if we look at those cantons that have not 
contracted out health promotion and prevention, we find that the level of administrative resources 
that cantons have at their disposal ranges from sizable specialised divisions to the assignment of these 
functions to one particular multifunctional position (i.e. the head of the cantonal health office or the 
cantonal health officer). 
Private actors in public health policy making and implementation 
Private organisations play an important part in the field of public health, notably in disease prevention 
and health promotion. Manifold such organisations exist, including local, regional and national 
organisations. In terms of degree of professionalization and size, the spectrum ranges from small self-
help groups to large-scale organisations with sizable professional staff levels. Both non-profit and for-
profit organisations are active in public health. Many organisations specialise in a particular issue area 
(such as addiction or healthy nutrition), while others cover a wider range of topics. Health leagues, 
professional and specialist organisations, centres of competence and other service deliverers, patient 
organisations, health insurance funds and many more engage in public health. Furthermore, various 
networks of public health organisations exist, which join organisations according to issue area (e.g. 
                                                          
79 This section is based on an analysis of cantonal websites. 
80 These organisations are: Fondation O2 (JU), Gesundheitsförderung Uri (UR), Verein für Jugendfragen, 
Prävention und Suchthilfe VJPS (SH), Gesundheitsförderung Wallis (VS) and the Epidemiology, Biostatistics and 
Prevention Institute of the University of Zurich (ZH). In Uri, Schaffhausen and Zurich, the heads of these 
organisations also serve as cantonal delegates for health promotion. In Jura and Valais, a staff member of the 
cantonal administration fulfils this function. 
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mental health) or setting (e.g. schools or hospitals). In short, a myriad of private organisations deals 
with public health issues.81 
In terms of public health policy making and implementation, private organisations matter in several 
ways. To begin with, in disease prevention and health promotion, private organisations are often at 
the origin of policy innovation. In many instances, private organisations devise new strategies and 
approaches and launch innovative projects. In adopting public health policies, federal, cantonal and 
municipal governments regularly draw on such privately-initiated projects.82 Secondly, as mentioned 
above, the representatives of private organisations serve (among others) on executive commissions 
and thus bring in their ideas and expertise into policy making. Third, private organisations participate 
in the political process as advocacy groups that lobby for pro-public health policies (cf. Vatter/Rüefli 
2014: 839). Fourth, they raise financial and human resources independently from the state (e.g. 
through donations or volunteering) and are thus in a position to provide services or benefits that are 
neither paid for nor delivered by state authorities. Finally, owing to the pattern of subsidiary policy 
implementation in Switzerland, private organisations also deliver a sizable share of services and 
benefits in disease prevention and health promotion on behalf of federal, cantonal and municipal 
authorities. 
Cooperation between the Confederation and the cantons in public health policy making83 
As the above paragraphs show, the federal government and the cantons are both responsible for public 
health. In safety and health, a clear division of federal (legislation) and cantonal tasks (implementation) 
exists. In disease prevention and health promotion, the federal level and the cantons fulfil parallel and 
overlapping tasks, though.84 Naturally, this constellation raises the question as to whether and in what 
ways the two state levels cooperate in these areas. Below, two aspects of vertical cooperation are 
sketched – the formulation of joint policy priorities and specific policies.85 
So far, federal government and cantons do not engage in any process of comprehensive priority-setting 
for public health. Thus, an overall public health strategy that is mutually agreed upon is lacking 
(Achtermann/Berset 2006a: 138, 150).86 However, the Confederation and the cantons have intensified 
their cooperation at the strategic level in recent years. More specifically, they set up the National 
Health Policy Dialogue as a permanent platform for exchange between federal and cantonal officials. 
                                                          
81 A complete list of public and private public health organisations does not exist. However, two websites list a 
number of organisations – the website of the Swiss Society for Public Health (Public Health Schweiz 2015) and 
QUINT-ESSENZ, which also allows searching for different types of organisations (Health Promotion Switzerland 
2015). 
82 To give an example, the private foundation IdéeSport devised and carries out the project “OpenSunday”, which 
intends to promote physical exercise among children aged 7 to 12 years through the opening-up of local sports 
halls every Sunday afternoon, including the provision of sports equipment and guidance. Currently, nine cantons 
have absorbed this project into their programmes on the promotion of a healthy body weight (Stiftung IdéeSport 
2015). 
83 For an assessment of the quality of coordination in public health, see the last OECD review of the Swiss health 
system (OECD/WHO 2011: 116-121). 
84 According to Achtermann and Berset (2006a: 31-34), federal and cantonal responsibilities used to be clearly 
separated. Shared responsibilities arose in the late 1980s when the federal government assumed new tasks in 
response to HIV/AIDS and drug-related problems. 
85 Other forms of cooperation are the participation of cantons in federal policy making through the vertical 
institutions of Swiss federalism as well as the consultation of the Conference of Cantonal Governments 
(Konferenz der Kantonsregierungen/Conférence des gouvernements cantonaux) on the Federal Council’s 
legislature planning (Achtermann/Berset 2006a: 130-139). They are not elaborated here. 
86 A federal bill on prevention and health promotion from 2009 provided for the Federal Council, in cooperation 
with the cantons, to formulate and adopt national goals on disease prevention and health promotion. These 
goals were to serve as the cornerstones of a coherent Swiss strategy in the policy field and were to direct federal 
and cantonal policy making alike (Bundesrat 2009a, 2009b). However, due to the rejection of the draft law by 
the Federal Assembly in 2012, binding national goals have not been formulated to date. 
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Since its initiation in 2004 and particularly since its strengthening in 2013, the platform has allowed 
the Confederation and the cantons to define joint goals in specific areas of health policy, including 
public health, and to launch projects in order to accomplish these goals. The National Health Policy 
Dialogue makes recommendations, which are directed at the Federal Council and the cantons, but are 
not binding (Bund/GDK 2003: 2-3). 
Similar to the identification of policy priorities, the separate formulation of specific policies by the two 
state levels used to be and still is the predominant pattern (cf. Achtermann/Berset 2006a: 142, 145). 
With the exception of drug policy and the prevention of HIV/AIDS, federal and cantonal cooperation 
had been infrequent (Achtermann/Berset 2006a: 145). In recent years, this picture has changed 
somewhat as efforts at joint policy formulation have intensified. This is evident from the National 
Health Policy Dialogue and from the evolution of national prevention programmes. While the federal 
government used to develop such programmes on its own authority, several recent and current 
programmes were formulated in cooperation with the Swiss Conference of the Cantonal Ministers of 
Public Health (CMPH). These include the national prevention programmes on alcohol (2008-2012, 
2013-2016), on tobacco (2008-2016) and on nutrition and physical activity (2008-2016), with the CMPH 
being involved in the strategic direction of the first two programmes (BAG 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2012, 
2013a). While national prevention programmes define joint goals, objectives and areas of intervention, 
cantons are free to decide on whether and how they contribute to programme implementation. 
Cantonal and federal fiscal responsibilities in public health 
In general, Confederation and cantons pay for the public health tasks that they fulfil from their own 
revenues (Vatter/Rüefli 2014: 836). Based on federal legislation, cantons receive or have access to four 
particular forms of funding for public health measures, though: 
(1) They receive one tenth of the taxes that the Swiss Alcohol Board collects on spirituous beverages, 
with the amount being split among cantons in proportion to their population share. They have to 
use these financial means for the prevention of the abuse of alcohol or other psychoactive 
substances and are required to give account of how they spend their share of revenues by 
submitting an annual report to the Swiss Alcohol Board (EAV 2015a). 
(2) Since 2006, cantons that establish tobacco prevention programmes can receive funding from the 
Tobacco Prevention Fund (TPF).87 Provided that the cantonal programme contributes to the 
federal tobacco control strategy (i.e. the National Tobacco Programme 2008-2016) and meets 
certain other requirements, the TPF covers up to 50 percent of programme costs (TPF 2012). 
(3) Health Promotion Switzerland, a joint institution of cantons and health insurance funds (see page 
57), co-finances cantonal action programmes on a healthy body weight among children and 
adolescents since 2007 (Gesundheitsförderung Schweiz 2015). Again, cantonal programmes have 
to fulfil certain criteria to be eligible for funding. 
(4) Under the Federal Accident Insurance Act, a supplement of 6.5 percent is levied on insurance 
premiums in order to finance the prevention of occupational accidents and diseases. Cantonal 
labour inspectorates receive a small fraction of these earmarked contributions (BAG 2007: 33). 
Institutionalised forms of cantonal exchange and coordination in public health 
Besides temporary forms of cooperation, the Swiss cantons have several institutions at their disposal 
that allow for exchange and joint policy formulation in public health. The most important institutions 
                                                          
87 TPF is a parastatal unit that pays for measures that are to prevent smoking initiation, to facilitate smoking 
cessation and to protect non-smokers against passive smoking. It is funded through a levy of 2.6 centimes on 
every packet of cigarettes sold (TPF 2016). 
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are the Swiss Conference of the Cantonal Ministers of Public Health (CMPH)88, including its regional 
and technical conferences, and Health Promotion Switzerland. 
CMPH, which was founded in 1919, aims at facilitating intercantonal exchange on health issues and at 
representing cantonal interests vis-à-vis the Confederation (Achtermann/Berset 2006a: 95). It is 
composed of the 26 cantonal health ministers, who constitute the plenary assembly of the organisation 
(GDK 2015). It also possesses a managing board, which is made up of eleven health ministers, and a 
permanent secretariat with currently 15 full-time positions (GDK 2015). In the 1990s and 2000s, CMPH 
paid relatively little attention to public health (Achtermann/Berset 2006a: 98; van der Linde 2005: 48). 
The participation of the CMPH in national public health policy making and the related creation of an 
organisational unit on health policy strategies, disease prevention and health promotion within the 
secretariat suggest that public health figures somewhat more strongly on its current agenda. Still, none 
of the many internal technical commissions, working groups and similar specialised bodies of the 
national association deals with public health (cf. GDK 2015). 
From the mid-1970s onwards, four regional conferences of the CMPH were created (Achtermann/ 
Berset 2006a: 81-87). Each of these is made up of the cantonal health ministers of the respective 
region. Most cantons belong to one regional conference, but three cantons are affiliated with two 
conferences (see Table 7). The level of intercantonal cooperation within these conferences varies 
greatly, with cooperation being much stronger within the Conférence latine des affaires sanitaires et 
sociales (CLASS) than among the members of the other conferences (Achtermann/Berset 2006a: 74, 
80). 
Further, CLASS is also the only regional conference that has institutionalised a platform for cooperation 
in disease prevention and health promotion, the Commission Prévention et Promotion de la Santé 
(CPPS). CPPS is a permanent commission that is endowed with its own budget and secretariat (VBGF 
2010: 21-22).89 It is thus not surprising that the French-speaking cantons and the Ticino have developed 
numerous joint projects in disease prevention and health promotion (Achtermann/Berset 2006a: 86). 
In contrast, the other three regional conferences do not have any permanent structures devoted to 
disease prevention and health promotion (VBGF 2010: 21-22; Achtermann/Berset 2006a: 80). Inter-
regional projects are thus rare in North-western, Eastern and Central Switzerland (Achtermann/Berset 
2006a: 100). 
Table 7: Regional conferences within the Swiss Conference of the Cantonal Ministers of Public Health 
Regional conferences Member cantons 
Central Switzerland 
(Zentralschweizer Gesundheits- und Sozialdirektorenkonferenz, ZGSDK) 
LU, UR, SZ, NW, OW, ZG 
Eastern Switzerland 
(Gesundheitsdirektorenkonferenz der Ostschweizer Kantone und des FL) 
ZH, GL, SH, AR, AI, SG, GR, TG90 
Northwestern Switzerland 
(Nordwestschweizer Gesundheitsdirektorenkonferenz) 
BE, LU, SO, BS, BL, AG, JU 
Romandie & Ticino 
(Conférence latine des affaires sanitaires et sociales, CLASS) 
BE, FR, TI, VD, VS, NE, GE, JU 
Note: BE, JU and LU are members of two regional conferences. Source: GDK (2014). 
                                                          
88 Other important institutions are the Swiss Conference of Cantonal Ministers of Social Affairs (Konferenz der 
kantonalen Sozialdirektorinnen und Sozialdirektoren/Conférence des directrices et directeurs cantonaux des 
affaires sociales), which is responsible for certain areas of drug policy (in particular illicit drugs and behavioural 
addictions), as well as the Conference of Cantonal Delegates for Drug-Related Issues (cf. page 55), which is a 
technical conference of the former (SODK 2018). 
89 The CPPS has been formerly known as the Dispositif intercantonal de Prévention et de Promotion de la Santé 
(DiPPS) (Achermann/Berset 2006a: 86). 
90 The Principality of Liechtenstein is not relevant for this study and is thus excluded. 
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Apart from these regional conferences, five technical conferences are integrated into the CMPH, i.e. 
the associations of cantonal health officers, dental officers, pharmacists, chemists and delegates for 
health promotion (KdK 2012). The first four serve as platforms for intercantonal coordination in fields 
of safety and health, while the Association of the Cantonal Delegates for Health Promotion (ADHP) is 
to further cooperation in disease prevention and health promotion (on ADHP, see also page 53). In 
contrast to regional conferences, technical conferences do not convene government representatives, 
but officials from public administrations. 
ADHP was founded in 2000 by 15 cantons (VBGF 2010: 21). Nowadays, all cantons are represented. 
The members of the conference divide into four regional sections.91 The 26 cantonal delegates for 
health promotion meet at least once a year, while the regional sections hold at least three annual 
meetings (VBGF 2013: 2-3). Furthermore, ADHP has a managing board that consists of four members, 
each of whom represents one region, as well as a small secretariat. 
Whereas the intercantonal conferences just described clearly belong to the horizontal institutions of 
Swiss federalism (cf. Vatter 2014a: 136-138), Health Promotion Switzerland represents a different 
type of institution. Being founded in 1989 on the initiative of the canton of Vaud, the institution 
became enshrined in federal legislation in the course of the 1994 revision of the Federal Health 
Insurance Act (van der Linde 2005: 32; BAG 2007: 22). As laid down in Art. 19 of the Federal Health 
Insurance Act, Health Promotion Switzerland is a joint institution of cantons and health insurance 
funds, being mandated to stimulate, coordinate and evaluate measures in disease prevention and 
health promotion. It is financed through earmarked levies (BAG 2007: 22).92 As a private-law 
foundation, Health Promotion Switzerland is governed by a board that determines the strategic 
direction of the organisation. The majority of seats of the board are allotted to cantons and health 
insurance funds on a parity basis. Besides representatives of other public health organisations, the 
board includes one person that is dispatched by the FOPH since Health Promotion Switzerland is 
subject to federal surveillance (BAG 2007: 22). 
Health Promotion Switzerland is not a purely intercantonal institution. Nevertheless, it constitutes an 
important channel for cooperation between cantons. Many of the projects sponsored by Health 
Promotion Switzerland are developed and tested by a small number of cantons in collaboration with 
the staff of the organisation. Once integrated into one of the programmes of Health Promotion 
Switzerland, these measures become available to all cantons. As mentioned in the section above, the 
organisation also provides financial incentives for the adoption of disease prevention and health 
promotion measures through the partial funding of cantonal action programmes on a healthy 
bodyweight. During the period 2007-2018, Health Promotion Switzerland concentrates on three 
priority areas: healthy body weight among children and adolescents, mental health/stress and the 
strengthening of health promotion (Gesundheitsförderung Schweiz 2006). 
 Selection of Policies 
Rationale for the choice of the policy field 
Swiss cantonal public health policies – or more precisely, disease prevention and health promotion 
policies – are used as the empirical basis for testing the hypotheses as formulated in Chapter 3. In 
principle, the implications of policy attributes for innovation decisions should be similar for national, 
subnational and local decision making regardless of the country and policy field chosen. So, what are 
the reasons for focussing on the Swiss cantons and on disease prevention and health promotion? 
                                                          
91 The division is the same as the one displayed in Table 7, with the exception that each canton participates in 
one section only (BE: North-western Switzerland, LU: Central Switzerland, JU: Romandie & Ticino). CPPS serves 
as the regional section of the Romandie & Ticino. 
92 Currently, every person insured under obligatory health insurance pays an annual contribution of CHF 2.40. 
58 
Scholarship both on policy diffusion within federal states and across nation states is extensive. Both 
approaches to studying diffusion have their particular pros and cons. In focussing on policy diffusion 
among subnational units, this study seeks to exploit one comparative advantage of research on federal 
policy diffusion: Subnational units are more similar to each other in institutional, economic and socio-
cultural terms than countries are. There is no denying that sizable differences between the Swiss 
cantons exist (Vatter 2014b: 248-249). Nevertheless, thanks to their integration into the same 
superordinate political system, Swiss cantons (or subnational jurisdictional units in any other country) 
share more commonalities than countries in a sample of similar size would do. This is advantageous as 
it facilitates model specification and reduces the risk of omitting relevant explanatory factors. 
For various reasons, the Swiss cantons are a suitable choice for studying policy innovation and diffusion 
in a federal context. As described in Chapter 4.1, they enjoy wide jurisdictional competencies and 
responsibilities, whereas the Confederation is more constrained in its scope of action. As a result, the 
cantons are often at the forefront of addressing pressing policy problems, resulting in the adoption of 
innovative policies. Further, thanks to the existence of manifold networks of cantonal government 
members, senior and expert officials (cf. page 55), the cantons have a large number of platforms for 
exchange and coordination at their disposal (Vatter 2014a: 136-138). Knowledge about innovative 
policies that are adopted elsewhere in the country is thus likely to spread among cantonal decision 
makers.93 In short, the Swiss political system fulfils important prerequisites for horizontal policy 
diffusion. Hence, Swiss cantons constitute an appropriate setting for an investigation into the impact 
of policy attributes.94 
As regards the selection of policies studied, ideally policies from a wide range of fields would enter the 
analysis so as to ensure that the results obtained hold for policy innovation choices in public policy in 
general. Apart from limited resources, a concern for appropriate model specification precluded the 
selection of a highly diverse set of policies, though. Internal determinants and diffusion effects differ 
across policy fields (cf. Karch 2006: 408). Moreover, specific explanatory factors may have opposite 
effects, such as furthering policy adoption in one field, while impeding it in another. Models on policies 
from multiple fields, which have to take such differences into account, thus become highly complex.95 
That is why this study concentrates on one field, privileging correct model specification and 
measurement validity over a high level of generality. 
In terms of the actual policy field chosen, disease prevention and health promotion lend themselves 
to the present research purpose for two reasons. First, cantonal powers are particularly extensive (see 
page 49). Besides, as Figure 7 on page 51 illustrates, the spending on public health (with the lion’s 
share falling upon disease prevention and health promotion) has increased significantly during the past 
25 years. New cantonal activities are likely to account for a sizable share of this growth. Thus, a 
sufficient number of policy innovations that may serve as objects of investigation should be available.96 
Criteria for policy selection 
For both theoretical and practical reasons, the policies selected need to fulfil a number of conditions 
– they must (1) be public policies, (2) fall into the domains of disease prevention and health 
promotion, (3) fall within cantonal jurisdiction, (4) be substantive policies, (5) constitute policy 
                                                          
93 The division of the country into four language regions might impede the diffusion of policy ideas somewhat, 
though. 
94 Compared to the U.S. states, the choice of Swiss cantons as objects of investigation is associated with one 
methodological drawback: there are only half as many cantons as there are U.S. states. For policies that hardly 
spread, the resultant small number of adopters can impede model estimation (see footnote 184). 
95 Of course, this problem may arise whenever two or more policies are pooled into the same model. But it is 
exacerbated when the policies come from highly different fields. 
96 Nevertheless, the identification of suitable policies proved to be much more demanding than expected (see 
the next but one section). 
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innovations and (6) have been adopted by the first Swiss canton between 1991 and 2005. These 
conditions are detailed and justified below: 
(1) The condition that policies must be public policies might seem obvious. Nevertheless, considering 
the strong presence of private actors in public health and the resultant coexistence of public and 
private activities (see Chapter 4.1), it is worth to be stated. As understood here, public policies are 
based on an authoritative decision made by the people, the cantonal parliament or government. 
However, they do not need to be delivered by public agencies. Instead, they may be implemented 
by private organisations under a public performance mandate. 
(2) See the previous section. 
(3) Owing to the focus on horizontal policy diffusion among the Swiss cantons, the policies studied 
need to fall under cantonal jurisdiction. Put differently, neither the Confederation nor the 
municipalities, but the cantons must decide on policy adoption. As a matter of clarification, areas 
of exclusive cantonal jurisdiction as well as those of concurrent or competing federal and 
cantonal jurisdiction meet this condition.97 In contrast, the incorporation of federal rules into 
cantonal legislation is not considered as an instance of cantonal policy innovation. Similarly, issues 
that the municipalities have the primary responsibility for (at least in some cantons) are 
disregarded. Instances where cantonal decision makers adopt a policy, but delegate its 
implementation to the municipal level qualify as cantonal policy making, though. 
(4) The selection of policies is limited to substantive policies; institutional policies are excluded.98 In 
public health, substantive policies aim at directly affecting individuals’ health outcomes, whereas 
institutional policies modify the institutions and procedures of public health policy making and 
implementation. Substantive policies address societal actors, while institutional policies target 
state actors (and sometimes societal actors, too). As a result, explaining the adoption of these 
different types of policies necessitates also different types of independent variables. Since the 
inclusion of substantive and institutional policies into the same models would “overstretch” the 
latter, the focus rests on substantive policies. Hence, policies that alter the internal workings of 
political or administrative institutions, modify the overall policy process (e.g. health impact 
assessments), affect coordination among public and private actors (e.g. networks) as well as 
research, monitoring and evaluation activities are disregarded. 
(5) As other political science diffusion research, this study is driven by an interest in policy innovation 
rather than incremental policy change. Policy innovation is defined in broad terms here. Based on 
an adaptation of a typology devised by Knill et al. (2010), three instances of policy making are 
classified as innovation: (1) a canton intervenes into a particular public health issue for the first 
time (issue initiation); (2) a canton replaces an existing policy measure in a public health issue 
area with a new one (issue realignment); and (3) a canton complements existing public health 
policy measures with a new one (issue expansion). Most policy innovations selected will fall into 
the third category since instances of issue initiation or realignment are relatively rare. In line with 
previous scholarship, the calibration of already existing policies is not considered as innovation 
(cf. Chapter 2.1). 
(6) Finally, the first cantonal adoption of each policy selected must have occurred between 1991 and 
2005. Longitudinal data on many control variables exist from 1990 onwards. For previous years, 
such data are difficult to come by. For the purpose of addressing the research questions of this 
                                                          
97 Concurrent jurisdiction means that the Confederation and the cantons have the right to regulate a subject on 
the basis of separate legislation (Serdült/Schenkel 2007: 528). In areas of competing jurisdiction, cantons may 
pass own legislation as long as the Confederation has not exhausted its superior legislative competencies. Under 
the conditions of competing responsibilities, federal legislation puts an end to processes of horizontal diffusion. 
In modelling cantonal policy adoptions, this eventuality can be handled by limiting the period of observation to 
the years up to federal legislation. 
98 This distinction is based on Howlett and Ramesh (2003: 116), who use the terms of “substantive policies” and 
“procedural policies”. 
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study, it is important to trace the spreading of the policies from the first cantonal adoption 
onwards. Given the lack of data for the decades prior to the 1990s, policy innovations pioneered 
before 1991 thus cannot be considered. Originally, it was envisaged to limit the period of first-
time cantonal adoption to the year 2000. The idea was that policies that were pioneered by 2000 
would have had ample time to diffuse by 2013 (i.e. the end of the observation period). However, 
information on cantonal policy making in the 1990s was difficult to obtain. Therefore, the period 
of first-time cantonal adoption was extended to 2005 so as to be able to select a larger number 
of policies. 
Selection procedure and difficulties encountered 
Public health policies that meet the six conditions specified in the section above constitute the universe 
of cases for this study. Ideally, the selection procedure used accomplishes two objectives. First, it 
ensures adequate leverage for testing the hypotheses of interest. This calls for a sample of policies that 
exhibit sufficient variation in terms of policy attributes (the key explanatory variables) as well as a 
sufficiently large sample of policies in order to enhance the chances of detecting the effects of the 
policy attributes studied (if existing). Secondly, the selection procedure guarantees external validity, 
i.e. allows for the generalisation of results from the policies selected to the universe of relevant public 
health policies. 
The absence of a comprehensive inventory of public health measures in Switzerland impeded the 
selection of policies. In order to identify relevant policies, the websites of cantons and of professional 
organisations were checked, existing databases were consulted and a number of policy documents 
were screened. In addition, a survey among public health professionals was conducted. Yet, for various 
reasons, this approach to selecting relevant policies did not prove very efficient. As Chapter 4.1 shows, 
public health is a highly complex field that comprises numerous subfields and a plethora of actors, both 
public and private. As a result, a vast number of activities exist that might be eligible for inclusion into 
the sample. Once an activity was identified, it often turned out to be very demanding to ascertain 
whether or not it met the selection criteria, in particular the sixth one. For policies that are not 
enshrined in legislation, it was particularly challenging to establish what cantons had adopted the 
policy, when they did so and whether policy adoption by the pioneering canton fell into the period 
between 1991 and 2005. Unfortunately, the majority of activities that were checked failed to meet at 
least one criterion. 
The difficulties encountered are also partly due to a selection procedure that was suboptimal. For the 
sake of a high level of generality, activities from a wide range of public health issues were examined.99 
It would probably have been advisable to concentrate the efforts on one or a small number of pre-
selected areas and to screen these areas in-depth. Hence, despite considerable time spent on the 
search for policies, only a few policies could be identified. 
The policies selected include two tobacco control policies (the bans on tobacco billboard advertising 
and on tobacco sales to children and adolescents), two alcohol control policies (restriction on alcohol 
sales at petrol stations, ban on takeout alcohol sales at night), one policy in the area of nutrition 
(restaurant food nutrition labelling for restaurants) and one measure for the secondary prevention 
of cancer (breast cancer screening programmes). 
 Specification and Measurement of Core Concepts in the Context of the Policy Field 
Apart from policy characteristics, “policy adoption” and “diffusion” are the most important concepts 
used in this study. This subchapter specifies and operationalises “adoption” and “diffusion” in the light 
                                                          
99 A concern about the fact that different policies that address a particular public health problem are often 
adopted at the same time, e.g. on the occasion of a revision of the cantonal health act or the enactment of a 
cantonal action programme, also motivated the search for policies from diverse subfields. 
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of the policies studied and the institutions that shape Swiss public health policy making. The first 
section looks at policy adoption and discusses a number of issues that arise as some adoptions do not 
manifest themselves in cantonal statutory provisions. Afterwards, “policy implementation” is defined. 
This is because two specifications of regional diffusion will be used throughout the analyses – one 
based on the date of policy adoption, the other based on the date of policy implementation (for the 
reasons, see below). The three following sections deal with the specification and measurement of 
policy diffusion, first clarifying the approach towards the study of diffusion effects and subsequently 
introducing the relevant regional diffusion variables as well as variables that capture nationwide 
diffusion stimuli (“point-source diffusion”). 
Policy adoption 
As most policy innovation and diffusion research, this study seeks to explain the adoption of policies. 
In general, the literature does not pay much attention to the specification of the concept of policy 
adoption. This is because most studies focus on the adoption of policies that have a statutory basis, 
which renders the definition of policy adoption fairly straightforward: The policy is adopted once the 
relevant legal norm is authoritatively approved of. Since the date at which legal provisions are enacted 
is usually published in official sources, data on policy adoption are also relatively easy to collect. Due 
to its primary concern with policy making, diffusion research normally does not follow up on policies 
once they are passed. Yet, it (implicitly) assumes that policies that are adopted are also implemented 
and thus lead to actual policy change. 
In line with this conception, this study considers policies as being adopted by a particular canton if the 
competent legislative body, i.e. government, parliament or the people, takes an authoritative decision 
in favour of the policy. Framing it in terms of the policy cycle, policy adoption signifies that the policy 
has successfully completed the decision-making stage. Upon closer inspection of the policy processes 
underlying some of the six policies studied, it becomes evident that some clarifications are needed in 
order to make this specification workable. For, in some instances, the transitions between the stages 
of policy formulation, decision making and implementation prove to be fuzzy and policies turn out to 
cycle through these stages more than once. The resultant succession of decisions by different actors 
renders it more difficult to determine the whether and when of policy adoption than the above 
definition suggests. 
As an example, in 1993, the government of Vaud authorised and funded a pilot project, which tested 
the feasibility of breast cancer screening programmes in three districts of the canton. It lasted until 
January 1999.100 In March 1999, a canton-wide screening programme was established, subsequent to 
the cantonal parliament appropriating programme funding at the end of 1998. In this example, the 
policy entered the decision-make stage twice – first a decision was taken on the pilot project and later 
on the expansion of the programme. Thus, what decision qualifies as policy adoption? 
As another example, in 2001, the cantons of Jura and Neuchâtel established an intercantonal working 
group so as to look into the establishment of a joint breast cancer screening programme. In passing 
the cantonal budget for 2002, the parliament of Jura provided for the necessary programme funds. 
When the decision in favour of a joint programme was delayed in Neuchâtel for financial reasons, Jura 
decided in January 2004 to launch the project on its own, with the government mandating the cantonal 
section of the Swiss pulmonary league with establishing a screening centre. Again, this raises the 
question as to what decision is the authoritative one – the funding decision by parliament, which was 
taken in 2001, or the governmental decision to set up the programme, which occurred three years 
later? 
                                                          
100 For the relevant sources on this and later examples, see Table 56 and Table 57 in the Appendix. 
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Below, three conceptual issues are addressed so as to concretise the definition of policy adoption: first, 
how pilot projects are dealt with;101 secondly, how other forms of time limits imposed on policies are 
handled; and third, what criteria for determining policy adoption are used if the policy is not enshrined 
in legislation. 
Swiss cantons sometimes test a policy in a small number of municipalities over a limited period of time, 
before expanding the policy to the entire canton. The breast cancer screening pilots in Vaud are one 
example of this practice. Because of the close institutional and cultural links between the French-
speaking Jura bernois and the canton of Jura, the canton of Bern benefits from a particular opportunity 
for conducting pilot projects. Provided that Jura has already adopted a policy, Bern can collaborate 
with the competent authorities from Jura in initiating and testing the policy in its French-speaking 
district, before deciding about canton-wide adoption. In fact, that is how Bern proceeded in 
introducing both restaurant food nutrition labelling and its breast cancer screening programme. Do 
such instances of policy testing qualify as policy adoptions? 
6 et al. (2010: 432) point out that two types of pilot tests exist – true pilot projects, which are policy 
experiments that do not entail a settled policy commitment, and instances where the term “pilot” is 
used to describe the first phase of implementation of a settled policy.102 The distinction made by 6 et 
al. between policy experimentation and gradual implementation is appealing. At first glance, it seems 
a fruitful avenue to follow for differentiating between more or less authoritative forms of policy 
decisions. Accordingly, cantons would be coded as adopters as soon as a settled commitment on a 
policy exists, no matter of whether implementation occurs instantly or gradually. In contrast, true 
experiments would not qualify as policy adoptions because an authoritative decision on the policy is 
still pending. However, on closer examination, it transpires that pilot projects in reality might not neatly 
divide into these two categories. Moreover, secondary sources, as used in this study for collecting data 
on the dependent variable, often do not provide detailed information on the motivations and 
intentions of decision makers and thus do not allow for reliable measurement of different types of 
pilot projects. As a consequence, for the purposes of this study, any authoritative decision to introduce 
a policy, even if on a trial basis, is defined as policy adoption. Thus, in the first example, Vaud is 
recorded as having adopted the policy in 1993. Similarly, Bern qualifies as policy adopter even in 
instances where the policy applies to the Jura bernois exclusively. 
Besides pilot projects, other instances of policy making exist that set a time limit on policies. In Swiss 
public health policy making, policies are often initiated as part of cantonal action programmes, which 
have a predefined duration.103 Such policies may be discontinued at the end of the programme, but 
may also outlast the programme (or may be extended in the course of programme renewal). Again, 
the question arises as to whether or not the adoption of a time-limited policy represents an 
authoritative decision on behalf of that policy. As stated above, policy innovation research is more 
concerned with the incidence than the permanence of policy change. In line with this perspective, this 
study seeks to shed light on the impact of policy attributes on the adoption of policies, not on their 
durability. Hence, it is justified to ignore the eventuality that a policy might be discontinued sooner or 
later. In any case, the actual life span of a policy does not need to correspond to the original intentions 
                                                          
101 Pilot testing of policies is probably endogenous to the explanatory models of interest since it is more likely to 
be used for policies with particular attributes (such as costly or complex policies). In addition, early adopters are 
more likely to make use of pilot projects. 
102 Framing these issues in terms of the concepts that event history analysis provides, one could argue that the 
adoption of a policy on a trial basis and the regular adoption of a policy represent two different types of events 
– i.e. different outcomes of a failure-time process. Hence, cantons that are in the risk set may transition to one 
of two different states: adoption on a trial basis and regular adoption. As a consequence, one might want to 
differentiate between these two types of adoption and model decision-making in terms of a competing risks 
model. 
103 Statutory policies can also be time-limited (“sunset legislation”). This legal practice does not seem to be in 
much use in cantonal public health legislation, though. 
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of policy makers. Policies that are enacted without any restrictions in terms of duration or geographical 
scope may be terminated before long. For these reasons, time limits are treated in the same way as 
pilot projects, with the passage of a time-limited policy being recorded as an instance of policy 
adoption. 
Besides the enacting of statutory provisions that lay down a particular policy, what other decisions 
indicate policy adoption? Depending on the cantonal rules for policy making, the policies concerned 
and the particular circumstances of decision making, authoritative decisions may assume various 
shapes. By way of example, in several cantons, the health department decided on its own responsibility 
to introduce restaurant food nutrition labelling. In other cantons, parliament authorised the policy, 
often by appropriating the funds for more comprehensive action programmes. Against this backdrop, 
it is impossible to define a universally applicable criterion for policy adoption. At the same time, it is 
important to measure adoption in a comparable fashion across policies and cantons. 
In this study, besides the passage of statutory provisions, other concrete indications of governmental 
authorisation, e.g. the issuance of ordinances, or parliamentary authorisation, such as appropriation 
decisions or the adoption of cantonal action programmes, are used.104 If a succession of decisions 
exists, the first one marks policy adoption. Thus, in the above example of Jura, the parliamentary 
appropriation decision in 2001 qualifies as policy adoption, whereas the governmental decision to 
establish the programme is regarded as the first step in implementation. 
In terms of measurement, a few aspects need to be highlighted. Similar to most policy innovation and 
diffusion research, the time of adoption is measured as the year in which the authoritative decision is 
made. In the case of policies that are first approved of by cantonal parliament and then accepted in a 
referendum, the year in which the referendum is held serves as the measure of adoption timing. 
Secondly, as pointed out before, the year in which an authoritative decision is made is used, even if 
policy implementation actually starts several years later.105 For most policies studied, implementation 
began in the year in which the policy was adopted or in the following year. However, the following 
example illustrates that policy implementation might occur quite some time after adoption: In 2008, 
the government and parliament of Solothurn approved a cantonal action programme on healthy body 
weight, including the introduction of restaurant food nutrition labelling. The process of implementing 
the label began somewhat later, with a pilot test being launched in 2010 and Solothurn joining the 
national association that administers the label in 2011. Solothurn is recorded as having adopted the 
policy in 2008 since an authoritative decision on behalf of the policy was made at that time – even 
though the process of making the policy fully operational took several years to come. 
To conclude with a caveat: Moving beyond an exclusive focus on statutory policies implies that the 
policy processes studied become more heterogeneous. As a result, measures of policy adoption are 
possibly not completely comparable across policies. 
Policy implementation 
Decision makers might attach more importance to the actual implementation of a particular policy 
innovation by another government than to the adoption of the policy by that government – especially 
when the policy at stake is technically complex and/or costly in budgetary terms. For instances of 
previous implementation demonstrate that the policy of interest – despite the considerable technical 
and financial demands that it makes – can be put into practice. What is more, instances of previous 
                                                          
104 In a few instances, the exact information required could be obtained from neither secondary sources nor 
public officials who were contacted. In those cases, the time of adoption was approximated based on existing 
information.  
105 Accordingly, for policies that are based on statutory provisions, the date of passage (rather than the date the 
law comes into effect) is used as the date of reference. 
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implementation allow later adopters to explicitly study and learn from the experiences that previous 
adopters have made with implementing the policy. 
Given that for some of the policies studied several years lie in between the dates of adoption and onset 
of implementation (see the section above), testing two specifications of the regional diffusion variable 
– i.e. the share of previous adopters and the share of previous implementers – may yield additional 
insights on what kind of information potential adopters draw on when deciding about innovations. 
That is why this study also records the year in which implementation began, being defined as the entry 
into force of statutory policies or the onset of service delivery in the case of non-statutory policies. 
Diffusion effects: Overview 
Among other things, this study strives to shed light on the impact of policy attributes on the weight of 
diffusion, understood in terms of previous policy choices made by peer governments (“peer effects”). 
It does not aim at disentangling the exact diffusion mechanisms at work, though. Thus, peer effects 
are specified in terms of the channels through which interdependent decision making may occur rather 
than the mechanisms behind such decision making. Like most other diffusion research, this study uses 
the share of prior adopters (or implementers, respectively) among a reference group (“peers”) as a 
measure of horizontal diffusion (see Chapter 2.2). Hence, the analysis refrains from opening the “black 
box” of horizontal diffusion – it does not uncover what forces cause the observed patterns of 
interdependent decision making. 
Concerning the identification of peer governments, this study draws on the CMPH-regions (see page 
65). CMPH-regions are a likely candidate for channelling interdependent decision making as public 
health-related networks of government officials (regional conferences) and senior public officials 
(technical conferences) exist at the regional level of the CMPH (cf. page 55). Information gathered from 
documents on the individual policies and the visualisation of their patterns of diffusion (see Chapter 
5) also suggest that diffusion within these regions is likely to have shaped cantonal adoptions of at 
least some of the policies studied. 
As discussed in Chapter 2.2, neighbouring states might also serve as reference for interdependent 
decision making. Schaltegger (2004), Kübler and Widmer (2007) and Gilardi and Wasserfallen (2016) 
observe neighbour-based diffusion among the Swiss cantons. Some neighbouring cantons, e.g. Basel-
Stadt and Basel-Landschaft, are known to collaborate in public health and in other policy fields. 
Moreover, to the extent that interdependent decision making is driven by citizen demands for public 
policies that exist in other states (cf. Pacheco 2012), the familiarity of citizens with policies in 
surrounding cantons might bring about neighbour-based diffusion. In principle, mass media allow 
Swiss citizens to learn about policies that exist in all parts of the country. However, for reasons such as 
commuter flows, shared media and personal relationships, citizens are likely to be more familiar with 
policies that are in place in neighbouring cantons. In view of these considerations, neighbour-based 
diffusion might be expected to have influenced cantonal innovation decisions on the policies of 
interest. In several instances, the patterns of diffusion revealed in Chapter 5 are also consistent with 
neighbour-based diffusion. Against this backdrop, both neighbour-based diffusion (defined as the 
percentage of previous adopters among neighbouring states) and regional diffusion were tested. Since 
the regional diffusion variables outperformed the neighbour-based one, the presentation of results in 
later chapters will be limited to regional diffusion effects.106 
Controlling for top-down and national diffusion effects requires a somewhat different approach to 
specification and measurement. Since the basic constellation of the Confederation being superior to 
the cantons does not change over time and thus does not entail any variation, top-down diffusion 
effects can only be assessed if federal-government influences that might shape cantonal policy making 
                                                          
106 For reasons of a succinct presentation, the models that include the neighbour-based diffusion variable will 
not be shown. 
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are explicitly identified. Besides the federal level, national intergovernmental associations, such as the 
Swiss Conference of the Cantonal Ministers of Public Health (CMPH), or parastatal organisations, e.g. 
Health Promotion Switzerland, may promote the nation-wide diffusion of policies, too.107 Again, the 
analysis of such national diffusion effects requires the identification of relevant diffusion stimuli that 
emanate from such organisations. 
In many instances, the federal government and national diffusion agencies use similar means of 
influence (e.g. technical assistance) to encourage cantonal policy adoptions. Moreover, policy diffusion 
that is brought about by the federal government or another national organisation likewise represent 
instances of “point source diffusion” (Eyestone 1977: 442): In both cases, the cantons are exposed to 
nationwide diffusion stimuli that emanate from a single source. (Other diffusion channels, in contrast, 
entail multiple sources of stimuli for interdependent decision making, e.g. all previous policy adopters 
in the same region.) Because of the similarity between top-down and national diffusion and for the 
sake of parsimony, the two diffusion channels will be analysed together, being termed “point-source 
diffusion” hereafter. 
Regional diffusion 
With the regional conferences of the CMPH being founded in the mid-1970s to mid-1980s (see page 
56), regional institutions that facilitate intercantonal exchange and joint formulation of health policies 
have been present over the entire period of cantonal policy making studied here. Among the four 
regions, the French-speaking cantons and the Ticino clearly suggest that existing networks of cantonal 
health ministers and public officials respectively promote interdependent decision making on public 
health. After all, the CLASS set up a permanent commission specifically for the harmonisation of 
cantonal legislation and the formulation of joint policies in the areas of disease prevention and health 
promotion (Achtermann/Berset 2006a: 80). 
In Central, Eastern and North-western Switzerland, public health issues seem to have been given 
relatively little formal attention at the governmental level (Achtermann/Berset 2006a: 81-87). 
Moreover, structures that provide for the exchange on disease prevention and health promotion at 
the administrative level are less institutionalised than among the French-speaking cantons and the 
Ticino (see page 56). Still, intercantonal exchange among health ministers, delegates for health 
promotion or other senior civil servants concerned with public health issues is likely to have promoted 
policy diffusion in these regions, too. 
In short, previous policy adoptions by governments within the same CMPH-region are expected to 
positively impact on the likelihood of cantonal policy innovation. As indicators of regional diffusion, 
the percentages of previous adopters/implementers among the members of the respective regional 
conference of the CMPH is used (see Figure 8 on the next page).  
                                                          
107 Relevant parastatal organisations divide into two categories: organisations with a wider mandate that decide 
to sponsor a specific innovation and organisations that are created specifically with the intention to promote the 
Swiss-wide adoption of some policy (see Chapter 5 for some examples). 
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Figure 8: Regional CMPH-conferences 
 
 
Point-source diffusion 
Scholars have shed light on a range of top-down influences, with most research pertaining to federal-
government influences on state-level decision making. Research on the impact of state-level action on 
the innovation decisions of large cities also exists (see page 16). As a basis for detailing the top-down 
influences that this study will control for, the insights from this body of research are reviewed first. 
Specifically, the following types of activities or constellations at the higher state level and their 
potential effects on the behaviour of governments at lower state levels have been examined: the use 
of financial incentives; the adoption of other legal provisions that facilitate or impede innovation, 
including pre-emptive action; the transmission of policy preferences; political debates and agenda-
setting; policy adoption and inversely political stalemate. 
Regarding financial incentives, Welch and Thompson’s (1980) main finding from an analysis of 57 
policies is that incentives greatly increase the speed of diffusion. Moreover, policies with positive 
incentives mainly account for this difference, while policies with negative incentives diffuse hardly any 
faster than policies without incentives. Allen et al. (2004) find that federal grant conditions designed 
to promote the diffusion of truth-in-sentencing laws indeed foster the adoption of such laws. Likewise, 
Karch’s (2006) analysis of state adoptions of individual development accounts reveals a sizable impact 
of federal fiscal provisions. Here, the federal government does not prescribe such accounts, but 
identifies them as a legitimate option for the use of federal funds allocated to state welfare 
programmes. Daley and Garand (2005) focus on the effects of forms of federal funding that are not 
directly related to the particular programme or programme type being studied, but might still affect 
state behaviour. According to their findings, the level of spending by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency allocated to state governments positively impacts on the stringency of state hazardous waste 
site programmes. 
Kim and Jennings (2012) report that the passage of federal provisions that facilitate the administration 
of Medicaid managed care programmes and thus lower the obstacles to innovation contributes to the 
extensiveness of one of two types of managed care programmes studied. This finding matches with 
evidence from Karch (2006). His study shows that federal legislation that entails strict requirements 
for state adoption of medical savings accounts and hence increases the obstacles to innovation 
impedes adoption. Shipan and Volden (2008) focus on statutory provisions that represent the most 
powerful form of intervention that higher state levels can make use of, i.e. to mandate or prohibit 
Central Switzerland Eastern Switzerland 
North-western Switzerland Romandie & Ticino 
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policy innovation. Specifically, the authors look at the enactment of state-level pre-emptive clauses, 
which prevent local decision makers from passing antismoking policies. As expected, pre-emption 
decreases the likelihood of local policy adoptions. 
More indirect forms of federal-level action, such as signals about policy preferences, are shown to be 
influential as well. Thus, in South Korea, the passage of a national act that indicates a strong preference 
for a pro-natalist policy by the national government encourages municipalities to adopt childbirth 
support policies (Kim 2013). Policy diffusion among municipalities occurs, although the national act 
neither requires the latter to take any action nor offers any financial incentives for doing so. While 
Kim’s account represents a case of clear policy signals being sent by the national government, Allen et 
al. (2004) examine what impact weak signals from the federal government about the desired course 
of action have. In failing to furnish a newly enacted law on hate crime statistics with effective 
implementation provisions, the U.S. federal government, Allen et al. (2004: 332) argue, sent an 
ambiguous signal to the states about the need for action on the policy issue. Accordingly, the federal 
intervention turns out not to have a significant effect on state policy adoptions. 
Several studies address the question of what difference national political debates and attention to a 
policy issue by the federal parliament make for state action. According to Karch (2012), the national 
controversy over stem cell research advances the introduction of related bills in state parliaments. 
Similarly, Pacheco and Boushey (2014) find Congressional hearings on the public health issues of 
tobacco and vaccines to exert a positive effect on the number of state bills on tobacco and vaccine 
regulations. Regarding policy adoption, McCann et al. (2015) discover a contingent effect – federal 
agenda-setting activities foster policy adoption in states with professional legislatures and strong 
policy advocates, but fail to do so in other states. 
Turning to policy adoption at the federal level, we learn from Grossback et al. (2004) that legislation 
on sentencing guidelines for the prosecution of criminal offences at the federal level encourages state 
adoption of similar policies. Focusing on an area of concurrent legislation, Shipan and Volden (2008) 
show state-level adoptions of antismoking restrictions to lower the likelihood of local action. Finally, 
what happens if national action clearly is not forthcoming? Allen et al. (2004) find that clear indications 
of political stalemate at the federal level may encourage state decision makers to step in. Thus, U.S. 
states are found to have experienced a significant increase in state adoptions of partial abortion laws 
in the aftermath of the presidential veto to a decision by Congress to ban such abortions. 
In short, research on policy innovation and diffusion provides ample evidence of top-down influences 
affecting the behaviour of lower-level governments. Moreover, Chapter 4.1 shows that public health 
policy making in Switzerland is characterised by overlapping federal and cantonal competencies. 
Against this backdrop, federal activities are likely to have an impact on the processes of cantonal 
decision making on the six policies studied. Top-down diffusion thus needs to be accounted for in the 
models on cantonal policy adoptions. In doing so, the focus will rest on the most important forms of 
influence. Based on the insights from the literature review and on an inspection of actual federal 
activities in the subfields of public health studied, four potential top-down influences are identified 
that the explanatory models will control for: 
(1) financial incentives; 
(2) technical assistance; 
(3) strong signals about the appropriate course of action; 
(4) concrete prospect that federal legislation on a policy issue is forthcoming. 
As pointed out before, apart from the federal government, intergovernmental associations and 
parastatal organisations at the national level may also act as diffusion agencies, employing any of the 
factors of influence just listed – except for the fourth one, which is reserved to federal decision makers. 
With the activities of intergovernmental associations and parastatal organisations being subsumed 
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under the same list of factors, the term of “point-source diffusion” (rather than “top-down diffusion”) 
is used hereafter. Table 8 translates the rather abstract factors of influence into observable activities.  
Table 8: Types of point-source diffusion effects considered: operational definitions and expected effects 
Factor of influence Operational definition Expected effect 
Financial incentives Dummy = 1 for provision of funding for the particular policy 
by the federal government or a national organisation 
Positive 
Technical assistance Dummy = 1 for provision of technical assistance on behalf of 
the particular policy by the federal government or a national 
organisation 
Positive 
Strong signal about 
appropriate course of 
action 
Dummy = 1 for federal government signing international 
treaty that requires adoption of the particular policy 
Positive 
Dummy = 1 for explicit endorsement of the particular policy 
by the Swiss Conference of Cantonal Ministers of Public 
Health  
Positive 
Concrete prospect of 
federal policy making 
Dummy = 1 for pending federal bill that includes the 
particular policy 
Negative 
Dummy = 1 for pending popular initiative that entails federal 
adoption of the particular policy 
Negative 
In accordance with the findings of the studies cited before (cf. Welch/Thompson 1980; Karch 2006), 
financial incentives are expected to increase the likelihood of cantonal policy adoptions. As specified 
here, this factor captures the provision of funding by federal institutions, parastatal organisations or 
intergovernmental associations for the policy, lowering the costs of implementation that cantons must 
shoulder themselves. Grant conditions that make the receipt of federal funds contingent upon the 
adoption of a particular policy, as frequently studied by U.S. scholars (e.g. Allen et al. 2004), do not 
exist for the six policies of interest (see Chapter 5). 
Considering the complex nature of some of the policies and the activities that diffusion agencies 
engage in, another potential form of influence suggests itself: the provision of technical assistance. 
Prospective adopters of a complex policy are likely to be more inclined to consider a policy if services 
or tools exist that render implementation less complex. At least, this expectation motivates diffusion 
agencies to provide consultation, training, opportunities for exchange or similar services and to offer 
such tools as information material, handbooks, software or the like. Technical assistance is thus likely 
to encourage cantonal policy adoptions. 
In line with Kim’s research (2013), strong signals about what constitutes the appropriate course of 
action on a particular issue are hypothesized to render cantonal policy innovation more likely. For such 
signals should strengthen the political clout of policy proponents at the cantonal level. A survey of 
activities in the policy field yields two situations that might entail such strong signals – the federal 
government signing an international treaty that stipulates the adoption of the policy of interest, and 
the Swiss Conference of the Cantonal Ministers of Public Health explicitly calling upon cantons to adopt 
a particular policy. Both situations are likely to convey a sense of what policy solutions are considered 
appropriate, based on national or even international consensus, and thus to encourage cantonal 
adoptions of the innovative policy. Federal and national actors communicate their policy preferences 
also in many other, less compelling ways. However, such messages are unlikely to significantly alter 
the motivations, obstacles or resources that determine the whether and when of cantonal policy 
innovation (cf. Allen et al. 2004). 
Regarding the impact of federal legislation, this study departs from the assumption that for cantonal 
innovation decisions the prospect of federal action on a policy issue is more relevant than indications 
of political stalemate (for the latter, see Allen et al. 2004). More specifically, the concrete prospect 
that the federal government is about to adopt a particular policy is conjectured to discourage the 
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cantons from adopting a similar policy. This expectation rests on two considerations. First, because of 
the precedence of federal over cantonal law, federal legislation may vitiate previous cantonal policy 
choices. Hence, with federal policy making being underway, the cantons have little incentive to act 
themselves. Secondly, the policy-making capacities of most cantons are relatively limited (cf. Chapter 
4.1). Once a federal policy solution in a particular area is in the offing, cantonal decision makers are 
therefore likely to concentrate on other matters. 
Nota bene, prospective federal action might have the opposite effect. With a federal decision being 
imminent, the cantons might decide to make the first move and innovate before the federal level can 
do so – either to forestall federal action and thus safeguard cantonal competencies or to produce a 
fait accompli as a means of directing federal policy making towards the policy solution preferred by 
the respective canton. Being involved in federal policy making through the institutions of vertical 
federalism, cantons have more direct means of shaping federal legislation, though. 
In terms of measurement, pending bills and popular initiatives that aim at federal-level adoption of 
the policy are taken as indicators of federal action being under way. In contrast, declarations of the 
intention to act on an issue, such as the approval of a parliamentary motion or initiative or the 
designation of federal policy adoption as one of the objectives of national prevention programmes, 
are not considered as signs of imminent federal action. Because of the many veto players in the Swiss 
political system, it is uncertain whether and when such declarations of intent can be translated into 
concrete action. 
Stalemate at the federal level might prompt cantonal decision makers to step in and pass own 
legislation. But the incapacity of the federal government to resolve a policy issue is also a sign of the 
issue being contentious. Therefore, federal stalemate is not assumed to prompt cantonal policy 
adoptions. 
Dummy variables are used to measure the various forms of point-source diffusion.108 “Financial 
incentives”, “technical assistance” and “strong signal about appropriate course of action” are coded 1 
from the year of first occurrence onwards throughout the entire period that they persist.109 All 
remaining years are coded 0. “Concrete prospect of federal policy making” is coded 1 from the time 
onwards when the federal bill is tabled, i.e. the beginning of the pre-consultation phase110, or the 
popular initiative is filed until a vote on the bill or initiative is taken. 
As a final note: Some forms of top-down influence discussed in the literature are not considered in this 
study, with federal mandates and pre-emption being the most important ones. They are disregarded 
since during the period of observation the Confederation neither required the cantons to adopt any of 
the six policy innovations studied nor prevented them from doing so. 
                                                          
108 Dummy variables are commonly used in research on top-down influences. Yet, it cannot be ruled out that 
unobserved factors that coincide with the event that is captured by the respective dummy cause the observed 
pattern. This must be kept in mind in interpreting the estimated effects. 
109 More precisely, if the respective factor of influence emerges in the first three months of the year, the year is 
coded 1, based on the assumption that cantons might still respond to it in the same year. In case the financial 
incentive, technical assistance or the signal about the appropriate course of action occurs in April or later, only 
subsequent years are coded 1. Given that cantonal decision-making processes take some time to unfold, it is 
assumed that the impact of such influences will materialise no sooner than in the next year or later. 
110 In Swiss legislative processes at the federal level, pre-consultation precedes parliamentary debate of draft 
laws (Vimentis 2015a). During pre-consultation, the Federal Council invites political parties, interest groups and 
cantons to comment on a bill. Often, the bill is adjusted in response to the statements received before it is 
submitted to the Federal Assembly (Vimentis 2015a). 
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5 Policy Portraits: Content, Characteristics, Context and Diffusion 
Chapter 5 describes the six policies studied. For each policy, it outlines the following aspects: (1) the 
core content of the policy; (2) the background to policy adoption by the pioneering canton; (3) the 
ensuing pattern of diffusion; (4) variations in policy design across cantons; (5) the design and 
characteristics of the policy; and (6) the federal and national context of cantonal policy innovation. In 
doing so, the various sections furnish background information, supply the operational definitions of 
key explanatory variables and derive the measures of the point-source diffusion variables. For the sake 
of providing an up-to-date picture, this chapter traces the patterns of diffusion as well as federal and 
national developments into 2015. Note that the analyses carried out in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 look 
at the period until 2013. 
Chapter 5 is divided into five subchapters, each of which is dedicated to one (or two) particular policies. 
The first subchapter focusses on the ban on tobacco billboard advertising, while the second one 
discusses the ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents. The third subchapter outlines both the 
restriction on alcohol sales at petrol stations and the ban on takeout alcohol sales at night-time. The 
two policies are presented together because they both entail alcohol sales restrictions and their scope 
partly overlaps. Furthermore, due to the small number of cantonal adoptions of both policies, there is 
less information to convey about them. The following subchapters deal with breast cancer screening 
programmes and healthy nutrition certification programmes for catering facilities. 
 Ban on Tobacco Billboard Advertising 
Policy name and core content 
In designating the policy described below, various terms might be used, including “ban on billboard 
advertising”, “ban on outdoor advertising” and “restrictions on advertising in the public space”. Each 
of these designations captures an important aspect of the policy, while neither of them reflects all 
variants of existing cantonal policy designs. Here, mainly the first term is used since it encapsulates the 
core content of the policy, which is invariant across adopters, i.e. the prohibition of billboard 
advertising for tobacco products. As the other two designations indicate, the basic idea of the policy is 
to banish tobacco advertising from outdoor spaces, or, more precisely, from places that are accessible 
or visible to the public. 
First adoption111 
On 9 June 2000, Geneva was the first canton to adopt the ban on tobacco billboard advertising.112 
Somewhat surprisingly, policy adoption by the pioneering canton was the by-product of a legislative 
reform in a policy field that is only marginally related to public health. More specifically, Geneva 
adopted the policy in the course of a total revision of its advertising legislation. Prompted by a ruling 
by the cantonal administrative tribunal that highlighted shortcomings in existing regulations, the 
canton embarked on a legislative reform that was to replace the fragmented statutory provisions on 
advertising with a comprehensive law, to delegate the competence to authorise billboard advertising 
to the municipalities and to expand the regulatory framework to advertising on private ground if visible 
from public ground. Since the original legislative goals had no relation with public health concerns, the 
bill drafted by the cantonal government did not regulate tobacco advertising at all. However, during 
the parliamentary commission’s consultation of the bill, the Alliance de Gauche, a left-wing 
                                                          
111 This account is based on the verbatim records of the parliamentary consultation of the relevant act in Geneva 
(Grand Conseil de Genève 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c). 
112 In 1988, Vaud had included into its advertising act a clause that authorised the cantonal government to 
prohibit advertising for tobacco (and spirits) in the public space. However, this discretionary clause was never 
made use of. Tobacco outdoor advertising was effectively prohibited in Vaud in 2006 after a revision of the 
advertising act had been undertaken. 
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parliamentary group, seized the opportunity and proposed banning billboard advertising for tobacco 
(and alcohol) as an amendment to the draft law. In the ensuing parliamentary debates, this 
amendment was contested and also the cantonal government had some reservations about it. It 
cautioned that the provision might encroach upon economic freedoms as guaranteed by the Swiss 
federal constitution and might conflict with the precedence of federal jurisdiction in the areas of 
tobacco and alcohol regulation. Nevertheless, the cantonal parliament voted in favour of the policy. 
Pattern of diffusion113 
Figure 9: Ban on tobacco billboard advertising: pattern of diffusion, 2000 to 2015 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own illustration; for data sources see Table 50 in the Appendix. 
Following the first cantonal adoption, a number of associations and companies from the advertising, 
beverages and tobacco industries appealed against the advertising ban at the Federal Supreme Court, 
with the lawsuit being filed in September 2000. In March 2002, the Federal Supreme Court ruled that 
                                                          
113 Table 50 in the Appendix lists the dates of cantonal policy adoptions and the sources that inform the following 
description. 
2000 2004 
2005 2006 
2007 2008 
2009-2014 2015 
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the policy did not violate any constitutional provisions (Tribunal fédéral 2002). With the policy being 
subjected to judicial review, it did not spread in the early 2000s. Four years passed until the second 
canton (BS) adopted it, with Graubünden following in 2005. Between 2006 and 2009, the number of 
adopters increased considerably, as Figure 9 on the previous page shows. However, after 2009 policy 
diffusion came to a temporary halt, with the total number of adopters levelling off at 15. In late 2015, 
Obwalden became the 16th canton to adopt the ban on tobacco billboard advertising. As regards the 
pattern of diffusion, it is noteworthy that the first two cantons to emulate the policy were neither 
neighbours of nor belonged to the same CMPH-region as Geneva. As a result, from 2005 onwards, the 
advertising ban was present in three out of four CMPH-regions, which might have fostered its diffusion 
in the following years. In 2008, the policy reached Central Switzerland, the fourth CMPH-region. While 
an analysis of the cantonal characteristics that shaped policy adoption will be saved for Chapter 7.1, it 
is interesting to note that the non-adopters in 2015 include the three most important tobacco-
manufacturing cantons (JU, LU, NE) and the largest tobacco-growing canton (FR). 
Variations in cantonal policy designs114 
In describing variations in cantonal policy designs, four aspects deserve particular attention: (1) the 
spatial scope of the policy; (2) the means of advertising that the policy prohibits; (3) the means or 
locations of advertising exempted from the prohibition; and (4) the coverage of indirect means of 
advertising.115 
As regards the spatial dimension, all adopters cover the public space in the strict sense, i.e. areas that 
are universally accessible. Hence, all adopters prohibit tobacco adverts on public ground, such as roads, 
roadsides, squares and parks. In addition, in all cantons except for Zurich, the advertising ban applies 
to private ground if visible from public ground. Often, the policy also pertains to quasi-public places, 
i.e. buildings and premises in the possession of the canton or other public-law corporations that are 
open to the public, but where access is more restricted than to the public ground. Public-
administration buildings, schools and hospitals are examples of such places. Thus, several cantons 
explicitly prohibit tobacco advertising inside and outside public buildings and other facilities that are 
owned by the canton, the municipalities or public-law corporations or foundations. For two reasons it 
can be difficult to infer from the relevant passages in legal texts what quasi-public places exactly are 
covered, though. First, the meaning of terms such as “public buildings” or “public sites” is not always 
specified and may differ between cantons. Secondly, at least in some cantons, the advertising ban 
covers public buildings or premises, even if the legal text does not explicitly say so.116 Finally, in banning 
tobacco commercials from sports facilities/events (AR, SG, SO, VS, ZH), movie theatres/cinema shows 
(SG, SO, VS) or cultural venues/events in general (SO, VS, ZH), some cantons extend the scope of 
application of the policy beyond public or quasi-public places, having thus reinvented the policy. 
In terms of the means of advertising prohibited, eight cantons ban tobacco advertising in the public 
space generally. Seven cantons (BL, BS, GE, OW, TG, UR and ZG) prohibit billboard advertising only, 
while ZH bans billboard advertising and all forms of advertising that are visible from a distance. Typical 
exemptions from the advertising ban include company nameplates and store window displays (or more 
generally point-of-sale advertising). Three cantons do not limit themselves to regulating direct means 
of tobacco advertising in the public space, but also deal with the issue of event sponsorship, i.e. a more 
indirect form of product promotion. Among these cantons, Solothurn adopts the most rigorous 
                                                          
114 This section is based on an analysis of the legal documents referred to in Table 50. 
115 Cantonal policy designs also differ with regard to the range of psychoactive substances that the advertising 
ban pertains to. Besides tobacco, most adopters ban outdoor advertising for alcohol in general or for certain 
types of alcoholic beverages. 
116 For example, Thurgau does not refer to public buildings or sites in the relevant legal norm. However, the 
message by the cantonal government that accompanied the draft law states that the advertising ban applies to 
buildings that serve public purposes and facilities that are owned by the canton, the municipalities and other 
public-law institutions (Regierungsrat des Kantons Thurgau 2005). 
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approach, completely prohibiting event sponsoring. Ticino allows for the sponsoring of temporary 
events (other than sports events and events that target minors) by way of an exception, whereas Valais 
stipulates that event sponsors have to comply with directives formulated by a specialised executive 
commission. 
Policy design and characteristics117 
The ban on tobacco billboard advertising aims at reducing the appeal of smoking. Its objective is 
embedded in the more general goals of tobacco prevention policy, i.e. to prevent the initiation of 
smoking, to facilitate its cessation and ultimately to reduce smoking-related diseases. As a means of 
accomplishing its objective, the policy prohibits the placement of billboards that advertise tobacco 
products on public ground and on private ground that is visible from public ground. Similar to other 
advertising restrictions, it thus intends to prevent the tobacco industry from associating smoking with 
values that have a positive connotation. The policy is based on a regulatory tool, which directly targets 
the behaviour of the tobacco industry and of brokers of advertising space. The general population 
constitutes the indirect target group. Policy implementation (authorisation of adverts, granting of 
concessions, enforcement and sanctions) usually resides with municipal administrations, with the 
cantons assuming oversight responsibilities. Table 9 summarises the policy design.  
Table 9: Ban on tobacco billboard advertising: components of the policy design 
Objective Reducing the force of attraction of smoking 
Tool Prohibition 
Action content Prohibition of the placement of tobacco billboards on public ground and on private 
ground visible from public ground 
Direct target group Tobacco industry; brokers of advertising space 
Indirect target group Entire population 
Delivery system Municipal/cantonal administrative units 
In policy debates, proponents of the ban on tobacco billboard advertising regularly point out that 
adolescents are particularly susceptible to advertising and that most smokers start smoking at a young 
age. The need for youth protection is thus often used as an argument in favour of the policy (e.g. Grand 
Conseil de Genève 2000a). As the ban reduces the exposure of the entire population to tobacco 
advertising, the designated beneficiaries extend beyond children and adolescents, though (see Table 
10 on the following page for a summary of the characteristics of the policy design). 
The ban on tobacco billboard advertising proscribes a particular activity and includes provisions for 
enforcement (prohibition and removal of adverts that violate the law) and sanctions (mainly monetary 
fines). It is thus highly coercive. Since tobacco advertising is likely to shape the overall demand for 
tobacco products and to influence the market share of individual brands, it represents an important 
activity to tobacco manufacturers. The ban on tobacco billboard advertising removes the availability 
of one means of advertising, it does not suppress tobacco advertising as such, though. Similarly, the 
ban intrudes into the core business of brokers of advertising space, but it does not affect the sale of 
advertising space in a fundamental way. Rather, it eliminates the demand for a specific type of 
advertising space (i.e. billboards) by a specific group of clients (i.e. tobacco companies and, in several 
cantons, the alcohol industry or at least certain alcohol producers). Hence, whether assessed from the 
perspectives of tobacco companies or the advertising sector, the policy entails an upper medium level 
of intrusion. Aggregating across the two dimensions, the ban qualifies as a highly interventionist policy. 
The policy consists of a single measure, which features a regulatory norm. As the latter plainly prohibits 
tobacco billboard advertising, it is enshrined in one or two single sentences in the pertinent cantonal 
acts. In the corresponding ordinances, few, if any, implementation rules are specified. Advert 
                                                          
117 Unless otherwise noted, the information presented here draws on the same sources as detailed in Table 50 
in the Appendix. 
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placements in the public space are subject to authorization by the competent state agency, regardless 
of whether or not tobacco billboards are forbidden. Hence, no new delivery structure has to be created 
for policy implementation. The narrow scope, low level of calibration and high level of automaticity 
translate into a simple policy design. 
The costs associated with implementing the advertising ban are not separately disclosed in cantonal 
budgets; they are absorbed into general staff expenditure categories. 
Table 10: Ban on tobacco billboard advertising: characteristics of the policy design 
Policy characteristic Dimension Value 
Designated beneficiaries - More comprehensive than age group of 
children/adolescents 
Degree of intervention Coerciveness High 
Intrusiveness Upper medium 
Overall High 
Complexity Scope Narrow 
Calibration Low 
Automaticity High 
Overall Low 
Implementation costs - Invisible 
Federal and national context118 
At the federal level, two restrictions on tobacco advertising exist, i.e. the prohibition of radio and TV 
commercials and the ban on advertising targeted at children and adolescents (see Table 11 on the next 
page). So far, no federal ban on billboard advertising has been passed, although several attempts at 
nationwide regulation have been made over the past two decades. In 1993, a popular initiative that 
required a complete ban on tobacco advertising was voted on. The Federal Council, which opposed a 
complete ban, drafted an indirect counterproposal119 that entailed a ban on billboard and cinema 
advertising instead. Neither policy proposal was endorsed, though. Whereas the Federal Assembly 
decided not to pursue the indirect counterproposal, the people rejected the popular initiative. 
Between 1998 and 2006, members of the National Council launched a number of motions and 
parliamentary initiatives with the intention to prohibit tobacco advertising on billboards, in the public 
space or in general. These efforts have not yet led to actual policy change, though. The relevant 
motions, i.e. mandates directed at the Federal Council to prepare draft legislation, were made into 
postulates, which are less authoritative in nature. Further, none of the parliamentary initiatives, which 
would have enabled the Federal Assembly to draft legislation itself, was pursued by the National 
Council. When commenting on the parliamentary initiatives and motions and on several other 
occasions, the Federal Council expressed its support for further federal restrictions on tobacco 
advertising and its willingness to consider tabling the required adjustments to the Federal Food Act. 
However, for many years, policy proposals for advertising restrictions did not find their way into draft 
legislation. In May 2014, this changed when the pre-consultation of the Tobacco Products Act began.120 
                                                          
118 Unless otherwise noted, this section is based on the information compiled in Table 51 in the Appendix. 
119 An indirect counterproposal suggests the modification of existing or the adoption of new laws in a way that 
reflects the policy change intended by the initiators of a popular initiative, but is less extensive in scope. The 
indirect counterproposal automatically enters into force if the respective popular initiative is rejected by the 
people (Vimentis 2015b). 
120 The need for a specific act on tobacco products became apparent in 2009 in the course of the total revision 
of the Federal Food Act, which was to bring Swiss food legislation in line with EU law (BAG 2014b). Since EU 
regulations do not allow for tobacco products to be treated as food items, the Federal Council announced in the 
report that was issued in July 2009 for the pre-consultation of the revised Federal Food Act that a separate act 
on tobacco products would be drafted (Bundesrat 2009c: 25-26). Hence, the new Federal Food Act, which was 
adopted in June 2014, no longer regulates tobacco. In order to allocate sufficient time for the drafting and 
adoption of the Tobacco Products Act a temporary provision was enacted that stipulates that the tobacco-related 
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Among other things, the bill proposes to prohibit tobacco billboard advertising, all other forms of 
outdoor advertising that are visible from public ground, tobacco advertising in public buildings and on 
their premises, in means of public transport, at sports facilities/events and in cinemas as well as the 
sponsoring of international events (Bundesrat 2014). Thus, the bill takes up many elements that are 
nowadays entailed in cantonal legislation. It does not cover advertising on private ground, though. Due 
to Art. 17 of the bill, which allows for further cantonal restrictions, the adoption of the new federal act 
would not affect cantonal prohibitions of tobacco advertising on private ground, though. 
Table 11: Federal tobacco advertising restrictions 
Regulation Description of content 
Ban on tobacco advertising on 
radio and TV 
▪ Ban on tobacco advertising on radio and television 
▪ Ban on sponsorship of radio and TV programmes by tobacco 
companies 
Ban on tobacco advertising 
targeted at minors 
▪ Ban on tobacco advertising targeted at minors; ban explicitly covers: 
- advertising at places frequented by minors, 
- advertising in newspapers, magazines or other publications that 
address minors; 
- advertising on school equipment; 
- advertising materials given free of charge to minors; 
- advertising on toys; 
- free-of charge dissemination of tobacco products to minors; 
- advertising at cultural, sports or other events frequented by 
minors. 
Source: Own compilation based on BAG (2015b). 
In June 2004, the Federal Council signed the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control of the World 
Health Organization (WHO FCTC) (BAG 2014a). In Art. 13, the WHO FCTC requires a complete, or at 
least as complete as possible, ban on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship (WHO 2003: 11-
12). Since 2004, the federal government has continually expressed its intention to ratify the convention 
(BAG 2008b: 35; BAG 2012: 11), emphasising that the adoption of additional, nationwide advertising 
restrictions is a prerequisite for doing so. The adoption of the convention by the WHO in 2003 and its 
signing by the Swiss federal government in 2004 might have sent a clear signal to cantonal decision 
makers about the legitimacy and desirability of tobacco control policies, including restrictions on 
advertising. In view of the parallel federal and cantonal competencies for tobacco regulation, the 
intended ratification does not depend on cantonal action. As a matter of fact, federal authorities have 
been aiming at the passage of federal legislation, with draft legislation finally being submitted in 2014. 
Nonetheless, the message about the desired course of action in tobacco control policy might well have 
encouraged cantonal decision makers to legislate on the issue – in particular when it became evident 
that federal legislation was not forthcoming. Moreover, the National Tobacco Programmes (NPT) 
2008-2012 and 2008-2016, the latter of which is also endorsed by the CMPH, call upon the cantons to 
make use of their legislative competencies so as to effectively restrict tobacco advertising (BAG 2008b: 
36; BAG 2012: 12). 
As the main source of federal funding on tobacco control policies, the Tobacco Prevention Fund (TPF) 
has provided the cantons with significant resources for the implementation of cantonal tobacco 
prevention programmes since 2012. In order to obtain such grants, the cantons have to incorporate 
regulatory measures in the areas of health protection or market regulation into their programmes (TPF 
2011). Yet, the cantons are free to decide what kinds of regulatory measures they adopt (e.g. smoke-
free schoolyards) and they can probably also refer to already existing legal provisions. Against this 
backdrop, TPF financing is unlikely to have had a noticeable impact on cantonal adoptions of the ban 
                                                          
provisions of the former Federal Food Act stay in force until the new tobacco legislation takes effect (Bundesrat 
2009c: 25-26). The final vote on the draft Tobacco Products Act was envisaged to take place in late 2016 (BAG 
2014b). 
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on tobacco billboard advertising. Furthermore, during the observation period, no other federal, 
intergovernmental or parastatal organisation provided financial incentives or technical assistance 
related to the policy. Based on this description of the federal and national context of cantonal policy 
making and the specification of diffusion variables in Chapter 4.3, the measures of point-source 
diffusion between 2000 and 2013, i.e. the actual period of analysis for this policy, can be derived – see 
Table 12. 
Table 12: Ban on tobacco billboard advertising: coding of point-source diffusion variables, 2000-2013 
Factor of influence Coding of variable Justification 
Financial incentives 2000-2013: 0 No provision of either positive or negative 
financial incentives 
Technical assistance 2000-2013: 0 No provision of technical assistance 
Strong signal about appropriate 
course of action 
2000-2004: 0 
2005-2013: 1 
No such signal 
Signal inherent to signing of WHO FCTC 
Clear prospect of federal policy 
making 
1990-1993: 1 
1994-2013: 0 
 
Popular initiative filed and finally voted on 
No federal bill tabled or popular initiative 
filed 
 Ban on Tobacco Sales to Children and Adolescents 
Policy name and core content 
In Vaud, the canton that pioneered the policy in Switzerland, the relevant legal provision is entitled 
“ban on tobacco sales to minors”. Here, the slightly wider term “ban on tobacco sales to children and 
adolescents” is used since some cantons set the minimum age for tobacco purchases at 16 years rather 
than at Swiss legal age (i.e. 18 years).121 The policy entails the prohibition to sell cigarettes and other 
tobacco products to children and adolescents. In order to cover all sales channels and more effectively 
limit the access of young people to tobacco, restrictions on tobacco sales from vending machines 
typically complement the minimum age requirement. 
First adoption122 
On 31 May 2005, the canton of Vaud was the first jurisdiction to enact a minimum age for tobacco 
purchases. Similar to the adoption of the ban on tobacco billboard advertising in Geneva, policy change 
occurred during a comprehensive revision of the legal foundations of an issue area different from 
public health. In January 2005, the government submitted a bill to the cantonal parliament that was to 
modernise the commercial inspectorate system of the canton. The legislative reform aimed at 
integrating cantonal and municipal commercial registers and at harmonising them with the federal 
register, at revising the cantonal provisions on economic activities subject to authorisation and at 
reorganising cantonal and municipal responsibilities for the surveillance of economic activities. The 
draft legislation suggested a modification of the existing provisions on tobacco vending machines, i.e. 
to restrict the installation of vending machines to the interior of establishments (e.g. restaurants or 
bars), where they are under surveillance. Given the voluntary practice of refraining from tobacco sales 
to minors that some retail businesses in Vaud adhered to at the time, this provision was to further limit 
the access of children and adolescents to tobacco products. While the bill did not contain an actual 
ban on such sales, the proposed regulation of the placement of vending machines paved the way for 
the insertion of the ban into the act. During the first parliamentary debate, a delegate of the Parti 
                                                          
121 These cantons use the federally required minimum age of 16 years for purchasing beer and wine as a point of 
reference. 
122 This account draws on the bill and the accompanying message by the cantonal government of Vaud (Conseil 
d’Etat de Vaud 2005), the report of the parliamentary commission (Grand Conseil de Vaud 2005) and the 
(unpublished) verbatim records of the parliamentary sessions. 
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socialiste proposed an amendment banning tobacco sales to minors, arguing that the restrictions on 
tobacco vending machines otherwise did not serve much purpose. After heated debates and votes 
taken on proposals to reject the amendment and to lower the minimum age to 16 years, the 
parliament adopted the ban on tobacco sales to minors in the final vote on the law in May 2005. 
Pattern of diffusion123 
Figure 10 shows a pattern of fast diffusion of the ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents. In 
2005 already, two more cantons (LU, GR) followed the lead of Vaud and by the end of 2007 almost 
every second canton had adopted the policy. When the year 2015 drew to a close, the number of 
adopters had reached 23. In comparing the diffusion of the policy across CMPH-regions, it transpires 
that the ban spread faster in North-western and Eastern Switzerland than in the Romandie & Ticino 
and in Central Switzerland where the territorial expansion occurred in a more staggered way. 
Figure 10: Ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents: pattern of diffusion, 2005 to 2015 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
123 See Table 52 in the Appendix for the exact dates of cantonal policy adoptions and the relevant legal sources. 
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Figure 10: Ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents: pattern of diffusion, 2005 to 2015 (continued) 
 
Source: Own illustration; for data sources see Table 52 in the Appendix. 
Variations in cantonal policy designs124 
Policy designs differ mainly with regard to four aspects: (1) the minimum age set for purchasing 
tobacco; (2) the existence of tobacco vending machine restrictions; (3) extensions to the scope of the 
ban; and (4) the enactment of implementation provisions designed to render the ban on tobacco sales 
to children and adolescents more effective. 
To begin with the minimum age requirements, besides Vaud, ten more cantons fix the legal age for 
tobacco purchases at 18 years. The remaining 12 adopters choose 16 years as the minimum age (see 
Figure 11). 
Figure 11: Minimum age for tobacco purchases by canton, 2015 
 
 
Except for Fribourg and Glarus, all adopters explicitly regulate tobacco vending machines in some way. 
No canton bans such machines, though. Most cantons simply stipulate that adequate measures must 
be taken so as to prevent children’ and adolescents’ access.125 In a few cantons, somewhat more 
restrictive provisions exist. Vaud and Neuchâtel stipulate that vending machines must be placed 
indoors and be under surveillance of the management and staff of the respective establishment. Jura 
also requires tobacco vending machines to be under permanent surveillance. The rationale behind 
these restraints is to ensure a level of control exercised over sales from vending machines that is similar 
to that prevailing in over-the-counter sales. 
As regards the scope of the policy, most adopters confine themselves to prohibiting tobacco sales to 
children and adolescents. A few cantons, however, aim at preventing any dissemination of cigarettes 
and other tobacco products to those younger than 16 or 18 years, whether for money or for free. 
Accordingly, Aargau, Bern and Zurich prohibit the sale and any other form of dissemination 
                                                          
124 This section is based on an analysis of the relevant text passages of the legal documents listed in Table 52. 
125 Vending machine operators and the hospitality industries have devised various such measures. Besides the 
surveillance of tobacco vending machines, the latter may be furnished with locking devices that prevent tobacco 
purchases unless unlocked through the insertion of a token or manipulation of a remote-control mechanism. 
Alternatively, machines may be endowed with an age verification device. 
Legend: 16 years (light grey); 18 years (dark grey); 
white: no minimum age. 
2015 
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(“Weitergabeverbot”) and sanction anybody (other than parents) who makes tobacco available to 
children and adolescents. Vaud does not go quite as far, but stipulates that tobacco purchases are 
banned if surmised to be occurring on behalf of minors. Finally, five cantons (AG, BL, BS, OW, VD) 
establish in their pertinent acts and ordinances the legal foundations for tobacco test purchases as a 
means of monitoring compliance with the underage sales restrictions.126 
Policy design and characteristics127 
The ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents aims at restricting the access of young people 
below a certain age to tobacco products and thus at preventing them from starting to smoke. It is 
based on a regulatory tool that prohibits underage tobacco sales and stipulates certain requirements 
for the operation of tobacco vending machines. The direct target group consists of retail businesses, 
operators of tobacco vending machines and the management and staff of establishments that have a 
vending machine on their premises. Children and adolescents are the indirect target group of the 
policy. Depending on the intracantonal division of tasks, cantonal and/or municipal administrative 
units are in charge of policy delivery (i.e. granting licences for tobacco sales and for the installation of 
vending machines, inspection of retail businesses, test purchases, sanctions). 
Table 13: Ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents: components of the policy design 
Objective Preventing young people from smoking 
Tool Prohibition 
Action content Prohibition of tobacco sales to children and adolescents; restriction on tobacco sales 
from vending machines 
Direct target group Tobacco retail businesses; vending machine operators; management and staff of 
establishments with tobacco vending machines 
Indirect target group Children/adolescents 
Delivery system Cantonal/municipal administrative units 
The policy design clearly designates children and adolescents as the beneficiaries since the sales ban 
pertains to this age group only. 
The ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents entails a high level of coerciveness, as it prohibits 
a particular activity (i.e. underage tobacco sales) and arranges for enforcement (inspection of 
establishments) and sanctions against violations of the regulatory norm (i.e. monetary fines). Tobacco 
sales are the primary or an important activity of several types of retail shops (e.g. tobacconists, kiosks, 
petrol station shops, supermarkets). Being limited to a relatively small segment of clients (i.e. those 
below 16 or 18 years, respectively), the policy restrains, but does not suppress tobacco sales. Hence, 
it exerts an upper medium level of intrusion. Overall, the ban represents a highly interventionist policy.  
                                                          
126 Several cantons that have not enshrined test purchases in their legislation also carry out such purchases. 
127 The sources that were used to extract the policy design and its characteristics are given in Table 52 in the 
Appendix. The description in the below section focuses on the ban as such, disregarding the ancillary measure of 
test purchases. This is because the cantons may adopt the ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents 
without carrying out any test purchases. For cantons that provide for test purchases, the delivery system differs 
in one respect from the one laid out in Table 13: non-governmental organisations are part of the system. Since 
public officials cannot carry out test purchases themselves, they rely on non-profit organisations, which recruit, 
train and accompany the teenage test buyers. Test purchases render the design more complex (Table 14). To 
begin with, test purchases might be considered as a measure in their own right. Moreover, given that test 
purchases are designed to elicit an illegal behaviour and deploy adolescent test buyers for that purpose, they are 
sensitive in legal and political terms. Detailed implementation rules are therefore usually specified (cf. EAV/BAG 
2010). 
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Table 14: Ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents: characteristics of the policy design 
Policy characteristic Dimension Value 
Designated beneficiaries - Children/adolescents 
Degree of intervention Coerciveness High 
Intrusiveness Upper medium 
Overall High 
Complexity 
 
Scope Narrow 
Calibration Low 
Automaticity High 
Overall Low 
Implementation costs - Invisible 
The ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents represents a single measure, which, depending 
on the canton, comprises one or two related regulatory norms (i.e. ban on underage tobacco sales, 
restriction on tobacco sales from vending machines). The level of calibration is low, with the action 
content being encapsulated in one or two short legal provisions and hardly any implementation rules 
being detailed. Tobacco sales fall into the category of economic activities that require a licence. Thus, 
cantonal and/or municipal administrative units exist that grant tobacco sales licences, inspect retail 
shops and vending machines and sanction illegal tobacco sales. No new delivery structure has to be 
set up for these activities. Overall, the policy design is simple. 
Implementation costs remain invisible since cantonal budgets do not contain a specific budgetary item 
on the policy. 
Federal and national context 
Besides the stipulation of a minimum pack size of 20 cigarettes, current federal legislation does not 
provide for any youth access restrictions (cf. BAG 2015b). Since the submission of the first postulate in 
1996, several attempts have been made by members of the Federal Assembly at enacting a federal 
ban on tobacco sales to minors (see Table 53 in the Appendix). Yet, like the advertising ban in the public 
space, such a ban was included in draft legislation only in May 2014 as part of the proposed Tobacco 
Products Act, the final vote on which was foreseen to take place at the end of 2016 (BAG 2014b). Art. 
18 of the bill prohibits the sale and other forms of dissemination of tobacco to minors and stipulates 
that vending machines must prevent minors’ access (Bundesrat 2014). Moreover, the bill establishes 
a federal statutory basis for test purchases, specifying the requirements that need to be met so that 
the results of such purchases can be used in administrative and criminal procedures (Bundesrat 2014). 
Thus, the draft legislation emulates the example of those cantons that have enacted more stringent 
legislation. 
The WHO FCTC, which Switzerland signed in 2004, contains a provision that requires the prohibition of 
tobacco sales to minors (Art. 16) (WHO 2003: 15-16).128 Switzerland’s signing of the FCTC is likely to 
have highlighted the desirability of a sales ban to minors. Furthermore, in the light of the intended 
FCTC ratification, NPT 2008-2012 and 2008-2016 quest for the cantons to utilise their legislative 
competencies so as to restrict youth access to tobacco products (BAG 2008b: 36; BAG 2012: 12). These 
signals on the desired course of action in tobacco control policy might have encouraged cantonal policy 
adoptions. 
Regarding the receipt of TPF funding for cantonal tobacco prevention programmes, cantons that adopt 
the ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents meet the requirement of enacting regulatory 
tobacco control policies (see Chapter 5.1). But again, the cantons may also opt for some other policy 
                                                          
128 Accordingly, the current lack of a nation-wide ban on under-age tobacco sales constitutes an obstacle to the 
ratification of the convention (similar to the lacking ban on tobacco advertising in the public space) (BAG 2013b: 
25). 
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or bring to bear another already existing regulation on this requirement. That is why TPF funding is not 
assumed to provide a financial incentive for cantonal adoptions of the ban. During the observation 
period, no other federal, intercantonal or parastatal organisation provided funding for or technical 
assistance on adoption of the ban. 
Against this background, the point-source diffusion variables for the ban on tobacco sales to children 
and adolescents for the years 2005 to 2013 are coded as summarised in Table 15. 
Table 15: Ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents: coding of point-source diffusion variables, 2005-2013 
Factor of influence Coding of variable Justification 
Financial incentives 2005-2013: 0 No provision of either positive or negative 
financial incentives 
Technical assistance 2005-2013: 0 No provision of technical assistance 
Strong signal about appropriate 
course of action 
2005-2013: 1 Signal inherent to signing of WHO FCTC 
Clear prospect of federal policy 
making 
2005-2013: 0 No federal bill tabled or popular initiative filed 
 Alcohol Sales Restrictions 
Core contents 
The policies described in this subchapter restrict the access to alcoholic beverages, by limiting either 
the points or hours of sale. The first policy restricts or prohibits alcohol sales by petrol stations. The 
second one imposes a general ban on alcohol sales between 9 pm and 7 am on all retail outlets.129 To 
some extent, the contents of the two policies overlap since petrol station shops are one type of retail 
outlets that are typically open beyond 9 pm.130 
First adoptions 
On 18 March 1998, the canton of Jura adopted a ban on alcohol sales at petrol stations, kiosks and 
school canteens.131 When following the example of Jura and other, mainly French-speaking cantons, 
Geneva did not only prohibit certain establishments from selling alcohol, but also enacted a limit on 
the hours of alcohol sales that pertains to all retail outlets.132 The legislative reform that resulted in the 
adoption of these alcohol sales restrictions was initiated by left-wing members of the cantonal 
parliament, who suggested a number of changes to the Act on Takeout Sales of Alcoholic Beverages 
                                                          
129 Restaurants, bars and similar establishments are exempt from the ban. The relevance of the night-time sales 
ban depends on the cantonal legal opening hours of retail businesses. The policy is the more relevant, the more 
liberal the opening hours are. 
130 Nevertheless, due to the different logics of intervention that they are based on, the two sales restrictions are 
treated as separate policies. 
131 Bans that pertain to other sales points (gaming arcades, swimming pools, youth centres, vending machines) 
exist since the 1980s or even longer. In the 1980s, many cantons also made use of needs clauses in order to 
prevent petrol stations from obtaining alcohol sales licences or explicitly banned such sales (e.g. BE). Economic 
liberalisation, including the extension of store opening hours and the deregulation of alcohol licencing, and the 
growing number of petrol station shops have led to an increasing supply of alcoholic beverages at petrol stations. 
Jura is thus not the first-ever canton to prohibit petrol station shops from selling alcohol, but rather the first one 
to re-enact such a ban. 
132 In a few cantons, other time restrictions on alcohol sales exist: Basel-Stadt prohibits alcohol sales to minors 
between midnight and 7 am; Neuchâtel stipulates that spirits must not be sold from the opening of the store 
until 9 am; Fribourg bars restaurants from over-the-counter sales of alcohol after 10 pm; and Vaud prohibits 
alcohol sales between 4 and 10 am under temporary alcohol sales licences (cf. BAG 2016b). These restrictions 
are much more confined than the ban adopted by Geneva and are not taken into account here. 
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dating from 1982.133 The initiators argued that the growing abuse of alcohol, particularly the increase 
in heavy episodic drinking among adolescents, required countering the easy accessibility of alcoholic 
beverages. Accordingly, the original legislative proposal provided for the prohibition of alcohol sales 
from vending machines and at kiosks, video rental shops and petrol stations. In accordance with the 
competent parliamentary commission, the cantonal government revised the original bill and inserted 
the ban on alcohol sales at night. The totally revised act, including the ban on takeout alcohol sales 
between 9 pm and 7 am, was adopted by the cantonal parliament on 22 January 2004. A referendum 
on the revised act was called for; the people approved the revisions on 26 September 2004. Most of 
the controversy surrounding the act, in both parliamentary and public debates, centred on the 
prohibition of alcohol sales by petrol stations and video rental shops, while the ban on sales at night 
proved much less contentious. 
The Federal Supreme Court was called upon twice to rule on these alcohol sales restrictions. First, the 
court had to decide upon an appeal lodged by the tenant of a petrol station shop in Jura against the 
withdrawal of its alcohol sales licence. Later on, it had to assess the constitutionality of the point-of-
sale and time restrictions entailed in the Geneva legislation, which the Association of Operators of 
Petrol Station Shops in Geneva (Association genevoise des exploitants de magasins de stations service) 
and two petrol stations had challenged. The court confirmed both the lawfulness of the administrative 
decision and the constitutionality of the statutory provisions (Tribunal fédéral 2000, 2005). 
Patterns of diffusion134 
Thus far, the ban on takeout alcohol sales at night has not spread to any canton beyond Geneva. 
Restrictions on alcohol sales by petrol stations have been adopted by five cantons in total, four of 
which are part of the CMPH-region of Romandie & Ticino. As Figure 12 shows, these adoptions 
occurred within a period of seven years, tapering off in 2004. 
Figure 12: Restriction on alcohol sales at petrol stations: pattern of diffusion, 1998 to 2015 
 
 
Source: Own illustration; for data sources see Table 54 and Table 55 in the Appendix. 
                                                          
133 The description of the decision-making process in Geneva is based on the parliamentary proceedings (Grand 
Conseil de Genève 2002, 2003, 2004) and the official booklet for the referendum (Chancellerie d’Etat de Genève 
2004). 
134 Table 54 and Table 55 in the Appendix list the dates of cantonal policy adoptions and the relevant legal 
sources. 
1998 2002 
2003 2004-2015 
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Variations in cantonal policy designs135 
Cantonal policy designs of the restriction on alcohol sales at petrol stations differ mainly in three 
aspects. First, Fribourg and Basel-Landschaft prohibit petrol stations only from selling spirits, while the 
three other adopters ban the sale of all alcoholic beverages. Secondly, Jura, Fribourg and Basel-
Landschaft extend the ban to kiosks, while Geneva covers video rental shops besides petrol stations. 
Thirdly, Jura provides for an exemption to the sales prohibition: If a petrol station shop or kiosk is the 
only local retail outlet, the cantonal government may licence it to sell alcoholic beverages. 
Policy designs and characteristics136 
The primary objective of the restriction on alcohol sales at petrol stations is to prevent drunk driving 
and thus to reduce the number of related road accidents. Moreover, the policy is to reduce the overall 
consumption of (strong) alcohol, especially at night. In restraining or prohibiting alcohol sales by petrol 
station shops, it targets a sales channel that otherwise supplies alcoholic beverages at low prices (as 
compared to the prices charged for alcoholic beverages in bars or restaurants) until late at night. The 
ban on takeout alcohol sales at night pursues a similar objective. It aims at preventing the excessive 
consumption of alcohol when people go out and the associated negative health and social effects. It 
does so by reducing the availability of low-priced alcoholic beverages. Both policies subscribe to the 
wider goal of alcohol prevention policy, which is to prevent forms of alcohol consumption that entail 
health risks for the person drinking and negative consequences for others. 
They are based on a regulatory tool. In the case of the restriction on alcohol sales at petrol stations, 
the licensees of petrol station shops constitute the direct target group, while shop customers make up 
the indirect targets. The ban on takeout alcohol sales at night directly targets the management and 
staff of retail businesses that hold an alcohol sales licence, with their clients being the indirect target 
group. 
The responsibility for implementing both policies (granting of sales licences, enforcement and 
sanctions) resides with cantonal and/or municipal administrative units. 
Table 16: Restriction on alcohol sales at petrol stations and ban on takeout alcohol sales at night: components of 
the policy designs 
 Restriction on alcohol sales at petrol 
stations 
Ban on alcohol sales at night 
Objective Preventing drunk driving; reducing the 
overall consumption of alcohol 
Preventing the excessive consumption of 
alcohol at night 
Action content Prohibition of the sale of spirits (or all 
alcoholic beverages) at petrol station shops 
Prohibition of alcohol sales at retail shops 
between 9 pm and 7 am 
Direct target 
group 
Petrol station shops Retail shops open at night 
Indirect target 
group 
Customers of petrol station shops Customers of retail shops open at night 
Tool Prohibition Prohibition 
Delivery system Cantonal/municipal administrative units Cantonal/municipal administrative units 
In political debates, young people are often stated as an important or even the primary target group 
of the two policies of interest. Since adolescents and young adults tend to have less money than adults 
at a higher age, they are more likely to stock up on alcohol from petrol station shops and other retail 
businesses that offer alcoholic beverages at relatively low prices. Nevertheless, neither of the policy 
                                                          
135 This description is based on an analysis of the legal documents referred to in Table 54 and Table 55. 
136 See Table 54 and Table 55 in the Appendix for the sources that inform the description of policy designs and 
characteristics in this section. 
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designs singles out children or adolescents as the direct or indirect target group and hence as the 
designated beneficiaries. 
Both policies are highly coercive: They ban a particular activity, include provisions for enforcement of 
regulatory norms (inspection of establishments, order to cease unauthorised activity, sequestration of 
alcohol, temporary closing of retail outlet, licence withdrawal) and stipulate sanctions in the case of 
non-compliance (monetary fines). Alcohol sales are likely to account for a noticeable share of sales of 
petrol station shops and shops that stay open at night. Overall, sales restrictions are associated with 
an upper medium level of intrusion in that they restrain, but do not suppress an economically relevant 
activity.137 Given the high degrees of coercion and the upper medium levels of intrusion, the two 
alcohol sales restrictions are to be classified as highly interventionist. 
The alcohol sales restrictions represent single measures. The relevant acts or ordinances simply state 
the ban or restriction, without the content being elaborated on. Since alcohol sales are subject to 
licencing, all cantons have, either at the cantonal or municipal level, administrative units that can be 
tasked with implementing the sales restrictions of interest. No policy-specific delivery system has to 
be created. Thus, both policies entail simple designs. Implementation costs are not budgeted 
separately, but figure under more general spending categories. 
Table 17: Restriction on alcohol sales at petrol stations and ban on takeout alcohol sales at night: characteristics 
of the policy designs 
Policy characteristic Dimension Value 
Designated beneficiaries - More comprehensive than children/adolescents 
Degree of intervention Coerciveness High 
Intrusiveness Upper medium 
Overall High 
Complexity Scope Narrow 
Calibration Low 
Automaticity High 
Overall Low 
Implementation costs - Invisible 
Federal and national contexts 
At the federal level, a few alcohol sales restrictions exist, including the prohibitions to sell alcohol to 
children and adolescents below 16 years of age, to sell spirits (i.e. alcoholic drinks with more than 15 
percent alcohol by volume) to young people below 18 years and to sell alcoholic beverages at 
motorway service areas (see Table 18). 
Table 18: Federal alcohol sales restrictions 
Regulation Description of content 
Ban on alcohol sales to 
children and adolescents 
▪ Ban on alcohol sales to children and adolescents below 16 years 
▪ Requirement to display alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages separately 
▪ Requirement to signpost minimum purchasing age at point of sale 
Ban on selling spirits to 
minors 
▪ Ban on the sale of alcoholic beverages with more than 15 % alcohol by 
volume to minors 
Ban on alcohol sales at 
motorway service areas 
▪ Ban on serving and selling alcoholic beverages at motorway service areas 
Source: Own compilation based on BAG (2015c). 
                                                          
137 In cantons that prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages by petrol station shops entirely, the policy involves a 
high level of intrusion. This difference in cantonal policy designs does not affect the degree of intervention, which 
is high under both constellations, though. 
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Between 1990 and 2010, there were no legislative endeavours at restricting alcohol sales by petrol 
stations or similar points of sale or at banning night-time sales at the federal level.138 In 2011, the 
Federal Council presented its suggestion for a total revision of the federal alcohol legislation. While 
the bill put up for discussion during the pre-consultation phase provided for several sales restrictions 
(e.g. ban on alcohol sales from vending machines that are not supervised; ban on loss-leader prices), 
it contained neither of the two policies of interest. In their statements on the federal bill, five cantons 
(FR, LU, SZ, TI, ZG) called for restrictions on alcohol sales at night, while one canton (BS) expressed its 
preference for time restrictions on alcohol sales imposed on particular points of sale, such as petrol 
stations (EAV 2011: 36-37). Left-wing parties and public health organisations also advocated a ban on 
alcohol sales at night (EAV 2011: 36-37). Because of these demands, the Federal Council included in 
the bill submitted to parliament a provision that prohibits retail outlets to sell alcohol between 10 pm 
and 6 am (Bundesrat 2012: 1379-1380). After the submission of the bill on 25 January 2012, the 
National Council and the Council of States debated and modified the bill several times. Yet, by the end 
of 2015, they had not reached a consensus on the future course of Swiss alcohol regulation, with the 
proposed ban on night-time sales being one of the contentious issues (EAV 2015b). As a consequence, 
the bill was abandoned (Bundesrat 2016). 
Regarding financial incentives or disincentives for the adoption of the two alcohol sales restrictions, 
the tenth of the taxes that the Swiss Alcohol Board collects on spirituous beverages and that the 
cantons receive (see page 55) is the only source of funding that comes into consideration. The cantons 
have to spend these revenues on the prevention of the abuse of alcohol or other psychoactive 
substances. However, no conditions exist that require the cantons to take regulatory measures in the 
field of alcohol prevention. Hence, the tenth of taxes on spirituous beverages is not assumed to exert 
any top-diffusion effect on the adoption of cantonal alcohol sales restrictions. 
With regard to technical assistance, the activities of the Swiss Federal Commission on Alcohol Policy 
(EKAL/CFAL) as well as of other federal actors merit closer inspection. More specifically, as a means of 
accomplishing the goals of the national prevention programmes on alcohol (NPA 2008-2012, NPA 
2013-2016), the EKAL/CFAL promotes the adoption of cantonal action plans, which set out the strategic 
foundations of cantonal alcohol control policy (EKAL 2015). The EKAL/CFAL, in collaboration with the 
FOPH, the Swiss Alcohol Board and the CMPH, also organises annual conferences that are directed at 
cantonal public officials in charge of alcohol control policy. Since 2011, it offers two or three half-day 
workshops per year on specific issues in alcohol control policy, two of which have so far broached the 
issue of the ban on alcohol sales at night (workshops in 2005 and 2010; EKAL 2015, BAG 2015d). Of 
late, the FOPH provides the cantons with a planning tool intended to support the formulation of 
alcohol prevention policies, which is to encourage the adoption of cantonal action plans and 
prevention programmes on alcohol (BAG 2015e; Balthasar et al. 2014). In short, in alcohol prevention 
policy, several forms of technical assistance are offered to the cantons. It is likely that these federal-
government activities positively impact on the overall scope of cantonal alcohol prevention policy. 
However, the federal activities do not specify any particular course of action to be followed by the 
cantons and they do not centre on sales restrictions. For these reasons, they are not assumed to have 
a noticeable impact on the likelihood that the cantons restrict either alcohol sales by petrol stations or 
                                                          
138 However, between July 2009 and November 2013, an administrative decision restricted night-time alcohol 
sale by the small number of petrol stations that are located at main artery roads and are open 24 hours. Based 
on the Federal Labour Act and its provisions on the admissibility of night work, the State Secretariat for Economic 
Affairs (SECO) conditioned the special authorization of night work that these petrol stations needed to obtain on 
the constraint that between 1 and 5 am only products are sold that travellers are in need of. Thus, the petrol 
stations concerned were allowed to sell petrol, coffee and snacks at night time, but not alcohol (and other goods). 
A change in the Federal Labour Act that was adopted in December 2012 removed the need for petrol station 
shops located on main artery roads and motorways to obtain a specific authorisation for night work, thus 
effectively allowing these outlets to offer their entire assortment of goods also during the night 
(Bundesversammlung 2012). 
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at night. Hence, the respective variable is coded 0. Table 19 summarises the coding of the point-source 
diffusion variables for the two alcohol sales restrictions throughout the respective period of analysis. 
Table 19: Alcohol sales restrictions: coding of point-source diffusion variables, 1998/2004-2013 
Factor of influence Coding of variable Justification 
Financial incentives  1998/2004-2013: 0 No positive or negative financial incentives for 
adopting sales restrictions 
Provision of technical assistance 1998/2004-2013: 0 No specific technical assistance on sales 
restrictions 
Strong signal about appropriate 
course of action 
1998/2004-2013: 0 Signal about desirability of cantonal action, but 
not specifically about sales restrictions 
Concrete prospect of federal 
policy making 
1998-2013: 0 
2004-2011: 0 
2012-2013: 1 
Alcohol sales at petrol stations: no federal bill 
tabled or popular initiative filed 
Alcohol sales at night: draft legislation submitted 
in January 2012 
 Breast Cancer Screening Programmes 
Core content 
Cantonal organised breast cancer screening programmes invite all women aged 50 years and older 
who live in the canton to attend a mammography examination at an accredited radiology centre every 
two years. Participation is voluntary. Unlike diagnostic mammography exams, which a gynaecologist 
or general practitioner may arrange for when being consulted, organised programmes entail the 
systematic and regular screening of the entire target population, thus aiming at equal access of all 
women. Moreover, organised programmes provide for quality assurance. 
First adoption 
On the initiative of a private-law foundation set up in Lausanne by several professors of medicine 
specifically for that purpose, the canton of Vaud pilot-tested an organised screening programme in 
Switzerland (Bulliard et al. 2003: 1762). It was expected that such a programme would promote the 
more rational utilisation of mammography examinations, lead to the earlier detection of breast cancer 
among participating women, allow for the use of less intrusive surgery, and ultimately decrease breast 
cancer mortality (Bulliard et al. 2003: 1761). 
In 1993, the cantonal government authorised and provided the financial means for the pilot project, 
which was carried out in the districts of Aigle, Aubonne and Morges and ran from October 1993 to 
January 1999. The pilot project confirmed the feasibility and acceptance of the programme. Against 
this backdrop, Vaud decided in 1998 to extend the programme to the entire canton (Bulliard et al. 
2003: 1761). 
Pattern of diffusion139 
By 2015, 12 cantons had adopted breast cancer screening programmes. As  
Figure 13 on the following page illustrates, there are large differences between the CMPH-regions. 
Early in the diffusion process, the policy spread exclusively among the French-speaking cantons and 
nowadays all cantons that make up the region of Romandie & Ticino operate such a programme. In 
contrast, in Central Switzerland, not a single canton has adopted organised breast cancer screenings 
to date. Three out of eight cantons in Eastern Switzerland have opted for a screening programme, with 
St. Gallen being the first one and its neighbours Graubünden and Thurgau to follow one year later. 
                                                          
139 For the dates of adoption and onset of implementation, see Table 56 in the Appendix. 
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Similarly, three out of eight members of the north-western CMPH-conference have instituted 
screening programmes. Two intercantonal programmes exist – Jura, Neuchâtel and the Jura bernois 
run a joint programme and so do St. Gallen and Graubünden.140 
Figure 13: Breast cancer screening programmes: pattern of diffusion, 1993 to 2015 
 
 
 
 
Variations in cantonal policy designs 
Due to the federal provisions on quality assurance (cf. Bundesrat 1999; for more details see below), 
the services provided are identical across programmes. Differences exist in three areas: cost-sharing 
provisions, the exact delineation of the target group and the type of institution that manages the 
programme. 
Since obligatory health insurance covers screening-mammography (if carried out within organised 
programmes), health insurance funds pay for a substantial share of the costs incurred. Due to the 
principle of cost sharing that governs Swiss obligatory health insurance, women who participate in the 
programme pay 10 percent of the costs of mammography exams out of their own pockets (i.e. 
                                                          
140 The dates of policy adoption nevertheless vary across these cantons. 
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approximately CHF 20) (swiss cancer screening 2015b).141 Currently, the practice in Ticino constitutes 
the only exception to this rule as it offers the examinations free of charge to women who reside in the 
canton, paying for the 10 percent retention fee with government funds (TI DSS 2015). As evident from 
Table 20, the age groups screened differ somewhat between cantons. Most cantons define a primary 
target group of women (aged 50-69/70 or 50-74 years), who are invited to participate in the 
programme every two years. At the same time, cantons usually open up the programme to older 
women, who may contact the programme centre themselves. Almost all adopters tie programme 
eligibility to residence in the canton, but Geneva also covers cross-border commuters who have taken 
out obligatory health insurance in Switzerland. 
Table 20: Cantonal breast cancer screening programmes: delineations of the direct target group 
Target group Cantons 
Women aged 50-69 GR/SG 
Women aged 50-74 FR 
Invited to programme: women aged 50-69; 
participation by request: women aged 70 and older 
BS, TI, VD 
Invited to programme: women aged 50-70; 
participation by request: women aged 71-74 
VS 
Invited to programme: women aged 50-74; 
participation by request: women aged 75 and older 
BE, GE, BEJUNE142, TG 
Source: Own compilation, based on swiss cancer screening (2015a). 
As regards programme management, different arrangements exist (swiss cancer screening 2015a): 
Four cantons (GE, JU, NE and VD) created a specific public- or private-law organisation and mandated 
it with the operation of the programme. Six adopters (BE, BS, FR, GR/SG, VS) delegated the 
establishment and management of the programme to the cantonal section of a health league (in most 
instances, the cancer league), i.e. to a private, non-profit organisation. Ticino mandated a unit within 
the cantonal administration with the creation and administration of the programme, while Thurgau 
gave a performance mandate to the private-law organisation that owns and runs the hospitals of the 
canton. 
Policy design and characteristics143 
Breast cancer screening programmes join three measures: a substantive one (i.e. screening for breast 
cancer) and two ancillary institutional ones (i.e. quality standards144 and further training of radiologists 
for the purposes of quality assurance) (see Table 21).145 
Breast cancer screenings aim at early detection as a prerequisite for early treatment of the disease, 
which increases the chances of women who are diagnosed with cancer to survive it. Women from the 
age of 50 years onwards are the direct target group. The delivery system for the provision of biennial 
mammography exams embraces the following institutions: a coordination centre, which is in charge of 
programme management; accredited radiology centres, which carry out the exams and subsequent 
                                                          
141 Swiss obligatory health insurance entails two elements of cost-sharing: an annual fixed amount (deductible) 
and a retention fee of 10 percent, which is levied on the costs of all treatments that exceed the deductible (up 
to a maximum of CHF 700 per year) (BAG 2015f). 
142 BEJUNE is the programme of the cantons Jura and Neuchâtel and the Jura bernois. 
143 The description of the policy design and characteristics is based on swiss cancer screening (2015a, 2015b). 
144 The federal government prescribes the standards of quality assurance that screening programmes have to 
meet (cf. Bundesrat 1999). The standards entailed in the relevant federal ordinance pertain to programmes as a 
whole and to the participating radiologists and radiology centres. Here, the focus rests on the latter types of 
standards. 
145 This is an instance of vertical packaging (cf. page 36). 
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readings of mammograms; external physicians (gynaecologists, primary care physicians), who offer 
consultation and arrange for follow-up diagnostic tests and treatment if needed. 
In most cases, parastatal organisations or other organisations provided with a performance mandate 
manage cantonal programmes, which includes the following tasks: ensuring the enrolment of the 
target group, organising the sequence of readings of the mammograms, coordinating the provision of 
follow-up tests and treatment if necessary, accrediting radiology centres, negotiating the tariffs for 
service provision, taking care of quality assurance and programme monitoring. 
Table 21: Breast cancer screening programmes: components of the policy design 
 Screening Quality standards Further training 
Objective Early detection of breast 
cancer 
Securing a high quality of 
diagnostic findings 
Securing a high quality of 
diagnostic findings 
Action content Biennial, quality-assured 
mammography exams 
Minimum number of exams 
and readings per 
radiologist; conformity of 
readings and apparatuses 
with EU guidelines; 
monitoring 
Courses on screening-
mammography 
Direct target 
group 
Women aged 50 years and 
more 
Radiologists; radiology 
centres 
Radiologists 
Indirect target 
group 
- Women who participate in 
the programme 
Women who participate in 
the programme 
Tool Service provision Contracting Training 
Delivery 
system 
Programme centre, 
radiology centres, external 
physicians  
Programme centre, swiss 
cancer screening 
Programme centre, 
professional experts 
The objective of the quality standards is to secure a high quality of diagnostic findings, in particular to 
minimise false negatives (i.e. failing to diagnose breast cancer when it exists) and false positives (i.e. 
diagnosing breast cancer when it does not exist). Besides the most important provision for quality 
assurance at the programme level, i.e. is the independent reading of mammograms by two radiologists 
and performance of a third arbitration reading in case of dissent, screening programmes impose a 
number of quality standards on radiologists and radiology centres involved in service delivery: Only 
specialists in medical radiology are allowed to carry out the mammography exams. They have to 
conduct a minimum number of exams per year, read a minimum number of mammograms each year, 
ensure that the quality of their readings conforms to the relevant EU guidelines for quality assurance 
in mammography screening and furnish the data needed for programme monitoring. The quality of 
readings is also subject to an annual evaluation. Finally, technical apparatuses need to conform to EU 
guidelines, with regular check-ups being required. These provisions are specified in federal regulation, 
with the cantons that adopt breast cancer screening programmes being the addressees of the relevant 
federal ordinance (cf. Bundesrat 1999). 
The policy instrument that is used for ensuring compliance with these quality standards in cantonal 
programmes is contracting since the relevant standards are included in the contracts that programme 
centres conclude with participating radiology centres. Radiologists and radiology centres are thus the 
direct target group of quality standards. The women who take mammography exams are intended to 
benefit from this measure of quality assurance and constitute the indirect target group. Programme 
centres are in charge of monitoring and enforcing compliance with these standards. For doing so, they 
can draw on the assistance of swiss cancer screening, which is the national umbrella organisation of 
cantonal programmes (see section below). 
Furthermore, radiologists have to complete a course on screening mammography prior to being 
admitted as service providers and to take part in regular case reviews later on. Similar to the quality 
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standards directed at them, this measure is to ensure the high quality of mammography exams and 
readings. Radiologists are again the direct target group and women who participate in the programme 
the intended beneficiaries. For this second measure of quality assurance, the tool used is the provision 
of training and the facilitation of professional exchange. Programme centres are in charge of organising 
training courses and case reviews. In doing so, they rely on professional experts. 
Table 22: Breast cancer screening programmes: characteristics of the policy design 
Policy characteristic Dimension Value 
Designated beneficiaries - Other than children/adolescents 
Degree of intervention Coerciveness Quality standards: Lower medium 
Intrusiveness Quality standards: Lower medium 
Overall Quality standards: Low 
Complexity Scope Wide 
Calibration High 
Automaticity Low 
Overall High 
Implementation costs - High 
None of the three measures addresses children or adolescents as direct or indirect target groups. 
In assessing the coerciveness and intrusiveness of the policy, the focus rests on the measure of quality 
standards. Radiology centres are free to decide whether or not to supply their services to breast cancer 
screening programmes. For centres admitted, compliance with quality standards is non-negotiable, 
though. The establishment of screening programmes effectively changes the business environment of 
radiology centres in that non-participating centres might fall behind competitors. As non-participating 
centres forego a benefit that the policy provides, the level of coercion applied is to classified as lower 
medium. Radiologists who are part of the programme have to comply with a comprehensive set of 
standards. The measure thus clearly defines the ways in which certain professional practices of the 
direct target group have to be carried out. Hence, the level of intrusion is lower medium. According to 
the aggregation rule specified in Chapter 3.3, quality standards directed at radiologists and radiology 
centres involve a low degree of intervention.146 
Screening programmes comprise three policy measures. Due to the extensive provisions on quality 
assurance, the degree of calibration is high. Probably due to the sizable number of implementation 
tasks involved, all cantons created a new structure (i.e. a coordination centre). Moreover, programme 
operation requires the coordination of a number of implementing agencies. Hence, the automaticity 
of the delivery system is low. Screening programmes clearly entail a complex policy design. 
Concerning implementation costs, the budget of the foundation managing the programme in the 
canton of Vaud amounted to CHF 900 000 in 1999, with CHF 700 000 of this sum being covered by the 
canton (Landtsheer et al. 2000). The cantonal subsidies provided in 1999 corresponded to an amount 
of CHF 12.50 per woman participating in the programme (Landtsheer et al. 2000). In addition to the 
spending on programme management, total costs include the expenses by health insurance funds for 
reimbursement of the costs of the mammography exams. Data on overall programme costs in 1999 
are not available, but the total costs for a two-year screening campaign in Vaud in the mid-2000s were 
calculated at CHF 6 350 656 (de Wolf 2007: 597). 
Federal and national context 
In the late 1990s, plans to set up a Swiss-wide breast cancer screening programme existed, as 
formulated by the first national cancer prevention programme (Zeyen 2001: 6). Under the auspices of 
                                                          
146 The value “low” is due to the two-fold classification system. If a scheme with three categories was used, quality 
standards would be classified as entailing a medium level of intrusion. 
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the Swiss Cancer League and with the support of the FOPH, an action plan was drafted in 1997 and the 
joint efforts culminated in the creation of a foundation that was to expedite the preparations for the 
programme (Faisst/Ricka-Heidelberger 2001: 26). But several obstacles, including the failure of service 
deliverers and health insurance funds to agree on a tariff for the reimbursement of mammography 
exams, prompted the foundation to cease its activities in 2000 (Faisst/Ricka-Heidelberger 2001: 26). 
While a national screening programme did not figure on the federal agenda until 2014, several federal 
decisions set important parameters for the establishment and operation of cantonal programmes.147 
In 1994, a new Federal Health Insurance Act was passed, which allows for cost coverage of certain 
measures of early diagnosis. In view of this provision, the Swiss Cancer League and the foundation in 
charge of the screening programme in Vaud requested in 1995 that mammography exams that are 
carried out within organised programmes are included into the catalogue of benefits paid for under 
obligatory health insurance (Faisst/Ricka-Heidelberger 2001: 24).  
In July 1997, inclusion into the catalogue of benefits was authorised for a period of 10 years, but made 
contingent on the conclusion of a nation-wide quality assurance treaty. Due to the failure of the parties 
concerned to conclude a treaty, the Federal Council enacted in June 1999 a set of minimum quality 
requirements that cantonal breast cancer screening programmes must meet (Faisst/Ricka-
Heidelberger 2001: 25). Subsequently, the Federal Department of Home Affairs enacted cost coverage, 
which became effective on 1 July 1999.148 Moreover, a revision of the Federal Health Insurance Act, 
which came into effect on 1 January 2001, allowed the Federal Council to exempt mammography 
exams from the deductible. As a result, since 2001, no insured person has to pay more than 10 percent 
of the costs of mammography exams. Since January 2010, mammography exams that are delivered 
within an organised programme are a regular benefit paid for by health insurance funds (cf. EDI 2009). 
On the initiative of CLASS, the national umbrella organisation “swiss cancer screening” was founded in 
July 2008, which is to support existing cantonal programmes and to promote the adoption of organised 
screening programmes by other cantons. Swiss cancer screening joins cantonal breast cancer screening 
programmes and provides technical assistance, such as the development of an IT tool for programme 
management, the formulation of programme materials and the implementation of quality assurance 
(swiss cancer screening 2015c). 
In 2014, the Federal Office of Public Health and Swiss Conference of Cantonal Ministers of Public Health 
jointly launched the National Strategy against Cancer, according to which all women in Switzerland 
should have access to organised breast cancer screenings (Dialog Nationale Gesundheitspolitik 2013). 
The strategy does not explicitly call upon the cantons (or the federal level) to assume responsibility for 
the establishment of such programmes, though. 
Table 23 summarises the coding of the point-source diffusion variables for breast cancer screening 
programmes between 1993 and 2013, i.e. the period during which the policy will be observed in later 
chapters. 
 
                                                          
147 Throughout this period, various parliamentary activities shaped federal policy making. They called for the 
coverage of breast cancer screenings under obligatory health insurance (parliamentary initiative 05.467, motion 
09.3356), the exemption of screenings from the deductible (motions 97.3486, 99.3071, 99.3641, 08.3733) and, 
more recently, raised issues concerning the quality of breast cancer screening in Switzerland (postulate 14.3054, 
motions 14.3049, 14.3055). However, they did not advocate the establishment of a nation-wide breast cancer 
screening programme (cf. Curia Vista (Bundesversammlung 2016b) 
148 In Table 23, the variable is coded as 1 from 1998 onwards since the commitment to cover mammography 
screenings under obligatory health insurance is likely to have encouraged the adoption of screening programmes, 
even before the Federal Council definitely enacted cost coverage. 
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Table 23: Breast cancer screening programmes: coding of point-source diffusion variables, 1993-2013 
Factor of influence Coding of variable Justification 
Financial incentives 1993-1997: 0 
1998-1999: 1 
2000-2013: 1 
No federal funding 
Commitment to cover mammography exams 
under obligatory health insurance 
Actual coverage 
Technical assistance 1993-2008: 0 
2009-2013: 1 
No technical assistance 
Provision of technical assistance by swiss cancer 
screening  
Strong signal about appropriate 
course of action 
1993-2013: 0 No such signal  
Concrete prospect of federal 
policy making 
1993-2013: 0 National-level activities, but no clear indications 
of federal policy making 
 Restaurant Food Nutrition Labelling 
Core content 
Restaurant food nutrition labelling attests to foodservice establishments that they offer healthy meals 
to their customers. In the course of the labelling process, the compliance of the catering facility with a 
set of nutritional standards (and possibly other criteria) is verified. At present, two labels, as awarded 
by the Swiss cantons, exist, which are entitled Fourchette verte (FV) and schnitz und drunder (s&d).149 
The labels differ mainly in terms of target groups. FV targets the entire spectrum of foodservice 
establishments, whereas s&d exclusively aims at the labelling of establishments that cater for children 
and adolescents. Both systems facilitate labelling with a number of services provided to foodservice 
establishments, such as consultancy and staff training. 
First adoption 
FV was created by the health department of the canton of Geneva in 1993, in collaboration with the 
Geneva Society of Restaurateurs and Hoteliers (Société des Cafetiers, Restaurateurs et Hôteliers de 
Genève) (FV-CH 2013a). The creation of the label was motivated by the recognition that certain health 
behaviours, such as unhealthy diets, smoking and excessive alcohol consumption, account for the lion’s 
share of premature deaths. Apart from making healthy out-of-home food, served in a healthy 
environment, more widely available, the initiators of the label also intended to raise the awareness of 
the importance of a healthy diet among restaurant staff and customers (cf. FV-CH 2013b: 4). In 
response to the opposition of restaurants to direct government intervention, the department set up a 
non-profit organisation in 1996 and mandated it with administering the programme (FV-CH 2013a). 
The results of the Swiss health survey 2002 on the prevalence of obesity and unbalanced diets in the 
canton provided the impetus for Basel-Landschaft to initiate s&d (BZ 2008). In 2007, the cantonal 
division on health promotion and disease prevention and the competence centre for agriculture and 
nutrition started to devise the policy. Later on, it was integrated into the cantonal action programme 
on a healthy body weight (Regierungsrat des Kantons Basel-Landschaft 2008). By awarding the label, 
the canton intended to arrange for healthy out-of-home eating of children and adolescents and to set 
an example of healthy eating habits more generally (BS LZE 2015). 
 
                                                          
149 Fourchette verte is French for “green fork”, which is the logo of the label. Schnitz und drunder is the name of 
a traditional winter dish from north-western Switzerland, which includes apple or pear cuts. 
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Pattern of diffusion150 
Figure 14: Restaurant food nutrition labelling: pattern of diffusion, 1993 to 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: Adoption of Fourchette verte (light grey); adoption of schnitz und drunder (dark grey). 
                                                          
150 See Table 57 in the Appendix for the dates of cantonal adoption. 
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Figure 14 reveals that for more than a decade restaurant food nutrition labelling diffused rather slowly 
and exclusively among the French-speaking cantons and Ticino. In 2007, Bern adopted the label for the 
Jura bernois, in collaboration with Fourchette verte Jura. It thus completed the diffusion of the label 
within the CMPH-region of Romandie & Ticino. 
In the same year, Basel-Landschaft created its own label (s&d), which gave new momentum to the 
diffusion of restaurant food nutrition labelling. Since 2008, two more cantons adopted FV (SO in 2008 
and AG in 2011) and seven opted for s&d (five of them in 2011 alone). The total number of adopters 
in 2014 stood at 18 cantons. In comparing the CMPH-regions, Eastern Switzerland exhibited the lowest 
extent of diffusion. Three out of eight cantons in that region had a labelling system in place (i.e. s&d). 
Half of the cantons in Central Switzerland awarded a healthy nutrition label. For all of them, s&d was 
the label of choice. In the two remaining regions, labelling systems spread to all members. In Romandie 
& Ticino, all cantons belonged to FV. North-western Switzerland was divided at the end of 2014, with 
four adopters of FV and three adopters of s&d. 
In 2012, FV-CH and Radix initiated a process of integrating s&d into FV (FV-CH 2015a: 5, 2016: 6). As a 
consequence, from 1 January 2016 onwards, FV will serve as the exclusive label for healthy nutrition 
(FV-CH 2016: 6). In late 2015, three adopters of s&d (BL, BS, SG) joined FV (FV-CH 2016: 6-7). 
Variations in cantonal policy designs 
Differences between the labels FV and s&d mainly account for variations in cantonal policy designs. 
The two labels and the delivery systems that the cantons established are presented below. 
FV is administered jointly by a national association (Fédération Fourchette verte Suisse) and cantonal 
sections (FV-CH 2013b: 3). In order to qualify for the label, foodservice establishments have to fulfil 
two general criteria: to serve varied and balanced meals151 and to ensure a healthy environment by 
observing hygiene standards and separating waste (FV-CH 2013b: 3). Restaurants, cafés, self-service 
restaurants and staff canteens also have to offer at least three non-alcoholic drinks at lower prices 
than the cheapest alcoholic beverage. Catering facilities are also recommended to give preference to 
sustainable products (i.e. local, seasonal and organic foodstuffs). 
FV targets the entire spectrum of foodservice establishments that offer midday lunches or full-day 
catering, including restaurants, cafés, fast-food restaurants and communal catering facilities (e.g. 
school and university canteens, staff restaurants, childcare centres and homes for the elderly). In order 
to make the label applicable to the different types of catering facilities, a number of sublabels were 
created successively (see Table 24 on the next page). Currently, a divide between the French/Italian- 
and the German-speaking cantons that have adopted FV exists. The former award all or almost all 
labels, while the latter concentrate their activities on facilities that cater for children and adolescents 
(FV-CH 2015b). 
Regardless of the range of labels awarded, labelling is restricted to facilities that are located in cantons 
that have set up a cantonal FV section.152 The respective cantonal section is in charge of labelling, which 
is based on the evaluation of a menu plan submitted and a test meal. Consultancy and staff training 
are offered to establishments that undergo labelling and also to certified facilities (FV-CH 2013b: 9). 
Labels are valid for one year. After one year, another test meal is carried out. If the establishment 
complies with the FV-standards (or makes necessary adjustments within the period stipulated), the 
label is renewed (FV-CH 2013b: 9). 
                                                          
151 Both FV and s&d draw on the recommendations of the Swiss Society for Nutrition. 
152 Due to the collaboration with the largest communal catering company in Switzerland, which was launched in 
December 2013, staff canteens all over Switzerland were recently labelled, also in cantons that have not joined 
FV or where the cantonal section does not offer the respective variant of the label (cf. FV-CH 2015a: 5). 
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Concerning the organisation in charge of labelling, two cantons set up a specific organisation (GE, TI), 
while most cantons awarded a performance mandate to an existing non-profit organisation (BE, FR, 
JU, NE, VD, VS) (FV-CH 2015c). Jura and Valais gave the mandate to the external organisation serving 
as the specialised unit on health promotion and prevention (see footnote 80). Solothurn delegated 
labelling to a cantonal division and Aargau to a self-employed nutritionist (FV-CH 2015c). All cantonal 
FV sections have established an independent committee, which decides on the labelling of each facility 
based on the recommendation by the nutritionist, who previews the application (FV-CH 2013b: 9-10). 
Table 24: Fourchette verte: sublabels 
▪ Facilities that take care of children aged less than four years (Fourchette verte des tout-petits) 
▪ School canteens and other providers of midday lunches to children and adolescents aged 4 to 15 years 
(Fourchette verte junior) 
▪ Day-care facilities for children and adolescents aged 4 to 15 years (Affiliation Fourchette verte junior) 
▪ Restaurants, cafés, self-service restaurants and communal catering facilities (Label Fourchette verte) 
▪ Day-care facilities for adults (Affiliation Fourchette verte) 
▪ Day-care facilities for the elderly (Affiliation Fourchette verte senior) 
Source: FV-CH (2013b: 4). 
The label s&d targets exclusively establishments that cater for children and adolescents, such as 
childcare facilities, providers of afterschool day-care, school canteens and similar institutions. While 
no diffusion agency was created specifically for the purpose of disseminating s&d, since late 2011, 
RADIX, a private-law foundation specialised in the field of health promotion, assumes the tasks of 
programme multiplication, coordination of cantonal activities and provision of technical assistance 
(RADIX 2011). 
To be awarded the label, childcare facilities and similar establishments have to comply with criteria in 
five areas: a balanced, healthy choice of ingredients of meals; the storage and preparation of groceries 
so that nutrients are preserved; the involvement of the children catered for in the planning and 
preparation of meals; sustainability (i.e. giving preference to seasonal, regional, ecological and fair-
trade products in purchasing groceries); and a positive, health-promoting table culture (RADIX 2015a). 
The labelling process is quite similar to the one that governs FV. The main differences are: a nutritionist 
(instead of a committee) decides about the awarding of the label; no test meals are carried out and 
the label is valid for two years. Consultation and training are provided to catering facilities during the 
process of labelling, which usually takes 6 to 12 months. Also, afterwards, coaching is offered to the 
facilities (Radix 2015b). 
In terms of delivery system, in the majority of cantons, a division or subdivision of the cantonal 
administration is in charge of programme management (BL, GR, LU, SG, and ZG). Basel-Stadt provided 
a performance mandate to a private, non-profit organisation, Thurgau to Perspektive Thurgau, which 
is a municipal administration union that is specialised in disease prevention and health promotion, and 
Uri to the external organisation that carries out the health promotion and prevention policies on behalf 
of the canton (see footnote 80). 
Policy design and characteristics 
Restaurant food nutrition labelling aims at promoting healthy out-of-home eating. Moreover, it is to 
raise the awareness of the importance of a balanced diet. Thus, it ties in with the more general goals 
of preventing health risks and diseases associated with malnutrition, e.g. obesity, cancer and 
cardiovascular diseases. Essentially, labelling combines two measures: the labelling proper and the 
coaching of management and staff of catering facilities on the principles and practices of preparing 
healthy food. As can be seen from Table 25 and Table 26 on the next page, coaching and labelling 
address the same direct and indirect target groups; they are tied together through horizontal 
packaging (see page 38). 
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Table 25: Fourchette verte: components of the policy design 
 Coaching Labelling 
Objective Enabling catering facilities to prepare 
healthy meals and to comply with the 
other FV-criteria 
Promoting the supply of healthy out-of-
home catering; raising awareness of the 
importance of healthy nutrition 
Action content Transfer of knowledge on planning and 
preparing healthy meals  
Adherence to standards on healthy 
nutrition and environment  
Direct target 
group 
Catering facilities Catering facilities 
Indirect target 
group 
Customers of catering facilities Customers of catering facilities 
Tools Consultancy, training Certification 
Delivery system Cantonal FV section (non-profit 
organisations predominantly) 
Cantonal FV section, certification 
committee 
 
Table 26: schnitz und drunder: components of the policy design 
 Coaching Labelling 
Objective Enabling catering facilities to prepare 
healthy meals and to comply with the 
other s&d-criteria 
Promotion of supply of healthy out-of-
home catering; raising awareness of the 
importance of healthy nutrition 
Action content Transfer of knowledge on planning and 
preparation of healthy meals  
Adherence to standards of healthy 
nutrition, preservation of nutrients, 
sustainability, involvement of children, 
positive table culture 
Direct target 
group 
Institutions that cater for children and 
adolescents 
Institutions that cater for children and 
adolescents 
Indirect target 
group 
Children and adolescents Children and adolescents 
Tools Consultancy, training Certification 
Delivery system Cantonal administrative division on health 
promotion and prevention (predominantly) 
Cantonal administrative division on health 
promotion and prevention (predominantly) 
Under both systems, coaching is to provide the management and staff of foodservice establishments 
with theoretical and practical knowledge on the preparation of healthy food. This knowledge transfer 
is based on the tools of consultancy and training. Catering facilities that agree to be labelled and those 
that are already labelled are the direct target group of the policy measure, i.e. eating places generally 
(FV) or establishments that cater for children and adolescents (s&d). Their customers are intended to 
benefit from the knowledge that catering businesses acquire. 
In the case of FV, an organisation that is given a performance mandate by the canton is usually in 
charge of the programme and consults catering outlets. In most cantons awarding the label s&d, a staff 
member of the specialised cantonal unit on health promotion and prevention offers this service.  
Labelling is to provide an additional incentive to foodservice establishments to offer balanced meals. 
Its aim is to increase the supply of healthy-out-home catering. As detailed before, the action content 
of labelling differs somewhat between FV and s&d in that they do not apply exactly the same 
standards. 
The direct and indirect target groups of labelling are the same as for coaching. In the case of s&d, 
coaching and labelling are delivered by one institution. For FV, a labelling committee complements the 
delivery system. 
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Since eating out of home at midday is widespread and FV targets all types of catering facilities, the 
general population is effectively the designated beneficiary of FV. s&d targets children and adolescents 
for benefits since only facilities that cater for this age group can obtain the label. 
Participation of catering facilities in the respective labelling system is voluntary.153 Presupposing that 
customers and parents of children and adolescents value a healthy nutrition, labelling might offer a 
competitive advantage to certified facilities (e.g. if parents give preference to childcare centres that 
offer healthy meals). In other words, the awarding of the label creates an incentive for foodservice 
establishments to comply with policy-makers’ intentions because otherwise they forego a potential 
benefit. The level of coercion is lower medium. From the perspective of the direct target group, 
restaurant food nutrition labelling touches upon an important – and for restaurants, cafés, self-service 
restaurants and communal catering facilities, even the core – activity. Both labels include detailed, 
specific and comprehensive requirements on the types and quantities of aliments, the composition 
and preparation of individual dishes and the compilation of daily and weekly menus. Criteria in other 
areas complement these stipulations. Given these detailed instructions on the nature of behavioural 
change desired, the policy entails a lower medium level of intrusion. The degree of intervention is low. 
FV and s&d are composed of two policy measures (coaching and labelling); the policy scope is hence 
coded as medium. Given its subdivision into six sublabels, each of which sets out detailed standards, 
the content of FV is a highly calibrated. While s&d is not differentiated into sublabels and therefore 
entails a lower level of calibration than FV, it still involves a set of detailed instructions. Hence, the 
level of calibration of s&d is classified as medium. In general, a single nutritionist, who is employed by 
an existing cantonal administrative unit, administers s&d. Policy adoption is thus often associated with 
the creation of a new position within an existing organisation. In the case of FV, a new implementation 
structure is usually created, which consists of a cantonal FV section and a labelling committee. In view 
of these differences, the automaticity of s&d is classified as high, the one of FV as low. Irrespective of 
certain differences, the design of both policies is complex. 
In 2003, the budget of the cantonal section of FV in Geneva amounted to CHF 184 000, with cantonal 
subsidies accounting for CHF 150 000 of this amount (FV 2015a: 31). Basel-Landschaft allocated CHF 
50 000 in 2008 for implementing s&d (Regierungsrat des Kantons Basel-Landschaft 2008). Thus, the 
implementation costs of both policies are high. However, those of FV clearly exceed those of s&d. 
Table 27: Restaurant food nutrition labelling: characteristics of the policy design 
Policy characteristic Dimension Value 
Designated beneficiaries - FV: More comprehensive than 
children/adolescents 
s&d: Children/adolescents 
Degree of intervention Coerciveness Lower medium 
Intrusiveness Lower medium 
Overall Low 
Complexity Scope Medium 
Calibration FV: High 
s&d: Medium 
Automaticity FV: Low 
s&d: High 
Overall High 
Implementation costs - High  
                                                          
153 Cantons or municipalities are in a position to exert pressure on certain types of communal catering facilities 
(e.g. childcare facilities, school canteens), though. They can make labelling mandatory or limit subsidies to 
certified facilities. Such pressures, if present, would result in higher levels of coercion. 
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Federal and national context 
At the federal level, there have been no endeavours to introduce a labelling system for foodservice 
establishments. However, as part of the National Programme on Diet and Physical Activity 2008-2012, 
the federal government funded a research project on catering for healthy out-of-home eating, which 
resulted in the publication of quality standards for health-promoting communal catering (cf. good 
practice 2015). 
In December 1999, CLASS initiated the establishment of the national association of FV (Fédération 
Fourchette verte Suisse, FV-CH), with the support of Health Promotion Switzerland. FV-CH was created 
to support existing cantonal FV sections and to promote the dissemination of the policy to other 
cantons. Over the years, the association devised several adaptations of the label and harmonised and 
standardised the requirements and processes of labelling across the cantons. As a result, detailed 
guidelines on each sublabel and other tools are available to cantonal FV-sections. From 2000 onwards, 
Health Promotion Switzerland provided funding to the national association and the cantonal sections 
of FV. Since 2007, Health Promotion Switzerland funds cantonal action programme that aim at 
promoting a healthy body weight. Both FV and s&d constitute modules suggested by Health Promotion 
Switzerland for inclusion into these programmes. Cantons are free to decide what modules they adopt, 
though. 
Table 28: Restaurant food nutrition labelling: coding of point-source diffusion variables, 1993-2013 
Factor of influence Coding of variable Justification 
Financial incentives 1993-1999: 0 
2000-2006: 0154 
2007-2013: 1 
Neither positive nor negative financial 
incentives 
Funding of cantonal action programmes by 
Health Promotion Switzerland 
Technical assistance 1993-1999: 0 
2000-2013: 1 
No technical assistance provided 
Provision of technical assistance through FV-
CH (plus provision of technical assistance for 
s&d through RADIX)  
Strong signal about appropriate 
course of action 
1993-2013: 0 No such signal 
Concrete prospect of federal policy 
making 
1993-2013: 0 No federal bill tabled or popular initiative filed 
  
                                                          
154 Strictly speaking, the value should be 1 since Health Promotion Switzerland provided funding for the creation 
of cantonal FV-sections from 2000 onwards. However, this form of financial support coincides with the 
foundation of the national association and thus cannot be tested separately. 
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6 Statistical Methods and Data 
In addressing the research questions raised in Chapter 1, statistical analyses that are based on event 
history analysis (EHA) will be carried out. The datasets used for this purpose join data from a variety 
of primary and secondary sources. This chapter describes the methods of statistical analysis and the 
data employed. Being divided into two subchapters, the first subchapter outlines the basics of EHA, 
introduces the different types of event history models that will be estimated and clarifies various 
modelling issues. Chapter 6.2 provides an overview of the variables that will be accounted for in the 
various models. It sets out their operational definitions, lists the data sources that they come from, 
discusses data limitations and provides information on the steps taken in preparing the data. 
 Event History Analysis: Logic and Application to the Present Research Endeavour 
The basics of EHA 
“Events” indicate the transition from one state to another and EHA models the whether and when of 
events occurring (Box-Steffensmeier/Jones 2004: 1, 7). It traces the history, i.e. the period of time up 
to the event (or the end of the observation period, respectively). Due to its concern with the duration 
of processes, the method is also called “duration analysis”. In medical research, engineering and other 
disciplines, event history processes are often conceived of as “failure-time processes” since they 
observe units, such as patients or machines, until they fail, i.e. experience death or break-down (Box-
Steffensmeier/Jones 2004: 7). Accordingly, “survival models” is another name for event history or 
duration models. The concepts of “survival” and “failure” reflect the origins of EHA in biostatistics (Box-
Steffensmeier/Jones 2004: 7). In policy diffusion research, policy adoption typically figures as the event 
to be explained (for other dependent variables, see page 8). 
EHA has several strengths: Most fundamentally, it accounts for the temporal dimension of social or 
other phenomena (Box-Steffensmeier/Jones 2004: 2). Moreover, event history models allow for the 
inclusion of time-varying covariates and thus for assessing the effects of changes in covariates over 
time (Box-Steffensmeier/Jones 2004: 10). EHA can also accommodate censoring. Censoring – or more 
precisely, right-censoring – occurs if event histories are incomplete because the observation period 
ends before all units have experienced the event (see Box-Steffensmeier/Jones 2004: 10, 16-19).155 
Given that right-censoring is omnipresent in datasets on policy adoption and that many explanatory 
factors of particular interest to diffusion research vary over time (e.g. the public salience of an issue), 
EHA provides a versatile framework for analysing whether, when and why policies are adopted. Hence, 
it is not surprising that EHA, which Berry and Berry (1990) introduced to policy diffusion research, has 
found widespread favour among the scholarly community and has been taken up in countless research 
articles (thus representing an instance of diffusion in diffusion research). As will be detailed below, 
EHA is also highly suitable for addressing the research interest of this study. 
Manifold approaches to event history modelling exist, with one distinction referring to continuous 
versus discrete models. Both revolve around the time until event occurrence, but they differ in terms 
of the conception of event history processes and/or the measurement of the dependent variable. 
Continuous models assume that events can occur at any time, with measures of the length of time 
(usually in days, months or years) that elapses before the event occurs (or, in the case of right-
censoring, the observation period ends) serving as the dependent variable (Box-Steffensmeier/Jones 
2004: 69).156 Discrete models record event occurrences at discrete points in time, either because event 
history processes are inherently discrete or because data on continuous processes exist for discrete 
                                                          
155 Left-censoring refers to failures that occur prior to the beginning of the observation period and are hence 
excluded from the respective study (Box-Steffensmeier/Jones 2004: 16, fn. 3). 
156 For an overview of continuous duration models, see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004: 21-67).  
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points in time only (Box-Steffensmeier/Jones 2004: 69). Analyses of policy adoption are typically based 
on discrete EHA, which is described below. 
Discrete EHA disaggregates the observation period into distinct time intervals (in policy diffusion 
studies, usually years) and records for each time interval and unit of analysis (e.g. a jurisdiction at the 
local, subnational or state level) if the latter is still at risk of the event or has experienced it during the 
interval (Box-Steffensmeier/Jones 2004: 69-70). Observations that are still at risk (in policy diffusion 
research, the non-adopters of a policy) are coded 0, while observations that have experienced the 
event (policy adopters) are coded 1. This procedure yields a binary dependent variable. After event 
occurrence, the units affected drop out of the dataset as they are no longer at risk of failure (in the 
policy diffusion context, jurisdictions are removed from the dataset in the year after adoption).157 As a 
result, in discrete EHA, duration times are reflected in the number of entries on each unit of analysis 
in the dataset (Box-Steffensmeier/Jones 2004: 69-70). 
To illustrate the structure of datasets in discrete EHA: If the units of analysis are the Swiss cantons, the 
observation period stretches from 1993 to 2013 (being divided into years) and the event is policy 
adoption, the dataset contains one entry on each canton and year between 1993 and 2013 up to the 
year in which a canton adopts the policy. Policy-years thus constitute the observations. If a canton 
innovates in 1998, the dataset comprises six records that pertain to this canton. The first five ones (for 
the years 1993-1997) are coded 0 and the sixth one, for 1998, is coded 1. These six entries correspond 
to the duration time of six years until policy adoption. From 1999 onwards, the canton is no longer in 
the dataset because it has ceased to be at risk of adopting the policy. Thus, with successive policy 
adoptions, the number of canton-years that each year in the observation period adds to the dataset 
becomes smaller. 
Event occurrence constitutes the manifest dependent variable, but EHA effectively models the latent 
conditional hazard probability, i.e. the probability that the event occurs at a given point of time, 
provided that is has not occurred before (Box-Steffensmeier/Jones 2004: 71). In mainstream policy 
diffusion studies, EHA models the probability (or likelihood) of policy adoption. Event history models 
condition the hazard probability on time and usually on predictors that are of theoretical interest in 
the respective area (such as internal determinants and diffusion effects in policy diffusion research). 
Maximum likelihood estimation is generally used to estimate the coefficients of event history models. 
Selection and specification of models 
In line with most policy diffusion studies, the models estimated in Chapters 7 and 8 will be based on 
discrete EHA.158 Two types of discrete event history models will be estimated: Single event models will 
provide the basis for explaining the adoption of individual policies (Chapter 7) and for comparing the 
strength of effects of various explanatory variables across policies with different characteristics 
(Chapter 8.28.1). Multiple events models, in turn, will be employed to directly assess the impact of 
policy design characteristics (Chapter 8.3). 
Single event models are appropriate for situations where the units observed may transition from one 
state to another one once (Box-Steffensmeier/Jones 2004: 155). As the adoption of a specific policy is 
concerned, single event models are a suitable specification of failure-time processes. This is because 
the jurisdictions observed are at risk of one transition only (i.e. from non-adoption to adoption). They 
cannot adopt the same policy twice – unless the policy was terminated meanwhile. During the 
                                                          
157 This applies to single event models, which assume that each unit of analysis can experience the event only 
once. 
158 Most policy diffusion studies focus on policy adoptions that manifest in parliamentary decisions. Parliaments 
do not convene in plenary sitting throughout the entire year. Therefore, one might argue that processes that 
lead to policy adoption are inherently discrete in nature. 
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observation period of this study, no instances of policy termination occurred, though.159 Moreover, 
due to the focus on model diffusion (cf. page 36), adoptions of policies that pursue the same objective 
as the policy of interest, but are based on different designs are disregarded. Thus, on both conceptual 
and empirical grounds, multiple events models – i.e. repeated events or competing risks models – do 
not match cantonal innovation decisions on the adoption of individual public health policies.160 Rather, 
single event models are the suitable framework for analysis. 
Similar to Berry and Berry (1990, 2007: 237), the single event models are specified as follows:  
ADOPTi,t = f (INTERNALi,t, EXTERNALi,t) 
Thus, the likelihood that a particular canton (“i”) adopts the policy of interest in a given year (“t”) is 
modelled to be a function of explanatory factors that divide into two groups: internal determinants 
(INTERNALi,t), which entail the political, economic and social characteristics of the canton in a specific 
year, and diffusion effects (EXTERNALi,t), which result from interdependent decision making among 
cantons and from federal and national influences as prevailing in the respective year.161 
To recapitulate, a single event set-up captures one-time transitions of units of analysis from some state 
to a singular destination (e.g. from non-adoption to adoption). In contrast, multiple events models 
apply to either of two constellations (Box-Steffensmeier/Jones 2004: 155): (1) Units of analysis are at 
risk of failing once, transitioning to one among several states (e.g. from non-adoption to adoption of 
either policy A, B or C). (2) Units of analysis are at risk of failing more than once – i.e. within the 
observation period, they may experience the same type of event several times (e.g. adopting various 
components of a specific policy, cf. Boehmke 2009) or may experience different types of events (e.g. 
adopting any of policies A, B and C). 
In selecting the appropriate multiple events model, two considerations are relevant (cf. Box-
Steffensmeier/Jones 2004: 156): Are the events at stake of the same type? And, do events occur in 
some natural order? In the present context, Swiss cantons are at risk of events of different types: They 
cannot adopt the same policy several times (in the absence of policy termination). However, they may 
adopt the policies studied in any order. No natural sequence of policy adoptions exists among the 
public health policies of interest. 
There is no agreed-upon classification of multiple events models (cf. Box-Steffensmeier/Jones 2004: 
155). The models estimated in Chapter 8.3 may be termed “stratified competing risk models”. They 
qualify as competing risks models because the units observed are at risk of events of different types. 
Unlike in the classic competing risks set-up, the units of analysis can experience each of the events 
under study, though (cf. Box-Steffensmeier/Jones 2004: 175-178). The models are stratified as policy 
fixed effects are entered to account for differences in event-specific hazard rates (for further details, 
see the next section). 
The joint analysis of adoptions of different policies based on a multiple events framework allows for a 
direct assessment of the impact of policy design characteristics. For that purpose, the policy attributes 
of interest will be entered into the multiple events models on policy adoption as a third group of 
                                                          
159 Successions of policy adoption, termination and re-adoption are amenable to EHA. Their analysis requires a 
specific repeated events set-up. 
160 Cantonal adoptions of restaurant food nutrition labelling could be framed in another way, though. Instead of 
predicting the adoption of any of the two existing labels, cantonal decisions on whether to adopt one or the 
other label (or none) could be modelled. In that case, a competing risks model would be the correct specification 
(cf. Box-Steffensmeier/Jones 2004: 166-181). 
161 In this equation, “INTERNALi,t” covers “MOTIVATIONi,t”, “RESOURCES/OBSTACLESi,t”, and “OTHER-POLICIESi,t”, 
as specified by Berry and Berry (2007: 237) (see page 8). Since the cantons did not adopt any policies that are 
complementary to, conditions for, or substitutes of the six policies of interest, the models presented in the 
following chapters will not include any variables that pertain to the category “OTHER-POLICIESi,t”. 
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independent variables (POLICIESp). In addition, two interaction terms will be provided for. They trace 
whether the effects of internal determinants and policy diffusion are contingent on the attributes of 
the policies studied: 
ADOPTp,i,t = f (INTERNALi,t, EXTERNALi,t, POLICIESp, POLICIESp*INTERNALi,t, POLICIESp*EXTERNALi,t) 
Besides containing an additional group of explanatory factors and related interaction terms, this 
equation differs from the specification of the single event models above in that multiple policies are 
pooled into one model (hence the subscript “p”).162 Datasets that allow for the estimation of such 
models contain one record for each combination of policies, jurisdictions and years studied. Thus, 
policy-state-years constitute the observations. 
Modelling issues 
Apart from the determination of types of event history models to be estimated, a number of modelling 
issues have to be settled, including (1) the delineation of the observation period, (2) the intervals that 
the observation period is divided into, (3) the choice of the link function between the probabilities 
estimated and the linear predictors, (4) the modelling of time dependency, (5) the correction for serial 
correlation, (6) the time lagging of independent variables, (7) the selection of covariates for the 
various types of models to be estimated and (8) the handling of heterogeneity of processes that lead 
to different types of events in multiple events models: 
(1) For reasons of data availability, the observation period for all analyses presented in the following 
chapters ends in 2013. As to the beginning of the observation period, the relevant question is 
when the respective failure-time process starts. As Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004: 8) point 
out, the determination of the starting point is a theoretical issue. Processes that lead to policy 
adoption often do not have a natural starting point.163 Many scholars define the year in which the 
first state in their sample adopts the policy of interest as the starting point (e.g. Berry/Berry 1990; 
Allen et al. 2004; Shipan/Volden 2006). As the policy idea that manifests in policy adoption often 
has been around for some time before the first government puts it into practice, defining an 
earlier starting point can make sense in substantive terms, too. This study observes the cantons 
from the first instance of cantonal policy adoption onwards – mostly for practical reasons. Data 
on most of the internal determinants accounted for are not available for the period prior to 1990. 
Since two of the policies studied were pioneered already in 1993, it is not possible to observe the 
cantons from several years prior to the first adoption onwards. 
(2) The study period is disaggregated into years. The annual periodicity of most secondary data 
inhibits a more fine-grained analysis of cantonal innovation and diffusion processes.164 
(3) Logit models have become the standard in policy diffusion research. To render the results of this 
study comparable to previous research, logit models on cantonal policy adoptions are estimated. 
Hence, the standard logistic distribution serves as the function that maps the linear predictors 
(i.e. INTERNALi,t, EXTERNALi,t, POLICIESp) into the probability of policy adoption.  
(4) Whatever functional form is chosen, discrete event history models yield flat hazard probabilities 
with respect to time, if time dependency is not accounted for (Box-Steffensmeier/Jones 2004: 75). 
Put differently, unless measures of time are included, the likelihood of policy adoption remains 
                                                          
162 As outlined in Chapter 3.1, the policy attributes studied are constant across adopters and time. Hence, they 
are subscripted with „p“ only. The designated beneficiaries of restaurant food nutrition labelling are an 
exemption, though (see Chapter 5.5). 
163 In some instances, however, the point in time at which jurisdictions begin to be at risk of policy adoption is 
clearly identifiable. For example, if a supreme court declares an existing legal practice to be unconstitutional and 
the governments concerned decide to replace it with new legislation, the court decision marks the onset of a 
period of policy innovation. 
164 Recording the values of the dependent variable and the diffusion variables for every individual month would 
be straightforward, though. A more fine-grained analysis might yield a more precise understanding of the effects 
of internal determinants and diffusion on policy adoption. 
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constant throughout the observation period. This is an unrealistic assumption. Various forms of 
modelling temporal dependence have been devised, such as time dummies and smoothening 
functions of time, including cubic splines (Beck et al. 1998). This study follows the 
recommendation made by Carter and Signorino (2010a), which is to include time (i.e. a time 
counter variable that records the years that passed since the beginning of the observation period), 
time squared and time cubed into the models. It does so because Carter and Signorino (2010a) 
show this approach to be more easily implemented than cubic splines, while performing equally 
well.165  
(5) In discrete EHA, the units of analysis enter the dataset multiple times. As described above, single 
event models contain multiple observations on each unit. For the values of the dependent and 
independent variables are recorded for each individual time interval until the unit drops out of 
the dataset. In multiple events models, there are even more observations per unit, with event 
occurrences being recorded not only for each time interval, but also for each of the events 
studied. As a result, the observations in discrete EHA are serially correlated, which violates the 
assumption of conditional independence (Buckley/Westerland 2004: 104; Box-Steffensmeier/ 
Jones 2004: 114-115). That is why standard errors need to be estimated that are robust to this 
violation of conditional independence (cf. Box-Steffensmeier/Jones 2004: 114-115). For the single 
event models, Huber/White robust standard errors clustered by canton are reported. Drawing 
on Shipan and Volden (2006: 833) and Makse and Volden (2011: 114), standard errors are 
clustered by canton-year in the multiple events models. In all models, the clustering procedure 
available in Stata 12 is used. 
(6) In order to reduce the risk that policy adoption is attributed to a change in predictors that in fact 
occurs at the same time or even after adoption (see Box-Steffensmeier/Jones 2004: 110-112), 
most of the independent variables (see Chapter 6.2) are lagged by one year. The variables on left-
party strength are an exemption. With policy adoption depending on the endorsement by the 
relevant institution, predictor and dependent variable need to be quasi-simultaneous.166 
(7) The predictors that shape cantonal innovation decisions are likely to vary by both issue and 
characteristics of the policy. Hence, different covariates (i.e. internal determinants and diffusion 
effects) will be accounted for in the single event models that are presented in Chapter 7. As a 
prerequisite for the comparison across policies, the single event models that figure in Chapter 8.2 
are based on a broad common set of covariates, though. In the multiple events models in Chapter 
8.3, a broad set of covariates that comprises all explanatory factors that were found relevant in 
the single event models will be accounted for. 
(8) The processes that generate different types of events (such as the adoptions of diverse policies) 
are heterogeneous. Multiple events models, which pool various events into one equation, must 
take this heterogeneity into account. The multiple events models estimated in this study handle 
this heterogeneity – as far as the sample allows for – through the inclusion of policy fixed effects 
and policy-by-covariate interactions (see Chapter 8.3 for a more detailed elaboration). 
 Feeding the Models: Categories of Variables, Data Sources and Data Processing 
Categories of variables accounted for and measurement issues 
While the specification of the individual models is reserved to Chapters 7 and 8, an overview of the 
variables that figure in the analyses is given here, with internal determinants corresponding to seven 
                                                          
165 For the ensuing debate on the relative merits of spline functions and Carter and Signorino’s approximation, 
see Beck (2010) and Carter and Signorino (2010b). 
166 The ideological orientations of decision makers in the years prior to policy adoption might be relevant in terms 
of agenda-setting and policy formulation. To account for this, lagged party composition variables could 
additionally be included in the models. Since the composition of political institutions usually changes only every 
so many years, this approach probably does not hold much analytical leverage, though. 
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theoretical concepts: (1) problem severity, (2) government ideological preferences, (3) interest group 
pressures, (4) policy-making capacity, (5) state fiscal situation, (6) state interventionism, and (7) 
producer pressures.167 Table 29 at the end of this section summarises these internal determinants.168 
Below, theoretical concepts and various measurement issues are detailed. 
Problem severity stands for the “objective reality” of the problem that the policy deals with (rather 
than its public salience). An indicator of problem severity that applies to all six policies studied and that 
measures the scope of the public problem addressed in a comparable way across policies is desirable. 
Regarding the public problems at stake, five policies aim at reducing a behaviour that is harmful to 
health (i.e. tobacco consumption, alcohol abuse or unhealthy diets), while one strives for the early 
detection of a specific disease (i.e. breast cancer). Ultimately, the policies revolve around the primary 
or secondary prevention of diseases, either one particular disease or multiple diseases that are 
associated with a particular risk factor (e.g. smoking and the increased risks for cardiovascular and 
respiratory diseases and cancer). Thus, the burden that these diseases impose on individuals and 
society could serve as the common metric in measuring problem severity across policies (cf. Armstrong 
et al. 2006: 734). For the individual, being ill is associated with a loss of quality of life or even premature 
death. Society at large incurs both direct costs in the form of health care expenditure and indirect 
costs, such as the loss of labour productivity (cf. Armstrong et al. 2006: 736-737). 
Although no complete measure of the burden of diseases exists, several aspects are amenable to 
measurement (Armstrong et al. 2006: 737). In fact, epidemiologists and health economists have 
devised multiple indicators that capture the prevalence or incidence of, or mortality from, specific 
diseases, combine morbidity and mortality into single measures or reflect healthcare, economic or 
other costs. However, most of these measures are based on complex estimations. As a result, data on 
indicators such as mortality rates, disability- or quality-adjusted life years, or the direct or indirect 
societal costs that are attributable to various health risks or diseases often exist for the national level 
and for individual years only. For example, while statistical sources provide longitudinal data on breast 
cancer mortality for each canton, times-series data on tobacco-related deaths exist only for the 
country as a whole (see BFS 2009a). Cross-cantonal, longitudinal data that measure the relevant public 
health problems in a fully comparable way are therefore not available. 
The following indicators of problem severity are available from secondary sources: prevalence of 
smoking, risky alcohol consumption and overweight respectively, and breast cancer mortality.169 Given 
that these indicators regularly figure in statistical as well as policy documents, they are easily accessible 
to policy makers. While not qualifying as fully comparable measures across policies, they should thus 
at least clearly show whether the objective scope of public problems matters for the adoption of public 
health policies.  
Since the empirical focus of this study rests on public health, ideological preferences are understood 
as “[…] assumptions about whether the ultimate responsibility for health lies with the individual or 
with society, and whether the government has a right, or even a responsibility, to regulate individual 
behaviour and commercial activity to protect and promote the public good.” (Cohen et al. 2000: 263). 
As proxy measures for the ideological positions of cantonal decision makers on public health, the party 
composition of political institutions is used. Swiss left-wing parties highlight the social determinants of 
health and advocate a strong role of governments in health policy. Centrist and rightist parties, in 
contrast, emphasise the individual responsibility for health. They generally reject state intervention 
                                                          
167 Due to data limitations, three types of internal determinants that are relevant in theoretical terms cannot be 
accounted for: legislative professionalism, public opinion and salience of the policy issue. 
168 For the sake of completeness, Table 30 at the end of this section assembles the operational definitions of 
policy adoption, implementation, diffusion and characteristics from previous chapters. For an elaboration of 
these variables, see Chapters 3.2, 4.3 and 5. 
169 Breast cancer incidence would be more comparable to the three other indicators, but canton-specific data 
are lacking for many cantons (cf. NICER 2015a). 
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into the private lives of individuals and the economy and give preference to market self-regulation. 
Therefore, government ideological preferences are measured as the strength of leftist parties in 
cantonal governments and parliaments and the party affiliation of cantonal health ministers.170 
Various organised groups may exert pressure on cantonal decision makers and marshal support for, or 
opposition to, specific public health policies. Organised interests range from public health advocacy 
groups (e.g. health leagues, professional associations, patient organisations) to interest groups that 
represent specific economic sectors (e.g. the tobacco industry) or economic interests more generally 
(e.g. trade and employers’ associations). Interest groups vary by issue area. Regarding data availability, 
time-series data on the number or strength of lobbyists or the number of, or resources available to, 
organisations that are active in specific issue areas in the Swiss cantons do not exist. However, sources 
of secondary data do provide one relevant indicator: the staff levels of organisations in cantonal public 
health sectors, defined as organisations that aim at the promotion of health, e.g. the cancer leagues 
and the Samaritans (BFS 2008: 238). 
Policy-making capacity is a function of the availability of professional human resources for policy 
analysis and formulation in the field of interest. Both cantonal administrations and parliaments 
command such resources. For the legislative branch, policy-making capacity follows from the level of 
professionalization of parliaments. Since legislative professionalism entails several aspects (e.g. the 
compensation of legislators, the length of parliamentary sessions, the size of parliamentary services), 
multi-dimensional indices are the most valid measures of the concept. As several observers note, there 
has been a clear trend towards the professionalization of cantonal parliaments since the early 1990s 
(Bochsler et al. 2004: 36; Trippolini 2007; Jaun 2011: 34). For that reason, it is important to measure 
legislative professionalism with annual data or data that at least cover the beginning, the middle and 
the end of the observation period. Unfortunately, longitudinal data do not exist for the Swiss cantons, 
neither on composite measures nor on individual dimensions.171 That is why the models estimated will 
not take legislative professionalism into account. 
Inside the administrative branch, executive commissions, specialist units of the central administrations 
and external organisations that work under a performance mandate are involved in cantonal policy 
making on public health (see Chapter 4.1). Because of the major differences in cantonal organisational 
structures, the collection of primary data on executive policy-making capacity proved too demanding. 
Secondary sources do not provide such data, either. Therefore, this study relies on a proxy measure 
instead: the density of cantonal administrations (i.e. the number of public administration staff per 1000 
residents in the canton). This indicator reflects the concept of interest in that it measures the scale of 
human resources that cantons have at their disposal. It is not specific to the area of public health, 
though. 
The fiscal situation of the state is specified in terms of the balance of the cantonal budget, i.e. the 
proportion of government revenue to spending.172 As can be seen from Table 29 on page 108, the 
                                                          
170 The following national or inter-regional parties were coded as leftist parties: Swiss Social Democratic Party, 
Swiss Green Party, feminist and green-alternative groupings, Christian Social Party, the Ring of Independents 
(LdU) and the Workers’ Party (PdA). So were several canton-specific left-wing parties. 
171 Jaun (2011) provides data on the Squire index of legislative professionalism for the cantonal parliaments for 
one point in time, i.e. the mid- to late 2000s (depending on the availability of data for each canton). Various 
sources contain data on one or another dimension of legislative professionalism, with the most important one 
being BADAC, the database on the Swiss cantons and cities (IDHEAP 2015). Yet, BADAC does not cover the period 
of observation as needed for the analyses. 
172 Cantonal public debts would be an alternative specification. However, the budgetary situation is more likely 
to shape innovation decisions on expensive policies.  
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revenue-to-spending ratio was transformed so that it gives the relative budget surplus or deficit 
respectively in a given year.173 
Due to differences in state-interventionist traditions, which reflect more general and long-standing 
ideological preferences of political elites and citizens, the public sectors of some cantons are more 
extensive than those of others. State interventionism is measured as the spending-to-GDP ratio. 
Public health policies may restrain or further the activities of economic sectors. Economic actors may 
therefore push for, or work against, the adoption of such policies. What type of reaction a policy 
triggers is likely to depend on its attributes, particularly its designated beneficiaries and degree of 
intervention. Based on the assumption that the level of potential pressure is positively related to the 
economic weight of the respective sector, the value that the sector adds to the cantonal economy 
would be the most valid measure. Because of the lack of such data, the models estimated will account 
for employment level of the sector concerned – more precisely, employment in production. Producer 
pressures thus approximate the influence that one important segment of economic actors affected by 
public health policies might exert during decision-making processes. 
Tobacco growers and manufacturers are the relevant producers in the field of tobacco control policy. 
As alcohol prevention policies are concerned, wine growers and the planters of other fruits and crops 
used for alcohol production as well as alcohol producers make up the production sector. Foodservice 
establishments, which include restaurants, cafés and bars, communal catering facilities (e.g. school, 
university and business canteens) and the catering units of care facilities (such as hospitals, childcare 
centres, day-care facilities and homes for diverse groups), are the producers affected by restaurant 
food nutrition labelling. Radiology centres and departments produce the services delivered under 
breast cancer screening programmes.174 
Thanks to the Business Census (BC) and the Statistics on Enterprise Structure (SES), employment data 
on all economic branches exist (see Table 29). In some instances, these data cannot be disaggregated 
in a way that fully corresponds to the concepts just outlined, but most indicators are close to the 
respective concept. The data on employment in tobacco cultivation are exhaustive. Regarding the 
workforce involved in the cultivation of crops that are used for the production of alcoholic beverages, 
only the figures on wine growing can be used.175 The variables on tobacco manufacturing and alcohol 
production cover employment almost fully, with the latter capturing establishments that produce 
spirits, wine, cider, beer, vermouth and similar beverages (cf. BFS 2008: 31-32). The indicator on the 
catering sector covers restaurants, cafés and bars, but not the catering units of care facilities.176 Finally, 
the two measures that pertain to the radiology sector embrace the radiologists that practice in each 
canton, but do not cover the number of radiologist assistants.177  
                                                          
173 Concretely, the government revenue-to-spending ratio for the canton was multiplied by 100 and then the 
value of 100 was deducted. 
174 As producers, radiologists have an economic stake in breast cancer screening programmes. At the same time, 
they are an important implementation resource since programmes cannot be put in operation without a 
sufficient number of radiologists and radiology assistants practicing in the canton. 
175 Other agricultural products that can be fermented or distilled are mostly used for purposes different from 
alcohol production. The statistical sources mentioned before do not allow singling out the share of employees 
who cultivate crops destined for alcohol production. Being a crop grown mainly for beer brewing, hops are one 
exception. However, workers who cultivate hops figure in a more general statistical category (i.e. the growing of 
spice plants; BFS 2008: 7-8). Again, they cannot be extracted from this relevant category and added to the 
employment level in alcohol production. 
176 Employment data on care facilities are provided for in the BC and SES, but the number of staff involved in 
catering tasks cannot be identified. 
177 The data come from the Physicians’ Statistics. While longitudinal data on the number of radiologist assistants 
do not exist, Lehmann et al. (2012) provides cross-sectional figures. 
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In conceptual terms, it is important to point out that the figures on employment in production do not 
fully reflect the importance of the sector to cantonal economies. Tobacco industry can illustrate this 
point: Three major international tobacco companies operate in Switzerland and divide almost the 
entire market among them (Swiss Cigarette 2015). The three companies maintain a strong presence in 
Switzerland where they do not only produce for the Swiss, but also for the worldwide market. Besides 
being an important manufacturing base, Switzerland also hosts other large divisions of these 
companies (e.g. research and development; vending and operations centres; international 
headquarters) (Swiss Cigarette 2015). The indicator described in Table 29 covers tobacco growing and 
manufacturing, but it does not cover the staff employed in other units of tobacco companies. Nor does 
it entail employment in tobacco wholesale or retail trade. Because of the classification system that 
governs the employment statistics used, an indicator of employment in all tobacco-related activities 
cannot be constructed from existing sources.178 For the alcohol sector, the situation is similar. 
Nevertheless, the figures on alcohol and tobacco production reflect the economic activities most 
directly affected by the policies studied. 
  
                                                          
178 This is because several activities are part of wider categories that pertain to cantonal economies as a whole 
(e.g. research and development as part of “research in the areas of natural, engineering, agricultural sciences 
and medicine”; BFS 2008: 194). In these instances, employment cannot be disaggregated by sector. 
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Table 29: Internal determinants: operational definitions, data sources used and years covered 
Type of 
explanatory 
factor 
Variable Operational definition Data sources Years covered 
Problem 
severity 
Prevalence of smoking Percentage of individuals who smoke at least one 
cigarette a day (among population aged 15+) in the 
canton/region 
Swiss Health Survey (FSO/Obsan) 1992, 1997, 2002, 
2007, 2012 
Prevalence of overweight Percentage of individuals whose BMI equals or exceeds 25 
(among population aged 18+) in the canton/region 
Swiss Health Survey (FSO/Obsan) 1992, 1997, 2002, 
2007, 2012 
Prevalence of risky alcohol 
consumption 
Percentage of women with a daily consumption of 20g of 
pure alcohol or more and percentage of men with a daily 
consumption of 40g of pure alcohol or more (among 
population aged 15+) in the canton/region 
Swiss Health Survey (FSO/Obsan) 1997, 2002, 2007, 
2012 
Deaths from breast cancer Number of deaths from breast cancer among women in 
the canton during five-year period 
Cause of Death Statistics (FSO/NICER) 
(NICER 2015b)179 
1987-1991, 1992-
1996, 1997-2001, 
2002-2006, 2007-
2011 
  
                                                          
179 Cancer data extracted from the Swiss national dataset managed by the Foundation National Institute for Cancer Epidemiology and Registration (NICER). 
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Table 29: Internal determinants: operational definitions, data sources used and years covered (continued) 
Type of 
explanatory 
factor 
Variable Operational definition Data sources Years covered 
Ideological 
preferences 
Strength of left parties in 
parliament 
Proportion of left-party seats in cantonal parliament FSO (BFS 2015a); cantonal websites; 
Année politique suisse (IPW 1990-
2013) 
1990-2013: annual 
data 
Strength of left parties in 
government 
Proportion of ministers with left-party affiliation in 
cantonal government 
Publicus (1989/1990-2012); cantonal 
websites; NZZ online archive; 
WorldStatesmen.org (2015) 
1990-2013: annual 
data 
Strength of left parties in 
parliament and government  
Proportion of left-party members of cantonal parliament 
and government combined 
See above 1990-2013: annual 
data 
Left-party affiliation of 
health minister 
Dummy = 1 for cantonal health minister belonging to a 
left party 
Publicus (1989/1990-2012); cantonal 
websites; NZZ online archive; 
WorldStatesmen.org (2015) 
1990-2013: annual 
data 
Interest group 
pressures 
Strength of public health 
organisations 
Number of public health organisation employees in the 
canton per 1000 employees (in full-time equivalents) 
Business Census (BFS 2015b); since 
2011: Statistics on Enterprise 
Structure (BFS 2015b) 
1995, 2001, 2005, 
2008, 2011, 2012 
Policy-making 
capacity 
Density of administration Number of cantonal administration employees (in full-
time equivalents) per 1000 population 
Business Census (BFS 2015b); since 
2011: Statistics on Enterprise 
Structure (BFS 2015b); 
ESPOP/STATPOP (BFS 2015d, 2015e) 
1991, 1995, 1998, 
2001, 2005, 2008, 
2011, 2012 
State fiscal 
situation 
Relative budget surplus/ 
deficit 
Cantonal budget surplus/deficit as percentage of 
government spending 
Financial Statistics (EFV 2015a) 1990-2011: annual 
data 
State 
interventionism 
Size of public sector  Government spending-to-GDP ratio for the canton (in %) Financial Statistics (EFV 2015a); 
BAKBASEL 
1990-2011: annual 
data 
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Table 29: Internal determinants: operational definitions, data sources used and years covered (continued) 
Type of 
explanatory 
factor 
Variable Operational definition Data sources Years covered 
Producer 
pressures 
Tobacco production Number of employees in tobacco cultivation and 
manufacturing in the canton per 1000 employees (in full-
time equivalents) 
Business Census (BFS 2015b); since 
2011: Statistics on Enterprise 
Structure (BFS 2015b) 
1995, 2001, 2005, 
2008, 2011, 2012 
Alcohol production Number of employees in winegrowing and alcohol 
production in the canton per 1000 employees (in full-time 
equivalents) 
See above See above 
Restaurant sector Number of employees in catering facilities in the canton 
per 1000 employees (in full-time equivalents) 
See above See above 
Radiology industry Number of radiologists in the canton per 1000 employees 
(in full-time equivalents) 
Radiologists: Physicians’ Statistics 
(FMH 2015); Business Census (BFS 
2015b); since 2011: Statistics on 
Enterprise Structure (BFS 2015b) 
1990-1994: annual 
data, 1996, 1998-
2012: annual data 
Other Day-care sector for children Number of employees in childcare facilities in the canton 
per 1000 employees (in full-time equivalents) 
Business Census (BFS 2015b); since 
2011: Statistics on Enterprise 
Structure (BFS 2015b) 
See above 
 Density of radiologists Number of radiologists in the canton per 1000 population Radiologists: Physicians’ Statistics 
(FMH 2015); ESPOP/STATPOP (BFS 
2015d, 2015e) 
1990-1994: annual 
data, 1996, 1998-
2012: annual data 
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Table 30: Policy adoption, implementation, diffusion and characteristics: operational definitions, data sources used and years covered 
Type of variable Variable Operational definition Data sources used Years covered 
Dependent 
variable 
Policy adoption Dummy = 1 for enactment of legal provision, 
appropriation decision, issuance of ordinance or similar 
type of authoritative decision 
Cantonal statutes (cf. Appendix); FV-
CH (2003-2015); Radix (2015c); swiss 
cancer screening (2015a) 
1990-2013: annual 
data 
Auxiliary variable Policy implementation Dummy = 1 for entry into force of legal provision or for 
onset of service delivery 
Cantonal statutes (cf. Appendix); FV-
CH (2003-2015); Radix (2015c); swiss 
cancer screening (2015a) 
1990-2013: annual 
data 
Regional diffusion Regional diffusion 1 Proportion of previous adopters among members of 
the same CMPH-region 
Own calculation based on policy 
adoption variable 
1991-2013: annual 
data 
Regional diffusion 2 Proportion of previous implementers among members 
of the same CMPH-region 
Own calculation based on policy 
implementation variable 
1991-2013: annual 
data 
Point-source 
diffusion 
Financial incentives Dummy = 1 for provision of funding for the particular 
policy by the federal government or a national 
organisation 
Various policy documents 
(see Chapters 5.1-5.5) 
1990-2013: annual 
data 
Technical assistance Dummy = 1 for provision of technical assistance for 
implementation of the particular policy by the federal 
government or a national organisation 
Various policy documents 
(see Chapters 5.1-5.5) 
1990-2013: annual 
data 
Signal about appropriate 
course of action 
Dummy = 1 for federal government signing 
international treaty that requires adoption of the 
particular policy or for endorsement of the particular 
policy by the CMPH 
Various policy documents 
(see Chapters 5.1-5.5) 
1990-2013: annual 
data 
Concrete prospect of federal 
policy making 
Dummy = 1 for federal bill or popular initiative that 
includes the particular policy being pending 
Curia Vista (Bundesversammlung 
2016b) 
1990-2013: annual 
data 
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Table 30: Policy adoption, implementation, diffusion and characteristics: operational definitions, data sources used and years covered (continued) 
Type of variable Variable Operational definition Data sources used Years covered 
Policy 
characteristics 
Designated beneficiaries Dummy = 1 for children’s policy (i.e. children/ 
adolescents being the direct or indirect target group) 
Same sources as for “policy 
adoption” 
1990-2013 
Degree of intervention Dummy=1 for highly-interventionist policy (i.e. policy 
that scores “upper medium” or “high” on both 
coerciveness and intrusiveness) 
Complexity Dummy = 1 for complex policy (i.e. policy that entails a 
wide scope, high level of calibration and/or low degree 
of automaticity) 
Implementation costs Dummy = 1 for policy with high implementation costs 
(i.e. at least CHF 50 000 as disclosed in government 
budgets) 
Policy type Dummy = 1 for policy with low degree of intervention 
and high levels of complexity and implementation 
costs 
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Data sources, processing and limitations 
Table 29 also list the sources of information used in compiling the datasets, which include legal texts, 
policy documents, yearbooks of Swiss political life, the database of parliamentary proceedings of the 
Federal Assembly (Curia Vista), websites, academic publications and several sources of secondary 
statistical data. Secondary data was processed to tailor it to the needs of the analyses. Data 
preparation included standardisation, linear inter- and extrapolation, other forms of imputation, 
smoothing and time lagging (cf. page 103). 
For various indicators, standardisation served the purpose of rendering the values comparable across 
cantons (e.g. adjustments for differences in population size) and time (e.g. adjustments for inflation). 
In the case of incomplete time-series data (see the last column in Table 29 on the years covered by the 
particular source of information), linear inter- and extrapolation was used for imputing missing values. 
For most indicators with missing values, data had to be extrapolated for one or two years at most. 
Usually, missing values pertain to the last year in a series of annual data that follow a stable time trend. 
In these cases, linear extrapolation seems unproblematic. The time-series data on employment levels 
in various economic sectors are an exception, though. Here, the time series start in 1995 only. Thus, 
depending on how the observation period is set, backward extrapolation over a period of several years 
is needed.180 In extrapolating these values, the Stata command used draws on the 1995 and 2001 
values of the respective series, which are the two closest data points available. The extrapolated values 
for the period prior to 1995 thus mirror the linear trend that the data exhibit between 1995 and 2001. 
Some economic branches of interest experienced substantial changes in employment levels within the 
latter period. Thus, the extrapolation of employment figures to the period 1990 to 1994 sometimes 
yields data points that are significantly lower or higher than the 1995 values. As the real values before 
1995 are unknown and the basis for extrapolation is not robust, the imputed values should be used 
with reservations only. 
In the employment data that inform the measures of the strength of public health organisations, the 
density of cantonal administrations and various producer pressures a break in the time series exists 
that results from the substitution of the Business Census (BC), which the (1991), 1995, 2001, 2005 and 
2008 values are taken from, with the Statistics on Enterprise Structure (SES), the source of the 2011 
and 2012 data. Both sources provide census data on the number and various attributes of Swiss 
businesses and are based on the same system of classification of economic activities. However, BC and 
SES differ in terms of methods of data collection, periodicity and coverage of enterprises and 
employees.181 As SES uses lower thresholds for the inclusion of enterprises and employees, it conveys 
a more complete picture of the economy and reports higher employment figures. Owing to these 
changes in methodology, employment data that represent the situation before 2011 are not fully 
comparable to data for 2011 and subsequent years. A conversion of either the BC-data used in this 
study into SES-values or vice versa is not feasible, though.182 Presumably, the methodological changes 
have small effects on most of the employment-based indicators used since micro enterprises and 
persons marginally employed are likely to be rare in the individual branches of interest to this study – 
public health organisations might be an exception, though. 
                                                          
180 Data collection for the Business Census reaches back to 1905, but data before 1995 are not to comparable to 
more recent ones (BFS 2015b, 2015c). 
181 BC used to be carried out three times per decade, was based on survey data and covered all places of work 
(Arbeitsstätten) with a total minimum working time of 20 hours per week and all employees that worked at least 
6 hours per week (BFS 2009b). SES provides annual data compiled from administrative registers and 
supplemented with survey data. It covers all enterprises that employ persons who are subject to compulsory old-
age insurance (i.e. who earn an income of at least CHF 2300 per year at present) and all employees who fulfil the 
latter criterion (BFS 2015c). 
182 The Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO) provides simulated SES-values for 2005 and 2008. However, these 
exist only at much higher levels of aggregation than needed for the purposes of this study. 
114 
Furthermore, regarding the indicator “density of cantonal administrations”, the staff levels of public 
administrations in a few cantons exhibit significant changes that occur within a few years only. Cross-
checking these distinctive developments in cantonal statistical sources confirmed that they are mostly 
due to public sector restructuring leading to the reclassification of specific units (e.g. the classification 
of hospitals as administrative units at one point in time and as public enterprises at another time). 
Such changes are statistical artefacts rather than “true” changes in policy-making capacity. Therefore, 
locally weighted scatterplot smoothing was used to attenuate the resultant changes in employment 
levels. 
For the prevalence data on risky health behaviours, missing values result from the quinquennial 
periodicity of the Swiss Health Survey (see Table 29) on the one hand and from incomplete canton-
specific data on the other hand.183 Here, the following procedure of imputation was used: Cantons that 
had no specific data for the entire period of observation were assigned the prevalence rates of the 
relevant region. In the case of cantonal data being available for some, but not for all waves of the 
survey, the values for the missing data collection points were imputed based on the trend in the 
relevant region. Having thus imputed values for each canton and each survey wave (i.e. 1992, 1997, 
2002, 2007, 2012), data for the remaining years was inter- and extrapolated. 
  
                                                          
183 The sampling design of the Swiss Health Survey allows for disaggregation of the data by seven geographical 
regions. Cantonal data can be disclosed only if the cantons pay for an increase in sample size. The 1992 wave of 
the survey provides for specific data on nine cantons, while in 2012 such data were available for 19 cantons. 
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7 Explaining the Adoption of Individual Cantonal Public Health Policies 
Chapter 7 sets out to explain the adoption of four of the cantonal public health policies of interest: ban 
on tobacco billboard advertising (Chapter 7.1), ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents 
(Chapter 7.2), breast cancer screening programmes (Chapter 7.3) and restaurant food nutrition 
labelling (Chapter 7.4). Each subchapter describes the specification of the models estimated, before 
presenting the results.184 Chapter 7.5 summarises the findings across policies, highlighting the overall 
research interest of the study. 
 Ban on Tobacco Billboard Advertising 
Model specification 
Based on the review of previous studies on the diffusion of antismoking policies (Chapter 2.4), the 
specification of policy diffusion (Chapter 4.3), the description of the federal context of cantonal policy 
making and the characteristics of the policy (Chapter 5.1) as well as the discussion of data sources 
available (Chapter 6.2), the factors presented in Table 31 below are identified as likely and testable 
predictors of cantonal adoptions of the ban on tobacco billboard advertising. 
Table 31: Ban on tobacco billboard advertising: explanatory factors 
Type of explanatory 
factor 
Variable and operational definition Expected impact 
Regional diffusion Regional diffusion 1: 
Proportion of previous adopters in CMPH-region (t-1) 
Positive 
Regional diffusion 2: 
Proportion of previous implementers in CMPH-region (t-1) 
Positive 
Point-source diffusion Signal about appropriate course of action: 
Signing of WHO FCTC 
Positive 
Problem severity Prevalence of smoking: 
Percentage of smokers (t-1) 
Positive 
Ideological 
preferences 
Strength of left parties in parliament: 
Proportion of left-party seats in cantonal parliament 
Positive 
Interest group 
pressures 
Strength of public health organisations: 
Employees of public health organisations per 1000 
employees (t-1) 
Positive 
Producer pressures Tobacco production: 
Employees in tobacco cultivation and manufacturing per 
1000 employees (t-1) 
Negative 
Diffusion research shows decision making on U.S. smoking and cigarette out-of-pack sales restrictions 
to be interdependent among neighbouring states (Shipan/Volden 2006; McCann et al. 2015). In the 
Swiss context, previous policy adoptions in the CMPH-region that a canton belongs to are expected to 
render the adoption of the ban on tobacco billboard advertising more likely (cf. page 65). Two variants 
of the regional diffusion variable are tested: the proportion of cantons in the region that had adopted 
the policy before the year of interest and the proportion of cantons that had implemented it within 
that period of time (see page 65). Since the policy design is fairly simple (cf. page 73), cantons that are 
at risk of policy adoption are unlikely to attach more weight to the policy being implemented than 
                                                          
184 The small numbers of adoptions of the bans on takeout alcohol sales at night and on alcohol sales at petrol 
stations (one and five, respectively) rule out separate analyses on these policies. Given the limited variance on 
the dependent variable, almost any model specification would lead to an overfitted model. However, the two 
policies can and will be included in the multiple events models in Chapter 8.3. 
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being adopted by other governments. Hence, the implementation-based regional diffusion variable is 
unlikely to outperform the adoption-based one. 
Besides regional diffusion, earlier research points to the relevance of top-down influences for the 
adoption of antismoking policies (cf. Shipan/Volden 2006). In the present context, the signing of the 
WHO FCTC by the federal government in 2004 (see page 75) might have increased the legitimacy of 
the policy and thus encouraged cantonal policy adoptions. 
Apart from diffusion, four internal determinants are accounted for – problem severity, ideological 
preferences, interest group and producer pressures. Smoking prevalence is used as a measure of the 
scope of the public health problem that the ban on tobacco billboard advertising addresses. So far, the 
evidence on the impact of the severity of smoking-related health problems on the adoption of 
antismoking problems is inconclusive (see page 28). Yet, if problem severity makes a difference, the 
likelihood of policy adoption should be positively associated with the percentage of smokers in the 
canton.185 
Leftist cantonal policy makers may be expected to be more prone to push for the adoption of the ban 
than their centrist and rightist colleagues, in particular in view of the highly interventionist nature of 
the policy (cf. page 73). Previous research findings (see page 28), the circumstances of the first cantonal 
adoption and the manifestation of party positions on the issue at the federal level lend support to this 
expectation: A left-wing parliamentary group initiated the policy in the pioneering canton (see page 
70). In their statements during the pre-consultation of the federal-level Tobacco Products Act (see 
page 74), the Social Democratic Party and the Swiss Green Party, i.e. the two most important parties 
in the left spectrum of the party system, did not only advocate a ban on tobacco outdoor advertising, 
but demanded a total advertising ban (BAG 2015g). In contrast, the rightist Swiss People’s Party and 
FDP The Liberals resolutely rejected the restrictions on advertising entailed in the bill, including the 
ban on billboard advertising. The Christian Democratic People’s Party and the Conservative Democratic 
Party, both centrist parties, also questioned the tobacco advertising restrictions envisaged, but did not 
dismiss them quite as firmly as the right-wing parties did (BAG 2015g). Since the ban on tobacco 
billboard advertising needs parliamentary approval (unless it is tabled as a popular initiative), the party 
composition of cantonal parliaments (rather than left-party strength in government or the party 
affiliation of the cantonal health minister) is used as a measure of ideological preferences. 
Moreover, the likelihood of policy adoption is expected to be a positive function of the strength of 
public health organisations in the canton. Again, some earlier research findings (see page 30) and 
information available from the pre-consultation of the Federal Tobacco Products Act supports this 
expectation. The public health organisations that commented on the bill advocated even stricter 
restrictions on tobacco advertising and sponsoring than a ban on billboard adverts (BAG 2015h). 
In line with the findings of several earlier studies (Shipan/Volden 2006; Toshkov 2013; McCann et al. 
2015; see page 29), policy innovation is expected to be negatively related to the scope of tobacco 
growing and manufacturing in the canton.186 Probably due to the high degree of intervention that the 
policy entails (see page 73), the tobacco industry (as the advertising sector) clearly expressed its 
opposition to the ban when commenting on the Federal Tobacco Products Act (BAG 2015i). 
                                                          
185 In diffusion research, the share of smokers is also used as a proxy measure of the level of public support of 
the policy, which suggests a negative relationship between the variable and the likelihood of policy adoption (see 
page 28). Smoking prevalence is more closely linked to the concept of problem severity than to that of public 
policy support, though. 
186 The ban on tobacco billboard advertising also affects the advertising sector and, due to the extension to 
alcohol adverts in most cantons, the alcohol industry. Alternative specifications of producer pressures that 
include these branches do not yield significant effects, though. 
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As described before (see page 71), the ban on tobacco billboard advertising was under judicial review 
between September 2000 and March 2002. The appeal at the Federal Supreme Court is likely to have 
slowed down the spreading of the ban.187 As a matter of fact, no single cantonal adoption occurred 
during that time period. For exactly that reason, the impact of judicial appraisal cannot be estimated 
in the models below, though. This is because the inclusion of a dummy variable that captures this 
aspect of the policy process leads to quasi-separation and renders maximum-likelihood estimation 
impossible. 
Results 
Table 33 on the next but one page reports the results of six logit models estimated on cantonal 
adoptions of the ban on tobacco billboard advertising. These differ in terms of the explanatory factors 
included. The first one limits itself to the internal determinants specified above. The second one adds 
the adoption-based regional diffusion variable; the third one does so for the implementation-based 
regional diffusion variable. Model 1d inserts the point-source diffusion variable instead. The fifth 
model includes the full set of explanatory factors. Finally, the reduced model (1f) concentrates on 
those predictors that proved to be statistically significant in Model 1e. For the descriptive statistics on 
the data used in estimating the models, see Table 32 below. 
Table 32: Ban on tobacco billboard advertising: descriptive statistics of variables, 2000-2013 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min. Max. Obs. 
Policy adoption 0.058 0.233 0 1 261 
Regional diffusion 1 (adopters) (t-1) 0.199 0.258 0 0.714 261 
Regional diffusion 2 (implementers) (t-1) 0.171 0.245 0 0.714 261 
Signal about appropriate course of action 
(signing of WHO FCTC) 
0.517 0.501 0 1 261 
Prevalence of smoking (t-1) 23.7 2.8 18.8 33.9 261 
Strength of left parties in parliament 0.253 0.133 0 0.531 261 
Strength of public health organisations (t-1) 0.3 0.4 0 3.3 261 
Tobacco production (t-1) 2.2 5.4 0 21.4 261 
Before interpreting the results, it is important to point out that a closer inspection of the models shows 
that the combination of highly skewed independent variables and the relatively small number of policy 
adoptions causes a situation that is close to quasi-separation for two variables, i.e. left-party strength 
in cantonal parliaments and strength of public health organisations. This explains why the sizable 
coefficients on these variables translate into noticeable changes in predicted probabilities only for very 
particular changes on the covariate (e.g., for an increase from the 75th percentile to the maximum 
value of the respective predictor) and why the effects then are large (e.g. an increase by 95 percent in 
predicted probabilities). Since this renders the interpretation of the effects difficult, the below 
illustration of the strength of effects is limited to tobacco production. 
In turning to the results, we find that smoking prevalence makes no difference for the likelihood of 
cantonal adoptions of the ban on tobacco billboard advertising, with the estimated coefficients being 
insignificant in all models. In contrast, left-party strength in cantonal parliaments, strength of public 
health organisations and tobacco production show the expected impact. Regardless of the particular 
model specification, cantons where a sizable share of parliamentary seats are allotted to left parties, 
where public health organisations are relatively strong and where a small fraction of the workforce is 
employed in tobacco growing and manufacturing are more likely to adopt the advertising ban. 
                                                          
187 The ruling of the Federal Supreme Court in 2002 might have heightened the awareness of the policy among 
policy makers and the public, thus rendering cantonal adoptions of the advertising ban more likely in the 
aftermath. The effect of a dummy variable that captures the court decision is statistically insignificant, though. 
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Surprisingly, neither of the diffusion variables exhibits the expected impact on policy adoption. 
Regional diffusion and the signing of the WHO FCTC consistently fail to reach statistical significance in 
the models estimated. 
Drawing on the reduced model in Table 33 and focusing on the year 2007 (when the diffusion of the 
policy was well underway, cf. page 71), the following estimation conveys an impression of the impact 
of tobacco production on policy adoption: For a canton with average left-party strength and strength 
of public health organisations, a shift from the minimum to the maximum level of employment in 
tobacco growing and manufacturing reduces the probability of the advertising ban being adopted by 
28.3 percent (95% confidence intervals (CI): -44.7, -11.9 percent). 
Thus far, bans on billboard advertising for tobacco products have not been addressed in studies on 
policy adoption (cf. Table 1). The findings of this subchapter on the likelihood that the Swiss cantons 
adopt the ban on tobacco billboard advertising between 2000 and 2013 are consistent with the results 
of earlier research on other antismoking policies (cf. Chapter 2.4) in terms of the relevance of 
government ideology, producer pressures and interest group strength. Different from previous studies 
on the adoption of antismoking policies, neither interdependent decision-making among proximate 
jurisdictions nor vertical influences shape cantonal innovation decisions on the advertising ban, 
though. 
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Table 33: Logit models on the adoption of the ban on tobacco billboard advertising, 2000-2013 
 (1a) 
Internal de-
terminants 
(1b) 
Plus regional 
diffusion 1 
(1c) 
Plus regional 
diffusion 2 
(1d) 
Plus point-
source diffusion 
(1e) 
Complete model 
(1f) 
Reduced model 
Regional 
diffusion 
Regional diffusion 1 (adopters) (t-1)  -1.480 
(2.167) 
  -1.501 
(2.189) 
 
Regional diffusion 2 (implementers) (t-1)   -0.535 
(2.650) 
   
Point-source 
diffusion 
Signal about appropriate course of action 
(signing of WHO FCTC) 
   -1.264 
(1.776) 
-1.285 
(1.722) 
 
Problem severity Prevalence of smoking (t-1) 0.063 
(0.207) 
0.109 
(0.234) 
0.073 
(0.226) 
0.051 
(0.206) 
0.098 
(0.231) 
 
Ideological 
preferences 
Strength of left parties in parliament 7.143* 
(3.174) 
7.352* 
(3.408) 
7.191* 
(3.230) 
7.533* 
(3.341) 
7.734* 
(3.547) 
7.422* 
(3.360) 
Interest group 
pressures 
Strength of public health organisations (t-1) 5.670*** 
(1.131) 
5.594*** 
(1.140) 
5.668*** 
(1.135) 
5.890*** 
(1.150) 
5.824*** 
(1.170) 
5.684*** 
(1.124) 
Producer 
pressures 
Tobacco production (t-1) -2.931*** 
(0.674) 
-2.851*** 
(0.640) 
-2.895*** 
(0.660) 
-2.964*** 
(0.705) 
-2.881*** 
(0.670) 
-2.879*** 
(0.616) 
Controls t -3.698* 
(1.498) 
-3.643* 
(1.491) 
-3.681* 
(1.511) 
-3.868** 
(1.306) 
-3.812** 
(1.312) 
-3.799** 
(1.377) 
t2 1.226*** 
(0.360) 
1.225*** 
(0.352) 
1.223*** 
(0.361) 
1.342*** 
(0.322) 
1.342*** 
(0.323) 
1.238*** 
(0.352) 
t3 -0.088*** 
(0.023) 
-0.087*** 
(0.023) 
-0.087*** 
(0.024) 
-0.097*** 
(0.022) 
-0.096*** 
(0.022) 
-0.088*** 
(0.023) 
Constant -8.801 
(6.147) 
-10.18 
(7.054) 
-9.120 
(6.720) 
-8.765 
(6.154) 
-10.16 
(7.014) 
-7.169*** 
(1.355) 
 N 261 261 261 261 261 261 
Years 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Wald Chi2 57.82*** 49.87*** 55.80*** 53.26*** 46.00*** 57.41*** 
McFadden’s R2 0.448 0.454 0.449 0.452 0.458 0.448 
AIC 79.32 80.75 81.28 80.87 82.28 77.42 
Legend: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by canton: # p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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 Ban on Tobacco Sales to Children and Adolescents 
Model specification 
As a tobacco prevention policy like the ban on outdoor advertising, the ban on sales to children and 
adolescents might be expected to be driven by the same explanatory factors as the former. Shipan and 
Volden (2006), e.g., find that similar predictors account for U.S. state adoptions of out-of-pack sales 
restrictions, which are intended to render cigarettes less accessible to minors, as for smoking 
restrictions in government buildings and restaurants. Accordingly, the models estimated on the ban 
on tobacco sales to children and adolescents draw on the same set of explanatory variables as the 
models on the advertising ban in Chapter 7.1.188 
However, the bans on tobacco sales to children and adolescents and on tobacco billboard advertising 
differ in that the design of the former clearly designates it as a youth protection measure (cf. page 79). 
There are some indications that this difference in policy design might have fundamental implications 
for the policy process. The heightened legitimacy of measures that prevent children and teenagers 
from smoking might attenuate ideological differences among policy makers and producer pressures 
that emanate from the tobacco industry. 
 
In line with this supposition, the comments of political actors on the federal-level draft Tobacco 
Products Act (see page 8074) reveal that, compared to other measures, the envisaged ban on tobacco 
sales to minors is much less controversial. Even tobacco growers and manufacturers and their 
associations expressed their support for a Swiss-wide ban during pre-consultation of the bill (BAG 
2015i).189 Differences in party positions on this issue also proved to be smaller. Apart from the Social 
Democrats and the Greens, the Christian Democrats and the Conservative Democrats unequivocally 
endorsed the ban on tobacco sales to minors entailed in the draft legislation (BAG 2015g). The two 
rightist parties rejected a federal sales bans, though. FDP The Liberals argued that the decision should 
be left to the cantons, while the Swiss People’s Party rejected the entire bill, characterising it as an 
undue intrusion into private lives and economic freedoms alike (BAG 2015g). 
 
Against this background, it is unclear whether to expect the various internal determinants to shape the 
likelihood of policy adoption – hence the brackets in Table 34.  
                                                          
188 There is one exception: Regardless of when the observation period starts, the impact of the point-source 
diffusion variable cannot be estimated here. This is because the first adoption of the ban on tobacco sales to 
children and adolescents occurred after the signing of the WHO FCTC. Hence, the inclusion of a dummy variable 
for signing of the convention leads to quasi-separation, rendering maximum-likelihood estimation impossible. 
189 On the other hand, the tobacco industry did not have much to lose from a federal ban since by then the sales 
ban had been effective in 22 cantons. 
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Table 34: Ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents: explanatory factors 
Type of explanatory 
factor 
Variable and operational definition Expected impact 
Regional diffusion Regional diffusion 1: 
Proportion of previous adopters in CMPH-region (t-1) 
(Positive) 
Regional diffusion 2: 
Proportion of previous implementers in CMPH-region (t-1) 
(Positive) 
Problem severity Prevalence of smoking: 
Percentage of smokers (t-1) 
(Positive) 
Ideological 
preferences 
Strength of left parties in parliament: 
Proportion of left-party seats in cantonal parliament 
(Positive) 
Interest group 
pressures 
Strength of public health organisations: 
Employees of public health organisations per 1000 
employees (t-1) 
(Positive) 
Producer pressures Tobacco production: 
Employees in tobacco cultivation and manufacturing per 
1000 employees (t-1) 
(Negative) 
Results 
Table 36 on the next page presents the results of three logit models on cantonal adoptions of the ban 
on tobacco sales to children and adolescents. The first one is restricted to internal determinants; the 
second and the third ones add the regional diffusion variables. For the descriptive statistics on the data 
used in estimating the models, see Table 35 below. 
Table 35: Ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents: descriptive statistics of variables, 2005-2013 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min. Max. Obs. 
Policy adoption 0.169 0.377 0 1 124 
Regional diffusion 1 (adopters) (t-1) 0.378 0.300 0 0.857 124 
Regional diffusion 2 (implementers) (t-1) 0.293 0.299 0 0.833 124 
Prevalence of smoking (t-1) 23.3 2.2 18.8  28.3 124 
Strength of left parties in parliament 0.269 0.140 0 0.523 124 
Strength of public health organisations (t-1) 0.4 0.5 0 2.7 124 
Tobacco production (t-1) 2.5 5.9 0 21.4 124 
As Table 36 shows, none of the substantive explanatory variables contributes to the understanding of 
cantonal adoptions of the ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents. Thus, the likelihood of 
policy adoption is unrelated to the prevalence of smoking, the strength of left parties in parliament, 
the strength of public health organisations and tobacco production. Neither does regional diffusion 
shape cantonal innovation decisions. Only the variables that control for time dependence exhibit 
significant effects. What is more, the overall model fit is low, with all three models failing to reach 
statistical significance. 
Thus, the spreading of the ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents among the Swiss cantons 
seems to follow a political logic that is different from the one governing the ban on tobacco billboard 
advertising and other antismoking policies that provided the empirical basis of previous studies (see 
Chapter 2.4). None of the predictors commonly accounted for in models on tobacco control policies 
holds analytical leverage for explaining the adoption of the sales ban. Most likely, the fact that the 
policy is clearly designed to protect children and adolescents from a behaviour that is nowadays 
acknowledged to be highly damaging to health, prompted it to spread like wildfire. Its pattern of fast 
diffusion (see Figure 10 on page 77) resembles the spreading of morality policies (cf. Mooney/Lee 
1995; Boushey 2010) – with one highly consequential difference: Hardly any opposition to the ban 
seems to be mounted. As a result, the extent of adoptions exceeds those of most morality policies. 
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Table 36: Logit models on the adoption of the ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents, 2005-2013 
 (1a) 
Internal de-
terminants 
(1b) 
Plus reg. 
diffusion 1 
(1c) 
Plus reg. 
diffusion 2 
Regional 
diffusion 
Regional diffusion 1 (adopters) (t-1)  -2.530 
(2.021) 
 
Regional diffusion 2 (implementers) (t-1)   -0.867 
(2.725) 
Problem 
severity 
Prevalence of smoking (t-1) -0.116 
(0.124) 
-0.107 
(0.122) 
-0.118 
(0.123) 
Ideological 
preferences 
Strength of left parties in parliament 3.798 
(2.705) 
4.065 
(2.842) 
3.831 
(2.739) 
Interest group 
pressures 
Strength of public health organisations (t-1) 0.250 
(0.944) 
0.097 
(0.964) 
0.200 
(0.992) 
Producer 
pressures 
Tobacco production (t-1) -0.106 
(0.066) 
-0.113 
(0.075) 
-0.108 
(0.069) 
Controls t 1.417# 
(0.766) 
1.876* 
(0.864) 
1.441# 
(0.794) 
t2 -0.550* 
(0.239) 
-0.569* 
(0.242) 
-0.512* 
(0.237) 
t3 0.050* 
(0.020) 
0.049* 
(0.021) 
0.046* 
(0.020) 
Constant -0.382 
(2.811) 
-0.612 
(2.796) 
-0.352 
(2.789) 
 N 124 124 124 
Years 9 9 9 
Wald Chi2 9.638 11.46 9.795 
McFadden’s R2 0.094 0.106 0.095 
AIC 118.2 118.9 120.1 
Legend: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by canton: # p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
 Breast Cancer Screening Programmes 
Model specification 
Breast cancer screening programmes have not been the subject of previous diffusion research. Yet, at 
least one case study analyses the determinants of the adoption of such programmes: In explaining the 
introduction of mammography screening for breast cancer in four Danish counties, Hjulmann et al. 
(2008) focus on seven explanatory factors: scientific evidence on the safety and effectiveness of 
screening, ethical issues, different recommendations of a national health advisory board, local-level 
financial and personnel resources, level of political agreement, roles of bureaucrats and physicians and 
a residual category of miscellaneous other factors. They observe a similar combination of these factors 
to be at work in the two counties that did not adopt mammography screening programmes within the 
period of observation, with negative assessments of scientific evidence, ethical issues, advisory board 
recommendations and inadequate implementation resources being particularly decisive. The two 
adopters have the availability of implementation resources in common, but differ in terms of relevance 
of most other factors. 
When drawing on findings of this case study, the description of the federal and national policy context 
in Switzerland and the design of breast cancer screening programmes (cf. Chapter 5.4) as well as the 
discussion of data sources available (Chapter 6.2), the factors assembled in Table 37 suggest 
themselves as potential predictors of cantonal policy adoptions.190 
                                                          
190 For reasons of limited resources, data on scientific evidence on the policy becoming available throughout the 
observation period and on public perceptions of scientific evidence and ethical issues could not be compiled. 
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Table 37: Breast cancer screening programmes: explanatory factors 
Type of explanatory 
factor 
Variable and operational definition Expected impact 
Regional diffusion Regional diffusion 1: 
Proportion of previous adopters in CMPH-region (t-1) 
Positive 
Regional diffusion 2: 
Proportion of previous implementers in CMPH-region (t-1) 
Positive 
Point-source diffusion Financial incentives: 
Commitment to cover mammography exams under 
obligatory health insurance and actual coverage 
Positive 
Technical assistance: 
Provided by swiss cancer screening 
Positive 
Problem severity Deaths from breast cancer: 
Number of women dead within five-year period 
Positive 
Ideological 
preferences 
Strength of left parties in parliament and government: 
Proportion of left-party members in parliament and 
government (averaged) 
Positive 
Interest group 
pressures 
Strength of public health organisations: 
Employees of public health organisations per 1000 
employees (t-1) 
Positive 
Policy-making capacity Density of administration: 
Employees of cantonal administration per 1000 employees 
(t-1) 
Positive 
State interventionism Size of public sector: 
Government-spending-to-GDP ratio (in %) (t-1) 
Positive 
State fiscal situation Relative budget surplus/deficit: 
Surplus/deficit as percentage of government spending (t-1) 
Positive 
Implementation 
resources 
Density of radiologists: 
Radiologists per 1000 population 
Positive 
To begin with, innovation decisions are likely to be subject to diffusion effects. Breast cancer screening 
programmes are based on a highly complex policy design and involve high implementation costs (see 
page 90). Because of these characteristics, previous policy adoptions by cantons that belong to the 
same CMPH-region are likely to decisively shape the innovation decisions of cantons that have not yet 
adopted the policy. Further, due to the complexity of the design and the fact that many uncertainties 
pertain to the implementation stage, instances of successful programme establishment are expected 
to convey the type of information that cantonal decision makers are most interested in. Therefore, the 
implementation-based regional diffusion variable should hold more explanatory power than the 
adoption-based one. 
As regards point-source diffusion, both the federal decision to cover screening-mammography under 
obligatory health insurance and the establishment of the national association of breast cancer 
programmes, which provides technical assistance, are expected to have positively shaped the 
likelihood of cantonal adoptions. Coverage under obligatory health insurance disburdens cantons from 
a sizable share of implementation costs, thus helping to lower a major obstacle to innovation. 
Accordingly, Hjulmann et al. (2008) report that the prospect of central government funding becoming 
available in the near future contributed to programme introduction in one of the counties. In view of 
the complexity of screening programmes, technical assistance is likely to constitute another resource 
for overcoming the obstacles to adopting such programmes. 
In terms of internal determinants, the absolute number of deaths from breast cancer among women 
(in a five-year period; cf. Table 29) is used as an indicator of the severity of the public health problem 
that screening programmes deal with. In cantons with a small population size, the number of lives 
potentially saved due to breast cancer screening is relatively small (see Table 38). In setting up a 
screening programme, cantons incur sizable fixed costs. It is quite conceivable that cantons are not 
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willing to bear these costs if the number of lives potentially saved is small. Against this background, 
the absolute number of deaths (instead of the mortality rate) is used as a measure of problem severity. 
Furthermore, the combined strength of left parties in government and parliament is expected to affect 
the likelihood of policy adoption. The establishment of breast cancer screening programmes requires 
the consent of parliaments and governments. Cantonal parliaments need to authorise funding, while 
governments have the policy-making expertise required for launching the policy. Hence, the average 
representation of left parties in the two institutions is used as indicator of ideological preferences. 
Moreover, cantons that have a more state-interventionist tradition are surmised to be more likely to 
introduce the policy. 
Due to the complexity and costs of the policy, innovation decisions in favour of screening programmes 
are expected to be a positive function of the policy-making capacities and fiscal balance of the canton. 
What is more, screening programmes can only be made to work if a sufficient number of radiology 
personnel are available. In fact, Hjulmann et al. (2008) identify availability of financial and personnel 
resources as one of the most decisive factors for the adoption of breast cancer screening programmes 
in the four Danish counties studied. 
Results 
Table 39 presents the results of seven logit models on the adoption of breast cancer screening 
programmes (for descriptive statistics, see Table 38 below). Besides the controls for time dependence, 
the first one features exclusively the internal determinants that are deemed relevant. In models 3b to 
3e, the various diffusion variables are added one after another. Model 3f contains the full set of 
explanatory variables, while model 3g limits itself to the substantive predictors that are statistically 
significant. Before looking at the results, it should be noted that – similar to the models on the ban on 
tobacco billboard advertising (see page 117) – the large coefficients on the density of radiologists and 
on the size of the public sector seem to result from a situation that approximates quasi-separation. 
The illustrations of effect strength below exempt these variables. 
Table 38: Breast cancer screening programmes: descriptive statistics of variables, 1993-2013 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min. Max. Obs. 
Policy adoption 0.027 0.162 0 1 448 
Regional diffusion 1 (adopters) (t-1) 0.110 0.195 0 1 448 
Regional diffusion 2 (implementers) (t-1) 0.083 0.171 0 1 448 
Financial incentives (mammography exams 
covered under obligatory health insurance) 
0.612 0.488 0 1 448 
Technical assistance (provided by swiss 
cancer league) 
0.183 0.387 0 1 448 
Deaths from breast cancer 257 297 10 1435 448 
Strength of left parties in parliament and 
government 
0.232 0.125 0 0.552 448 
Strength of public health organisations (t-1) 0.2 0.2 0 1.3 448 
Density of administration (t-1) 17.1 9.2 7.6 58.2 448 
Size of public sector (t-1) 14.3 2.9 8.5 26.8 448 
Relative budget surplus/deficit (t-1) -.156 5.237 -26 19 448 
Density of radiologists (t-1) 0.0 0.0 0 0.2 448 
In turning to the results, we find a clear indication of regional diffusion – across all models. In other 
words, the Swiss cantons are the more likely to introduce a screening programme, the more common 
such programmes are in the CMPH-region that they belong to. As evident from the comparison of 
models 3b and 3c in terms of the Akaike information criterion (AIC), the model using the percentage 
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of previous implementers in the region as the specification of regional diffusion performs slightly 
better than the one using the share of adopters. The difference is small, though. 
The coefficients on the dummy variable that records the commitment of the federal government to 
include mammography screenings into the catalogue of benefits paid for under obligatory health 
insurance are consistently positive as expected, but fail to reach statistical significance. On substantive 
grounds, it seems unlikely that breast cancer screening programmes would have spread if cantons had 
to shoulder the full burden of programme costs. In statistical terms, we cannot say so with certainty, 
though. 
As regards the establishment of “swiss cancer screening”, i.e. the association of cantonal programmes 
for the early detection of cancer, the measure included in models 3e and 3f is positively related to the 
adoption of cantonal programmes, but clearly fails to reach statistical significance. 
Contrary to expectation, differences in the absolute number of deaths attributable to breast cancer do 
not explain the likelihood that cantons adopt a screening programme, given that the estimated 
coefficients are hardly different from zero. Across models, the coefficients on left-party representation 
in political institutions exhibit the expected sign (except for model 3f), but are statistically insignificant. 
More general and longstanding ideological preferences in favour of state intervention, as manifest in 
public sector size, are associated with a higher likelihood of cantons opting for organised breast cancer 
screening, though.  
The picture on the impact of potential obstacles to innovation and the resources available to overcome 
such obstacles is not entirely consistent. As expected, cantons that exhibit a budget surplus (i.e. a state 
resource for policy implementation) and a high density of radiologists, which is a societal resource for 
implementation, are more likely to adopt a screening programme. However, the estimated coefficient 
on density of cantonal administrations is negative and significant in all models. So, counterintuitively, 
cantons with lower policy-making capacities show a higher probability of adoption. As described in 
Chapter 6.2, density of administration is a proxy variable for the concept of interest, i.e. the resources 
for policy analysis and formulation in public health that cantons have at their command. While the 
indicator used might not adequately measure the underlying concept, it is still surprising that it yields 
significant negative coefficients. Finally, strength of public health organisations is not associated with 
innovation decisions in favour of the policy: While the estimated coefficients exhibit the expected sign, 
they fail to reach significance. 
In estimating predicted probabilities based on model 3g, looking at the year 2007 and holding all 
remaining predictors constant at their means, a shift from the minimum to the maximum percentage 
of previous implementers in the region increases the likelihood of policy adoption by 19.9 percent (CI: 
-0.1, 44.8). The same type of change on the relative budget surplus/deficit variable renders programme 
adoption 5.4 percent more likely (CI: -4.2, 15.0).
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Table 39: Logit models on the adoption of breast cancer screening programmes, 1993-2013 
  (3a) 
Internal deter-
minants 
(3b) 
Plus regional 
diffusion 1 
(3c) 
Plus regional 
diffusion 2 
(3d) 
Plus financial 
incentives 
(3e) 
Plus technical 
assistance 
(3f) 
Complete 
model 
(3g) 
Reduced 
model 
Regional diffusion Regional diffusion 1 (adopters) (t-1)  3.127** 
(1.164) 
     
Regional diffusion 2 (implementers) 
(t-1) 
  3.459** 
(1.161) 
  3.874** 
(1.209) 
3.739*** 
(1.097) 
Point-source 
diffusion 
Financial incentives (exams covered 
under obligatory health insurance) 
   8.369 
(5.566) 
 9.465 
(5.935) 
 
Technical assistance (provided by 
swiss cancer league) 
    1.030 
(2.327) 
0.497 
(2.484) 
 
Problem severity Deaths from breast cancer 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
 
Ideological 
preferences 
Strength of left parties in parliament 
and government 
3.082 
(2.218) 
0.341 
(2.599) 
0.515 
(2.568) 
2.350 
(2.458) 
3.111 
(2.342) 
-0.630 
(2.733) 
 
Interest group 
pressures 
Strength of public health 
organisations (t-1) 
1.219 
(0.967) 
1.338 
(1.272) 
1.177 
(1.280) 
1.206 
(0.942) 
1.261 
(0.994) 
1.164 
(1.352) 
 
Policy-making 
capacity 
Density of administration (t-1) -0.146* 
(0.074) 
-0.167* 
(0.081) 
-0.169* 
(0.084) 
-0.144* 
(0.071) 
-0.149* 
(0.074) 
-0.175* 
(0.077) 
-0.182* 
(0.077) 
State 
interventionism 
Size of public sector (t-1) 0.637*** 
(0.135) 
0.637*** 
(0.150) 
0.644*** 
(0.158) 
0.666*** 
(0.144) 
0.649*** 
(0.134) 
0.721*** 
(0.167) 
0.648*** 
(0.139) 
State fiscal 
situation  
Relative budget surplus/deficit (t-1) 0.078* 
(0.034) 
0.096* 
(0.039) 
0.103** 
(0.038) 
0.078* 
(0.034) 
0.073* 
(0.036) 
0.109** 
(0.038) 
0.102* 
(0.047) 
Implementation 
resource 
Density of radiologists (t-1) 40.40* 
(17.74) 
50.27* 
(19.90) 
50.07* 
(20.61) 
41.51* 
(16.43) 
41.44* 
(17.81) 
54.74** 
(18.44) 
54.40** 
(16.91) 
Controls t -0.221 
(0.691) 
-0.420 
(0.676) 
-0.409 
(0.682) 
-2.623 
(1.862) 
-0.190 
(0.708) 
-3.150 
(1.928) 
-0.474 
(0.688) 
t2 -0.015 
(0.076) 
0.000 
(0.077) 
0.002 
(0.077) 
0.175 
(0.164) 
-0.016 
(0.077) 
0.218 
(0.168) 
0.012 
(0.075) 
t3 0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
Constant -12.34*** 
(2.807) 
-11.20*** 
(2.536) 
-11.29*** 
(2.549) 
-11.96*** 
(2.568) 
-12.61*** 
(2.842) 
-11.41*** 
(2.436) 
-10.72*** 
(2.237) 
 N 448 448 448 448 448 448 448 
Years 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Wald Chi2 75.25*** 125.1*** 101.4*** 59.96*** 86.61*** 100.1*** 92.85*** 
McFadden’s R2 0.240 0.274 0.277 0.292 0.244 0.340 0.269 
AIC 106.0 104.2 103.9 102.2 107.6 101.0 98.84 
Legend: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by canton: # p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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 Restaurant Food Nutrition Labelling 
Model specification 
Table 40 on the next page lists the independent variables that will be accounted for in the models on 
the adoption of restaurant food nutrition labelling. Their selection is based mainly on the portrayal of 
the policy in Chapter 5.5.191 The policy design of restaurant food nutrition labelling is complex and 
labelling is associated with sizable implementation costs. Against this background, the cantons are 
expected to be reluctant to decide about such labels independently of the behaviour of other cantons. 
Regional diffusion is thus likely to shape innovation decisions. Given the challenges of defining the 
details of labelling, cantonal decision makers are expected to attach more weight to the actual 
implementation than to the mere adoption of healthy nutrition labels by other cantons. Hence, the 
implementation-based regional diffusion variable should perform better than the adoption-based one. 
Presumably, point-source diffusion also plays a part in cantonal policy adoptions. The effects of the 
establishment of the national FV association, which offers technical expertise and funding, and the 
provision of funding by Health Promotion Switzerland are modelled, both of which are expected to be 
positive. 
As regards the internal determinants studied, the prevalence of overweight is used as a measure of 
the scope of the relevant public health problem. The likelihood of policy adoption might also 
correspond to the pervasiveness of out-of-home eating. After all, the policy primarily targets this 
aspect of nutrition. Time-series data on out-of-home eating, disaggregated by canton, do not exist. 
The models therefore contain a variable that reflects one of the drivers of out-of-home eating, i.e. the 
expansion of the day-care sector for children (measured in terms of employment in that sector; see 
Chapter 6.2).192 
Government ideological preferences are specified in terms of the party affiliation of health ministers. 
As described in Chapter 5.5, the creation of both labels was initiated by cantonal administrations, 
either the health department of the pioneering canton or units subordinate to it. If healthy nutrition 
labels are incorporated into cantonal action programmes, the health department is also in charge of 
selecting the policy measures that make up the programme. Health departments are thus deemed to 
be the most relevant governmental institution in innovation decisions on this policy. 
In view of the complex policy design, policy adoption is expected to be the more likely to occur, the 
more extensive cantonal resources for policy analysis and formulation are. Labelling is associated with 
sizable costs. Thus, state fiscal situation and degree of state interventionism are likely to matter, with 
positive estimated coefficients being expected on the relevant variables.  
                                                          
191 Boehmke (2009) provides the only diffusion study in the area of healthy nutrition. It focuses on U.S. state 
adoptions of various components of obesity legislation (including labelling). Since he uses obesity-related policies 
merely as an illustration of a more general issue (i.e. modelling the adoption of policies that entail multiple 
components), he does not elaborate on the state characteristics that might explain policy adoption (Boehmke 
2009: 239-240). Besides variables that are common to many diffusion studies (government ideology, legislative 
professionalism, neighbour-based diffusion), he controls for the prevalence of overweight as well as state 
population and per capita income, with the latter two serving as proxy measures of the propensity to innovate. 
192 The size of the day-care sector for children is a reasonable proxy measure of the demand for s&d. With FV 
covering the entire spectrum of out-of-home eating, the variable is only a partial indicator of the concept of 
interest. Other variables, which cover employment in the restaurant sector or in the care industry, were also 
tested. Their effects were not significant, either. 
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Table 40: Restaurant food nutrition labelling: explanatory factors 
Type of explanatory 
factor 
Variable and operational definition Expected impact 
Regional diffusion Regional diffusion 1: 
Proportion of previous adopters in CMPH-region (t-1) 
Positive 
Regional diffusion 2: 
Proportion of previous implementers in CMPH-region (t-1) 
Positive 
Point-source diffusion Financial incentives: 
Funding of cantonal action programmes by Health 
Promotion Switzerland 
Positive 
Technical assistance: 
Provision by FV-CH/Radix 
Positive 
Problem severity Prevalence of overweight: 
Percentage of individuals with BMI > 25 (t-1) 
Positive 
Ideological 
preferences 
Left-party affiliation of health minister: 
Dummy for left-party affiliation 
Positive 
Interest group 
pressures 
Strength of public health organisations: 
Employees of public health organisations per 1000 
employees (t-1) 
Positive 
Policy-making capacity Density of administration: 
Employees of cantonal administration per 1000 employees 
(t-1) 
Positive 
State interventionism Size of public sector: 
Government-spending-to-GDP ratio (in %) (t-1) 
(Positive) 
State fiscal situation Relative budget surplus/deficit: 
Surplus/deficit as percentage of government spending (t-1) 
(Positive) 
Relevance of policy Day-care sector for children: 
Employees in childcare facilities per 1000 employees (t-1) 
Positive 
 
Results 
In line with the procedure in previous subchapters, Table 42 on the following page presents a set of 
logit models on cantonal adoptions of restaurant food nutrition labelling that range from an internal-
determinants model (4a) to a model that focuses on predictors that reach statistical significance at 
least at the 0.10 level (4f). Beforehand, Table 41 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used. 
Table 41: Restaurant food nutrition labelling: descriptive statistics of variables, 1993-2013 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min. Max. Obs. 
Policy adoption 0.044 0.205 0 1 410 
Regional diffusion 1 (adopters) (t-1) 0.098 0.177 0 0.857 410 
Regional diffusion 2 (implementers) (t-1) 0.055 0.128 0 0.714 410 
Financial incentives (funding of cantonal 
action programmes by Health Promotion 
Switzerland) 
0.232 0.422 0 1 410 
Technical assistance (provided by FV-
CH/Radix) 
0.583 0.494 0 1 410 
Prevalence of overweight (t-1) 37.2 3.7 26.1 46.8 410 
Left-party affiliation of health minister 0.405 0.491 0 1 410 
Strength of public health organisations (t-1) 0.2 0.2 0 1.3 410 
Density of administration (t-1) 16.1 8.6 7.6 58.2 410 
Size of public sector (t-1) 14.3 2.8 8.5 26.8 410 
Relative budget surplus/deficit (t-1) 0.0 5.1 -26 19 410 
Day-care sector for children (t-1) 1.3 1.1 0 6.4 410 
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Table 42: Logit models on the adoption of restaurant food nutrition labelling, 1993-2013 
  (4a) 
Internal deter-
minants 
(4b) 
Plus regional 
diffusion 1 
(4c) 
Plus regional 
diffusion 2 
(4d) 
Plus financial 
incentives 
(4e) 
Plus technical 
assistance 
(4f) 
Complete 
model 
(4g) 
Reduced model 
Regional diffusion Regional diffusion 1 (adopters) (t-1)  5.822*** 
(1.163) 
     
Regional diffusion 2 (implementers) (t-1)   7.265*** 
(1.347) 
  8.066*** 
(1.330) 
6.514*** 
(0.997) 
Point-source 
diffusion  
Financial incentives (funding by Health 
Promotion Switzerland) 
   1.676 
(1.279) 
 3.483* 
(1.353) 
2.662# 
(1.408) 
Technical assistance (provided by FV-
CH/Radix) 
    1.181 
(1.491) 
1.064 
(1.143) 
 
Problem severity Prevalence of overweight (t-1) -0.073 
(0.101) 
-0.291** 
(0.106) 
-0.292* 
(0.128) 
-0.055 
(0.104) 
-0.081 
(0.105) 
-0.257* 
(0.124) 
 
Ideological 
preferences 
Left-party affiliation of health minister 1.043# 
(0.565) 
0.743 
(0.544) 
0.531 
(0.566) 
0.949 
(0.603) 
1.085# 
(0.582) 
0.422 
(0.608) 
 
Interest group 
pressures 
Strength of public health organisations 
(t-1) 
1.271 
(0.960) 
1.321 
(0.997) 
1.295 
(0.986) 
1.404 
(0.960) 
1.268 
(0.958) 
1.663# 
(0.980) 
 
Policy-making 
capacity 
Density of administration (t-1) 0.012 
(0.035) 
0.029 
(0.040) 
0.035 
(0.040) 
0.017 
(0.036) 
0.013 
(0.035) 
0.045 
(0.043) 
 
State fiscal situation Relative budget surplus/deficit (t-1)  0.060* 
(0.024) 
0.013 
(0.031) 
0.014 
(0.031) 
0.026 
(0.034) 
0.064** 
(0.025) 
-0.054 
(0.041) 
 
State interventionism Size of public sector (t-1) 0.316* 
(0.143) 
0.242# 
(0.143) 
0.213 
(0.144) 
0.302* 
(0.148) 
0.316* 
(0.137) 
0.171 
(0.156) 
 
Policy relevance Day-care sector for children (t-1) 0.403 
(0.255) 
-0.366 
(0.279) 
-0.380 
(0.282) 
0.372 
(0.255) 
0.391 
(0.255) 
-0.511# 
(0.279) 
 
Controls t -0.265 
(0.398) 
-0.243 
(0.398) 
-0.257 
(0.400) 
-0.005 
(0.413) 
-0.400 
(0.450) 
0.095 
(0.493) 
-0.217 
(0.491) 
t2 0.032 
(0.043) 
0.050 
(0.045) 
0.042 
(0.045) 
-0.004 
(0.044) 
0.032 
(0.044) 
-0.027 
(0.050) 
0.012 
(0.057) 
t3 -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
Constant -7.098* 
(3.399) 
1.210 
(3.416) 
1.733 
(4.125) 
-7.881* 
(3.434) 
-6.667# 
(3.488) 
0.633 
(3.979) 
-3.735*** 
(1.092) 
 N 410 410 410 410 410 410 410 
Years 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Wald Chi2 52.10 111.8 181.0 48.76 58.61 169.8 133.3 
McFadden’s R2 0.169*** 0.270*** 0.283*** 0.179*** 0.173*** 0.312*** 0.240*** 
AIC 144.8 131.8 129.9 145.3 146.2 129.6 124.2 
Legend: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by canton: # p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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According to the internal determinants models, three variables shape cantonal innovation decisions –
party affiliation of cantonal health minister, fiscal situation and state interventionism. Problem 
severity, government ideological preferences, interest group pressures, policy-making capacity and 
policy relevance do not exhibit significant effects on the likelihood of policy adoption. In comparing 
models 4b to 4f, it becomes apparent that the effects of the internal determinants accounted for are 
not robust. What is more, if clearly insignificant predictors are removed, none of the remaining internal 
determinants reaches statistical significance. Overall, the internal determinants studied provide little 
leverage for explaining cantonal policy adoptions. That is why model 4f includes diffusion variables 
only. 
In contrast, cantonal adoptions turn out to be clearly influenced by interdependent decision-making 
within CMPH-regions. Regardless of model specification, the estimated coefficients on regional 
diffusion are consistently positive and highly significant. As expected, the percentage of previous 
implementers exhibits a somewhat stronger effect than the adoption-based diffusion variable. 
 
When entered on its own, the variable that captures the provision of funding by Health Promotion 
Switzerland for cantonal action programmes yields a positive coefficient, but is not quite statistically 
significant (p=0.10). Yet, in models that test for the effects of regional diffusion and the provision of 
funding at the same time, the point-source diffusion variable proves to be statistically significant at the 
0.05 level (model 4f) or the 0.10 level (model 4g). Thus, the funding provided by Health Promotion 
Switzerland for cantonal action programmes seems to further cantonal adoptions of restaurant food 
nutrition labelling. The coefficient on the variable, which records the establishment of Fourchette verte 
Suisse and thus reflects the availability of technical assistance, later also by Radix, as well as early 
funding by Health Promotion Switzerland (see footnote 154), is also positive, but does not reach 
significance in either of the models. 
 
In sum, the adoption of restaurant food nutrition labelling appears to be entirely driven by diffusion 
effects. Based on the reduced model, we find that a shift from the minimum to the maximum value of 
the regional diffusion variable, with funding for cantonal action programmes by Health Promotion 
Switzerland being set as available, increased the likelihood of policy adoption in 2007 by 54.7 percent 
(CI: 26.9, 82.5). For the same year, the provision of funding for cantonal action programmes increased 
the likelihood of policy adoption by 13.6 percent (CI: -11.7, 39.0), with regional diffusion being fixed at 
the mean. 
 Summary: The Determinants of Four Cantonal Public Health Policies 
The four public health policies analysed in Chapters 7.1 to 7.4 diverge greatly in terms of the types of 
explanatory factors that are found to drive cantonal adoptions: Internal determinants shape adoptions 
of the ban on tobacco billboard advertising, with diffusion effects failing to have a significant impact. 
The opposite holds for restaurant food nutrition labelling: Instead of internal determinants, diffusion 
effects explain policy adoption. Adoptions of breast cancer screening programmes, in turn, are a 
function of both internal determinants and diffusion effects. In contrast, variables from neither 
category contribute to the explanation of cantonal adoptions of the ban on tobacco sales to children 
and adolescents. 
These differences in patterns of policy innovation and diffusion are striking. Without increasing the 
number of policies studied and extending the sample to areas of Swiss public health policy-making not 
covered at present, it is impossible to generalise the findings to the policy field. Yet, they serve to 
highlight the overall research question that guides this study: What difference do the characteristics 
of innovative policies make? Regarding the diverging patterns among the four policies, to what extent 
are they accounted for by differences in policy attributes? The following chapter seeks to shed light on 
this question, using the findings from this chapter also as the basis for the specification of models that 
are to disentangle the impact of policy characteristics. 
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8 Disentangling the Effects of Policy Characteristics on Innovation and 
Diffusion 
This chapter aims at disentangling the impact of the policy design characteristics of interest: Depending 
on the specific combination of characteristics, are some policies more adoptable than others? Do 
design characteristics affect the importance of individual internal determinants for the adoption of 
innovative policies? Finally, do they condition the weight of diffusion effects, more precisely of 
interdependent decision making among peer governments, in innovation choices? To answer these 
questions, Chapter 8 tests – as far as the actual sample of policies permits – the hypotheses formulated 
in Chapter 3.2. The analysis rests on two approaches: the estimation of “standardised single event 
models” and of multiple events models. 
Standardised single event models, as defined here, analyse the adoptions of different policies 
separately. They use the same set of predictors across models, though. In that sense, these models are 
“standardised”. This approach allows comparing the impact of specific internal determinants and 
diffusion effects on adoption across policies as a means of uncovering if differences in policy designs 
manifest in differential effects. In situations where heterogeneous processes undergird the adoptions 
of the policies studied, such standardised models offer an alternative to pooling policies into the same 
model (cf. page 103). Separate models have one drawback, though: Without pooling policies into one 
model, it is impossible to model the direct effects of policy characteristics (see page 101). As a result, 
standardised single event models are suitable for testing the Policy Characteristics and Internal 
Determinants Hypothesis (H 2.0) and the Policy Characteristics and Diffusion Effects Hypothesis (H 
3.0), but cannot provide an insight into whether the Policy Characteristics and Adoption Hypothesis 
(H 1.0) holds. 
In the present context, the comparison of results across policies suffers from another limitation: As 
described before (cf. footnote 184), the small number of cantonal adoptions of the two alcohol sales 
restrictions in the sample makes the estimation of single event models on these policies impossible. 
Hence, Chapter 8.2 must confine itself to the same four policies that were analysed Chapter 7. 
Nevertheless, the results of the standardised single event models will be presented – as one part of 
the overall analysis and as a useful preparatory step for the multiple event models estimated in 
Chapter 8.3. 
Models that pool policies with different characteristics and trace their adoptions over time allow for 
testing for the expected direct effects of policy characteristics – through the inclusion of variables that 
capture such characteristics. What is more, the resultant multiple events models also permit testing if 
the effects of internal determinants and diffusion on adoption vary by policy attributes. Interaction 
terms of policy attributes and the explanatory factors of interest serve this purpose. Hence, multiple 
events models are a versatile framework for assessing what difference policy characteristics make. 
They allow for testing hypotheses H 1.0, H 2.0 and H 3.0 alike. 
Because of limitations in sample size and composition, this study cannot test all sub-hypotheses of 
interest, though. It must limit itself to testing a subsection of the hypotheses raised in Chapter 3.2. 
Against this background, Chapter 8.1 describes the empirical constraints that the study faces. Chapter 
8.2 presents the results of the standardised single event models and Chapter 8.3 does so for the 
multiple events models estimated. Chapter 8.4 summarises the insights gained from these analyses.  
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 Empirical Constraints to Hypothesis Testing 
A comprehensive test of the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 3.2 requires a sample that covers each 
of the policy design characteristics of theoretical interest as well as different combinations of values 
of these characteristics through a sufficient number of policies. 
Due to difficulties in selecting suitable policies (cf. page 60), the sample used in this study does not 
meet this requirement. The number of policies selected is too small and their designs are too similar 
(for an overview, see Table 43 below). Thus, among the six policies sampled, degree of intervention, 
complexity and implementation costs turn out to be collinear: Four policies score high on degree of 
intervention and low on complexity and implementation costs. The remaining policies typify the 
reverse combination of values, i.e. a low degree of intervention and high levels of complexity and costs. 
The sample does not include other combinations of values of these policy characteristics variables. This 
empirical set-up restricts the potential for disentangling the effects of the three policy attributes 
concerned. Regarding designated beneficiaries, the sample is more conducive to testing the hypothesis 
of interest as the actual values of this variable are not collinear with the other characteristics studied 
(cf. Table 43). 
Table 43: Summary of design characteristics of the policies studied 
Policy Designated 
beneficiaries 
Degree of 
intervention 
Complexity Implemen-
tation costs 
Ban on tobacco billboard advertising Other High Low Invisible 
Ban on tobacco sales to minors Children/ 
adolescents 
High Low Invisible 
Ban on alcohol sales at petrol stations Other High Low Invisible 
Ban on take-out alcohol sales at night Other High Low Invisible 
Breast cancer screening programmes Other Low High High 
Restaurant food nutrition labelling Other; 
children/ 
adolescents193 
Low High High 
These constraints in sample size and composition have several implications. First, the study must 
forego testing several of the sub-hypotheses of interest. More specifically, it adopts the following 
approach to hypothesis testing (which Table 44 on the following page sums up): 
▪ Policy Characteristics and Adoption Hypothesis: The study limits itself to testing H 1.1, with H 1.2, 
H 1.3 and H 1.4 – due to multicollinearity among the policy characteristics at stake – being left aside. 
▪ Policy Characteristics and Internal Determinants Hypothesis: It tests H 2.1, H 2.2 and H 2.3. Strictly 
speaking, with the policy characteristics concerned being collinear, the design of the study cannot 
rule out that another characteristic than the one that the particular hypothesis centres on causes 
an observed effect. Yet, thanks to the clear theoretical expectations on the links between policy 
characteristics and specific internal determinants or diffusion effects, it seems justified to attribute 
a particular empirical pattern, if observed, to the impact of a particular policy attribute. 
▪ Policy Characteristics and Diffusion Effects Hypothesis: While the sample does not allow for 
individual tests of H 3.1 and H 3.2, the hypotheses are amenable to a joint test of statistical 
significance.  
                                                          
193 Cantons that introduced restaurant food nutrition labelling between 2007 and 2013 target children and 
adolescents exclusively, adopting either s&d or exclusively those FV-sublabels directed at that age group. As 
these later adopters effectively re-defined the designated beneficiaries of the policy, the latter is coded as 
“children/adolescents” from 2007 onwards. 
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Table 44: Approach to hypothesis testing 
Hypothesis Sub-hypothesis Tested? 
Policy Characteristics and 
Adoption Hypothesis 
H 1.1: designated beneficiaries and the likelihood of policy 
adoption 
yes 
H 1.2: degree of intervention and the likelihood of policy adoption no 
H 1.3: complexity and the likelihood of policy adoption no 
H 1.4: implementation costs and the likelihood of policy adoption no 
Policy Characteristics and 
Internal Determinants 
Hypothesis 
H 2.1: degree of intervention and the impact of ideological 
preferences on the likelihood of policy adoption 
yes 
H 2.2: complexity and the impact of state policy-making capacity 
on the likelihood of policy adoption 
yes 
H 2.3: implementation costs and the impact of state fiscal 
situation on the likelihood of policy adoption 
yes 
Policy Characteristics and 
Diffusion Effects 
Hypothesis 
H 3.1: implementation costs and the impact of peer effects on the 
likelihood of policy adoption 
yes, joint 
test 
H 3.2: complexity and the impact of peer effects on the likelihood 
of policy adoption 
 
Secondly, because of the small sample size, the research design cannot entirely rule out that 
unobserved idiosyncrasies of the policies studied (rather than the characteristics of interest) produce 
an observed effect. This weakens the causal inference on the sub-hypotheses tested. The multiple 
events models estimated in Chapter 8.3 will account for such idiosyncrasies as far as possible through 
policy fixed effects, though. 
Third, the small number of policies sampled compromises the statistical power of tests. In other words, 
the sample size may impede the detection of existing effects. 
 Standardised Single Event Models: Evidence on the Indirect Effects of Policy 
Characteristics 
Testing logic and model specifications 
This section subjects the sub-hypotheses of the Policy Characteristics and Internal Determinants 
Hypothesis and the Policy Characteristics and Diffusion Effects Hypothesis to a first empirical test. 
When looking at the same subsample of policies as in Chapter 7 and taking the actual distribution of 
policy design characteristics as summarised in Table 43 into account, we expect the standardised single 
event models estimated to lead to the following observations – provided that hypotheses H 2.1 to H 
2.3 and H 3.1 and H 3.2 combined hold: 
▪ Ideological preferences more strongly affect the likelihoods of cantonal adoption of the bans on 
tobacco billboard advertising and on tobacco sales to minors than of breast cancer screening 
programmes and restaurant food nutrition labelling. 
▪ Cantonal policy-making capacity more strongly shapes the likelihoods of adoption of breast cancer 
screening programmes and restaurant food nutrition labelling than of the bans on tobacco billboard 
advertising and tobacco sales to minors. 
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▪ The fiscal situation of the canton influences the whether and when of adopting a breast cancer 
screening programme and restaurant food nutrition labelling, but does not affect adoptions of the 
bans on tobacco billboard advertising and on tobacco sales to minors. 
▪ Peer effects hold more weight over adoptions of breast cancer screening programmes and 
restaurant food nutrition labelling than over adoptions of the bans on tobacco billboard advertising 
and on tobacco sales to minors. 
Standardised single event models serve to contrast these expectations with the actual empirical 
patterns for the four public health policies. The models, which are presented in Table 58 in the 
Appendix, follow the specifications used in Chapter 7 – with the difference that they use a common 
set of explanatory variables across policies. This set assembles the predictors that figure in the 
“reduced models” on the four policies in Chapter 7.194 
Given that the coefficients of individual models cannot directly be compared, average marginal effects 
(AME) 195, i.e. marginal effects averaged across all observations that form the estimation sample of the 
specific model, are computed (see Table 45 on the following page). 
Results 
Table 45 displays the results. For several key explanatory factors, the findings do not follow the 
expected pattern or at least fail to do so unequivocally: 
▪ The estimated AME of left-party strength for the two highly-interventionist policies (models 5a and 
5b) exceed those for the policies that involve a low degree of intervention (models 5c and 5d) and 
are in line with H 2.1. However, the AME in model 5a is statistically insignificant. 
▪ The estimated AME of state policy-making capacity diverge from what H 2.2 predicts: Model 5a, 
which reflects cantonal adoptions of a simple policy, shows a larger effect than models 5c and 5d, 
which cover cantonal adoptions of complex policies.196 
▪ As expected, the AME of state fiscal situation in model 5c on a high-cost policy is positive and 
statistically significant and the AME in model 5b on a low-cost policy is statistically insignificant. 
However, the statistically insignificant effect in model 5d (policy with sizable implementation costs) 
and the statistically significant effect in model 5a (low-cost policy) do not conform to H 2.3. 
However, one finding clearly is in line with the hypotheses specified: The AME of the regional diffusion 
variable in models 5c and 5d clearly outperform those in models 5a and 5b, where they are not even 
statistically significant. Put differently, the effects of interdependent decision making among peer 
governments shape cantonal innovation decisions on those policies in the sample that are costly and 
complex, but not on those policies that entail low levels of complexity and implementation costs. 
In sum, the results lend initial support to H 3.1 and H 3.2 combined, but neither to H 2.1, H 2.2 nor to 
H 2.3. 
                                                          
194 To render the models more comparable, the operational definitions of a few variables were slightly changed. 
The model on the adoption of breast cancer screening programmes now includes the number of radiologists per 
1000 employees (instead of the density of radiologists). The two variables are almost identical (r=0.94, N=410). 
Furthermore, employment in the restaurant sector (rather than in the day-care sector for children) is used in 
model 6d as a measure of producer pressures. 
195 In the present context, a marginal effect reflects the instantaneous change in the predicted probability of 
policy adoption that is associated with an infinitesimal change in the predictor of interest (i.e. a specific internal 
determinant or diffusion effect), with the remaining predictors held constant (cf. Steenbergen 2010: 35). 
196 What is more, the instantaneous change in the probability that cantons adopt organised breast cancer 
screenings for an infinitesimal change in policy-making capacity is statistically significant and negative (model 
5c). While strictly speaking not running counter to H 2.2, this is counterintuitive. 
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Table 45: Average marginal effects on the adoptions of four public health policies 
  (5a) 
Ban on 
tobacco 
billboard 
advertising 
(5b) 
Ban on 
tobacco sales 
to minors 
(5c) 
Breast cancer 
screening 
programmes 
(5d) 
Restaurant 
food nutrition 
labelling 
Regional diffusion Regional diffusion 2 
(implementers) (t-1) 
-0.064 
(0.073) 
-0.151 
(0.335) 
0.068** 
(0.020) 
0.225*** 
(0.047) 
Point-source 
diffusion  
Financial incentives - - 0.171* 
(0.072) 
0.158 
(0.124) 
Ideological 
preferences 
Strength of left parties in 
parliament 
0.176 
(0.111) 
0.720# 
(0.418) 
-0.055 
(0.079) 
-0.065 
(0.126) 
Interest group 
pressures 
Strength of public health 
organisations (t-1) 
0.303*** 
(0.032) 
0.131 
(0.147) 
0.022 
(0.026) 
0.063# 
(0.033) 
Policy-making 
capacity 
Density of adminis-
tration (t-1) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
-0.010  
(0.008) 
-0.003* 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
State 
interventionism 
Size of public sector (t-1) 0.001 
(0.002) 
0.006 
(0.014) 
0.014*** 
(0.003) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
State fiscal 
situation 
Relative budget 
surplus/deficit (t-1) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.007) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Producer 
pressures 
Tobacco production (t-1) -0.224*** 
(0.032) 
-0.018# 
(0.010) 
- - 
Radiology industry (t-1) - - 0.857** 
(0.274) 
- 
Restaurant sector (t-1) - - - -0.002 
(0.002) 
Legend: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by canton; # p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 Multiple Events Models: Evidence on the Direct and Indirect Effects of Policy 
Characteristics 
Testing logic and model specification 
Drawing on the complete sample of six policies, the multiple events models to be estimated serve to 
subject the Policy Characteristics and Adoption Hypothesis, the Policy Characteristics and Internal 
Determinants Hypothesis and the Policy Characteristics and Diffusion Effects Hypothesis a more 
comprehensive test than the preceding subchapter did. 
Table 46 on the next page extracts the key explanatory factors from the sub-hypotheses to be tested 
(cf. Chapter 8.1), translates the contingent effects hypothesised in H 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 as well as H 3.1 and 
3.2 combined into interaction terms, recapitulates operational definitions and shows the expected 
direction of effects. Note that – due to the issue of multicollinearity discussed in Chapter 8.1 – the 
models cannot include separate variables on degree of intervention, complexity and implementation 
costs. Instead, “policy type”, which combines these three characteristics into one variable, is used.  
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Table 46: Multiple events models: key explanatory factors 
Category Type of explanatory factor Variable and operational definition Expected 
impact 
Policy characteristics Designated beneficiaries Dummy = 1 for children’s health 
policy 
H 1.1: 
Positive 
 
Degree of intervention, 
complexity, implementation 
costs 
Policy type: Dummy = 1 for hardly-
interventionist, complex, high-cost 
policy 
- 
 
Internal determinants Ideological preferences Strength of left parties in 
parliament: Proportion of left-party 
seats in cantonal parliament 
Positive 
Policy-making capacity Density of administration: 
Employees of cantonal 
administration per 1000 employees 
(t-1) 
Positive 
State fiscal situation Relative budget surplus/deficit: 
Surplus/deficit as percentage of 
government spending (t-1) 
(Positive) 
Diffusion effects Peer effects Regional diffusion 2: Proportion of 
previous implementers in CMPH-
region (t-1) 
Positive 
Policy characteristics * 
internal determinants 
Degree of intervention * 
ideological preferences 
Policy type * 
strength of left parties in 
parliament 
H 2.1: 
Negative197 
Complexity * 
policy-making capacity 
Policy type * 
density of administration 
H 2.2: 
Positive 
Implementation costs * 
state fiscal situation 
Policy type * 
relative budget surplus/deficit 
H 2.3: 
Positive 
Policy characteristics * 
diffusion effects 
Complexity and 
implementation costs * 
peer effects 
Policy type * 
regional diffusion 2 
H 3.1+3.2: 
Positive 
Apart from these key explanatory variables, the models will control for other potential predictors of 
policy adoption, including other internal determinants (i.e. interest group pressures, state 
interventionism, producer pressures, problem severity)198 and point-source diffusion influences (i.e. 
financial incentives, technical assistance, signal about appropriate course of action).199 
As mentioned before, the adoptions of different policies might be driven by quite heterogeneous 
processes. Therefore, the following questions need to be answered in specifying multiple events 
models that pool different policies into one equation (cf. Boehmke 2009: 234-236): 
▪ Should the coefficients on explanatory variables be restricted to be constant across event types 
(here, adoptions of different policies) or allowed to vary? 
▪ Moreover, should the baseline hazard rates be fixed or allowed to vary by event type, by event 
number or by both?  
Regarding the estimation of coefficients, this study adopts a middle course. If the standardised single 
event models estimated in Table 58 in the Appendix show a predictor to have a significant positive 
effect on the adoption of at least one, but a significant negative effect on the adoption of at least 
another policy, the models estimated below will allow coefficient estimates to vary. For that purpose, 
                                                          
197 Because of the way that the variable “policy type” is coded. 
198 For operational definitions of these variables, see Table 30. 
199 For operational definitions of these variables, see Table 8. The effects of “concrete prospect of federal 
legislation” cannot be estimated because the variable leads to quasi-separation. 
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they will provide for a variable that interacts the predictor concerned with a dummy for the policy that 
produces the divergent pattern. It will do so whenever the interaction terms listed in Table 46 do not 
already allow for differential effects. In all other instances, the coefficients will be restricted to be 
constant across policies. 
As the baseline hazard rate is concerned, policy fixed effects (i.e. a dummy variable for each policy 
analysed) are used. Stratification by policy is necessary. For the analyses in Chapter 7 showed the 
policies to exhibit highly different patterns of adoption and the explanatory variables used will not fully 
account for these differences. In contrast, stratification of the sample by order of policy adoption, i.e. 
estimating different baseline hazards for the first policy that a government adopts, the second one and 
so on, does not seem warranted on substantive grounds.200 
Table 47 describes the statistical distribution of variables that feature in the multiple events models 
presented in the next section. 
Table 47: Multiple events models: descriptive statistics of variables 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min. Max. Obs. 
Policy adoption 0.039 0.193 0 1 1856 
Designated beneficiaries 0.118 0.323 0 1 1856 
Policy type 0.462 0.499 0 1 1856 
Strength of left parties in parliament 0.246 0.130 0 0.531 1856 
Strength of public health organisations (t-1) 0.3 0.3 0 3.3 1856 
Density of administration (t-1) 17.1 8.9 7.6 58.2 1856 
Size of public sector (t-1) 14.9 3.1 8.5 26.8 1856 
Relative budget surplus/deficit (t-1) 0.0 5.3 -26 19 1856 
Producer pressures (t-1) 8.8 13.7 0 59.4 1856 
Regional diffusion 2 (implementers) (t-1) 0.101 0.188 0 1 1856 
Financial incentives 0.199 0.399 0 1 1856 
Technical assistance 0.173 0.378 0 1 1856 
Signal about appropriate course of action 0.140 0.347 0 1 1856 
Policy type * strength of left parties in 
parliament 
0.110 0.147 0 0.531 1856 
Policy type * density of administration 7.7 10.3 0 58.2 1856 
Policy type * relative budget surplus/deficit -0.0 3.5 -26 19 1856 
Policy type * regional diffusion 2 0.032 0.109 0 1 1856 
Ban on tobacco outdoor advertising (P1) 
dummy 
0.141 0.348 0 1 1856 
Ban on tobacco sales to children (P2) dummy 0.067 0.250 0 1 1856 
Ban on alcohol sales at petrol stations (P3) 
dummy 
0.135 0.342 0 1 1856 
Ban on take-away alcohol sales at night (P4) 
dummy 
0.195 0.396 0 1 1856 
Breast cancer screening programmes (P5) 
dummy 
0.241 0.428 0 1 1856 
Restaurant food nutrition labelling (P6) 
dummy 
0.221 0.415 0 1 1856 
Results 
Table 48 on page 140 presents the results of seven multiple events models. Model 5a contains the 
entire set of internal determinants and diffusion effects. Model 5b adds the policy dummies, with the 
                                                          
200 It might be appropriate in a situation where the analysis is based on an exhaustive list of policies from the 
same issue area. 
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ban on tobacco billboard advertising serving as the reference category. Moreover, it interacts the 
policy dummy for breast cancer screening programmes with the predictor “producer pressures” as 
Table 56 in the Appendix attests to the differential effect of that predictor on the adoption of the 
policies studied. Model 5c adds the policy characteristic variables – designated beneficiaries and policy 
type – to this set-up. Note that, due to multicollinearity, one policy dummy drops out of this and later 
models. Model 5d complements the analysis with the interaction of policy type and ideological 
preferences, while models 5e, 5f and 5g do so for the interactions of policy type and policy-making 
capacity, state fiscal situation and regional diffusion, respectively. 
 
In turning to the results, let us first look at H 1.1, according to which innovative policies that target 
children for benefits are more likely to be adopted than other policies. In line with what H 1.1 predicts, 
the estimated coefficient of designated beneficiaries has a positive sign in models 5c to 5g. In most 
models, it does not reach statistical significance, though. Only Model 5g shows a significant effect for 
“designated beneficiaries”. According to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) displayed in the lower 
part of the table, model 5g fits the data best. Yet, due to the suppression of one policy dummy, 5g does 
not fully control for (unobserved) heterogeneity among the policies studied. Against this background, 
the model does not allow for unambiguous inferences on the effects of designated beneficiaries. For 
the time being, we do not know if children’s health policies are more likely to be adopted than policies 
that target other age groups or the population as a whole. 
To assess if degree of intervention conditions the weight of ideological preferences in policy innovation 
decisions (H 2.1) we turn to model 5d. As expected, the interaction term is negative (see Table 46). 
However, it is clearly insignificant. Hence, we cannot rule out with sufficient certainty that the effects 
of left-party representation in cantonal parliaments are the same, regardless of the degree to which 
the policy intervenes into the private or professional sphere of the direct target group. Regarding the 
main effect of left-party strength, Table 48 does not convey a clear picture as to whether such parties 
advance policy innovation. The estimated coefficients are consistently positive, but statistically 
insignificant in several models, including 5g. 
Model 5e sheds light on H 2.2, which revolves around the difference that the complexity of innovative 
policies might make for the impact of state policy-making capacity on the likelihood of adoption. The 
main effect of policy-making capacity turns out to be statistically insignificant in all models, suggesting 
that states with sizable policy-making capacities (at least as measured here) are no more likely to 
innovate than their counterparts with fewer resources. With the relevant interaction term also failing 
to reach statistical significance, this finding holds for both simple and complex policies. 
What about a contingent effect of state fiscal situation then? According to model 5f, which shows the 
relevant interaction to be statistically insignificant, implementation costs do not shape the importance 
of this predictor for policy innovation – contrary to what H 2.3 predicts. Rather, as the main effect is 
also insignificant, state fiscal situation appears to have no impact on the likelihood of policy adoption 
whatsoever. 
In contrast, Table 48 indicates a contingent effect for regional diffusion. According to models 5a to 5f, 
governments are the more likely to innovate the higher the share of adopters of the same policy within 
the respective regional conference of cantonal health ministers (“peers”) is. Once important features 
of the policy design are controlled for, this finding has to be qualified: Model 5g shows that the positive 
effect of previous policy adoptions by peers does not apply universally, but is limited to complex and 
costly policies.201 
                                                          
201 Given that the dropping out of the dummy variable for Policy 6 in the course of the transition from model 5b 
to 5c has no noticeable impact on the estimated coefficient of regional diffusion and that its significance changes 
only once the interaction between regional diffusion and policy characteristics is included in model 5g, it is highly 
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In other words, policy makers seem to pay attention to peers’ previous policy choices when the 
innovations at stake require a substantial investment of resources, but not otherwise. Hence, in the 
case of relatively simple and low-cost policies, innovation decisions appear to be driven first and 
foremost by internal determinants. 
In all, the results from the multiple events models support H 3.1 and H 3.2 combined. They are 
insufficient for assessing H 1.1, while backing neither H 2.1, H 2.2 nor H 2.3. 
                                                          
unlikely that the omission of the fixed effect for Policy 6 confounds the observed differential effect of 
interdependent decision making among peers. 
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Table 48: Pooled logit models on the adoption of six public health policies 
  (5a) 
Baseline 
(5b) 
Plus policy 
fixed effects 
(5c) 
Plus policy 
characteristics 
(5d) 
Plus policy type 
* ideological 
preferences 
(5e) 
Plus policy type 
* policy-making 
capacity 
(5f) 
Plus policy type 
* state fiscal 
situation  
(5g) 
Plus policy type 
* regional 
diffusion  
Designated 
beneficiaries 
Children’s health policy - - 
 
1.380 
(0.952) 
1.401 
(0.955) 
1.314 
(1.003) 
1.385 
(0.958) 
2.345* 
(1.097) 
Policy type Hardly-interventionist, 
complex, high-cost policy 
- - 3.310* 
(1.426) 
4.172** 
(1.598) 
3.104* 
(1.481) 
3.429* 
(1.420) 
2.615# 
(1.473) 
Regional diffusion Regional diffusion 2 (% 
implementers) (t-1) 
1.469# 
(0.755) 
1.771* 
(0.749) 
1.837* 
(0.766) 
1.929* 
(0.758) 
1.807* 
(0.764) 
1.892* 
(0.783) 
-0.367 
(1.076) 
Policy type * 
regional diffusion 
 - - - - - - 4.366** 
(1.597) 
Point-source 
diffusion 
Financial incentives 2.367*** 
(0.457) 
2.788*** 
(0.697) 
1.945* 
(0.876) 
1.947* 
(0.880) 
1.979* 
(0.924) 
1.851* 
(0.867) 
0.737 
(0.981) 
Technical assistance 1.848** 
(0.697) 
1.658* 
(0.727) 
1.746* 
(0.789) 
1.741* 
(0.791) 
1.738* 
(0.786) 
1.642* 
(0.781) 
0.972 
(0.802) 
Signal about appropriate 
course of action 
1.646*** 2.806** 2.701** 2.695** 2.702** 2.683** 2.444** 
(0.455) (0.885) (0.880) (0.886) (0.881) (0.879) (0.837) 
Problem severity Prevalence/mortality 0.047* 
(0.019) 
-0.009 
(0.077) 
-0.030 
(0.079) 
-0.038 
(0.080) 
-0.026 
(0.079) 
-0.029 
(0.080) 
-0.047 
(0.081) 
Ideological 
preferences 
Strength of left parties in 
parliament 
1.858 
(1.344) 
2.287 
(1.404) 
2.457# 
(1.416) 
3.164# 
(1.826) 
2.464# 
(1.414) 
2.480# 
(1.416) 
2.183 
(1.387) 
Policy type * 
ideol. preferences 
 - - - -1.801 
(2.385) 
- - - 
Interest group 
pressures 
Strength of public health 
organisations 
0.236 
(0.355) 
0.452 
(0.369) 
0.491 
(0.372) 
0.449 
(0.384) 
0.534 
(0.443) 
0.499 
(0.376) 
0.628# 
(0.379) 
Policy-making 
capacity 
Density of administration (t-1) 0.015 
(0.019) 
-0.003 
(0.021) 
-0.007 
(0.023) 
-0.006 
(0.023) 
-0.012 
(0.034) 
-0.008 
(0.023) 
-0.005 
(0.023) 
Policy type * policy-
making capacity 
 - - - - 0.009 
(0.037) 
- - 
State 
interventionism 
Size of public sector (t-1) 0.056 
(0.054) 
0.101# 
(0.061) 
0.100 
(0.062) 
0.101 
(0.062) 
0.103 
(0.063) 
0.102 
(0.062) 
0.082 
(0.061) 
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Table 48: Pooled logit models on the adoption of six public health policies (continued) 
  (5a) 
Baseline 
(5b) 
Plus policy 
fixed effects 
(5c) 
Plus policy 
characteristics 
(5d) 
Plus policy type 
* ideological 
preferences 
(5e) 
Plus policy type 
* policymaking 
capacity 
(5f) 
Plus policy type 
* state fiscal 
situation  
(5g) 
Plus policy type 
* regional 
diffusion  
State fiscal situation Relative budget surplus/deficit 
(t-1) 
-0.034 
(0.034) 
-0.024 
(0.035) 
-0.025 
(0.035) 
-0.026 
(0.035) 
-0.025 
(0.034) 
-0.034 
(0.047) 
-0.019 
(0.035) 
Policy type * 
state fiscal situation 
 - - - - . 0.030 
(0.066) 
- 
Producer pressures 
 
Sector employment (t-1) -0.042 
(0.027) 
-0.088* 
(0.039) 
-0.082* 
(0.038) 
-0.089* 
(0.040) 
-0.082* 
(0.038) 
-0.083* 
(0.039) 
-0.066# 
(0.037) 
Producer pressures * 
P5 
  13.13** 
(4.857) 
14.24** 
(5.321) 
15.58** 
(5.448) 
13.43* 
(5.631) 
14.44** 
(5.367) 
13.45* 
(5.916) 
Policy fixed effects Tobacco sales to children (P2)  -0.632 
(0.480) 
-1.975# 
(1.049) 
-2.017# 
(1.053) 
-1.892# 
(1.080) 
-1.976# 
(1.058) 
-2.290* 
(1.133)  
Alcohol sales at night (P3)  -1.271 
(1.945) 
-1.711 
(1.961) 
-1.885 
(1.979) 
-1.619 
(1.956) 
-1.693 
(1.978) 
-2.234 
(2.001) 
Alcohol sales at petrol 
stations (P4) 
 0.457 
(1.752) 
0.025 
(1.756) 
-0.147 
(1.803) 
0.127 
(1.825) 
0.047 
(1.775) 
-0.426 
(1.780) 
Breast cancer screening 
programmes (P5) 
 -1.913 
(2.197) 
-5.209# 
(2.924) 
-5.851* 
(2.898) 
-5.015# 
(2.938) 
-5.205# 
(2.928) 
-5.153# 
(3.041) 
Restaurant food nutrition 
labelling (P6) 
 3.506* 
(1.405) 
0 
(.) 
0 
(.) 
0 
(.) 
0 
(.) 
0 
(.) 
Further controls t 0.002 
(0.165) 
-0.052 
(0.178) 
-0.013 
(0.179) 
-0.014 
(0.180) 
-0.012 
(0.179) 
-0.011 
(0.180) 
0.163 
(0.217) 
t2 -0.025 
(0.021) 
-0.031 
(0.021) 
-0.035 
(0.022) 
-0.035 
(0.022) 
-0.035 
(0.022) 
-0.036 
(0.022) 
-0.040# 
(0.024) 
t3 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001# 
(0.001) 
0.001# 
(0.001) 
0.001# 
(0.001) 
0.001# 
(0.001) 
0.001# 
(0.001) 
0.001# 
(0.001) 
Constant -6.176*** 
(0.907) 
-5.859** 
(1.987) 
-5.364** 
(2.006) 
-5.377** -5.445** -5.420** -4.912* 
 (2.040) (2.031) (2.040) (2.051) 
 N 1856 1856 1856 1856 1856 1856 1856 
Wald Chi2 120.0 130.1 137.6 160.4 161.5 139.3 157.2 
Mc Fadden’s R2 0.185 0.214 0.217 0.218 0.218 0.218 0.235 
AIC 526.4 520.7 520.7 522.2 522.6 522.3 512.0 
Legend: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by canton-years; # p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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 Evidence on the Effects of Policy Characteristics: Summary and Appraisal 
What can we learn from the analyses in Chapters 8.2 and 8.3? Evidently, the limitations in sample size 
and composition discussed before (see Chapter 8.1) restrict the inferences that can be made. Against 
this background, it needs to be stressed that the results summarised below are preliminary in nature 
and that the research questions raised in this study warrant further investigation. 
Chapter 8.3 sheds a spot of light on the Policy Characteristics and Adoption Hypothesis. The multiple 
events models estimated suggest that policies that target children for benefits might be more likely to 
be adopted than policies that designate other age groups or the population as a whole as beneficiaries, 
but they cannot substantiate this supposition with sufficient certainty (H 1.1). Due to the small sample 
size, the models cannot fully control for the policy characteristics of interest and other, unobserved 
differences among the policies studied (through policy fixed effects) at the same time. As a result, the 
analyses do not provide a conclusive answer as to the effect of the designated beneficiaries of the 
policy being children and/or adolescents as opposed to other age groups or the population as a whole. 
Because of the three remaining policy design characteristics – degree of intervention, complexity and 
implementation costs – being collinear, Chapter 8.3 refrains from explicitly testing the sub-hypotheses 
that centre on these characteristics. As a result, the analyses do not reveal whether innovative policies 
that entail a low-degree of intervention are more likely to be adopted than highly-interventionist ones 
(H 1.2), whether innovative policies that are based on a simple design are more likely to be adopted 
than those with a complex design (H 1.3), and whether innovative policies that involve low or invisible 
implementation costs are more likely to be adopted than high-cost policies (H 1.4). 
However, the fact that the coefficient of “policy type”, i.e. the dummy variable that is coded 1 for 
policies that combine a low degree of intervention, a complex policy design and high implementation 
costs, is consistently positive and statistically significant in the models estimated suggests that these 
design characteristics matter for the likelihood of innovative policies being adopted. The models do 
not allow disentangling the individual effects. However, it appears as if an innovation being associated 
with a high degree of intervention into the privates lives or business activities of the direct target is a 
more important obstacle to its adoption than a complex policy design or high implementation costs. 
Chapters 8.2 and 8.3 subject the three sub-hypotheses of the Policy Characteristics and Internal 
Determinants Hypothesis to a first empirical test, the results of which are summarised below: 
▪ At present, we cannot infer that ideological preferences more strongly affect the likelihood of 
adoption of highly interventionist innovative policies than of policies that entail a low degree of 
intervention (H 2.1), given that the differences observed are statistically insignificant. Yet, the signs 
of the estimated coefficients are consistently in line with H 2.1. In a larger sample of policies, the 
differential effects of ideological preferences by degree of intervention might be significant. 
▪ Neither the results of the standardised single event models nor those of the multiple events models 
back H 2.2: There is no evidence of state policy-making capacity more strongly affecting the 
likelihood of adoption of complex than of simple innovative policies. However, it should be noted 
that the models use a proxy variable for capturing the resources for policy analysis and formulation 
in public health that are available to the executive branch of government (see page 105). More valid 
measures of the underlying concept might yield different results. 
▪ The analyses carried out in Chapters 8.2 and 8.3 do not disclose any systematic differences between 
low- and high-cost innovative policies in terms of the difference that the balance of state revenues 
and spending makes for the likelihood of policy adoption. In other words, there is no evidence of 
the fiscal situation of the state affecting the likelihood of adoption of innovations that entail high 
implementation costs, but not of policies with low or invisible costs (H 2.3). 
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According to the findings from Chapters 8.2 and 8.3 alike, previous policy choices by peer governments 
affect the adoption of complex and high-cost innovative policies, but not of simple and low-cost ones 
(H 3.1 and H 3.2 combined). Hence, as regards the Policy Characteristics and Diffusion Effects 
Hypothesis, we may conclude that governments pay attention to decision making by relevant peers 
whenever they seek to limit the risks associated with innovating, but otherwise do not rely on such 
cues. Whether the risks that innovations involve arise from the complexity of policy designs and/or the 
costs of policy implementation, cannot yet be inferred from the analyses. 
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9 Policy Design, Innovation and Diffusion: Conclusion 
This study set out to explore an issue that had been largely ignored in policy innovation research: the 
difference that the characteristics of innovative policies make. In doing so, it focussed on attributes 
that emanate from the basic design of the policy – its designated beneficiaries, degree of intervention, 
complexity and implementation costs (see Chapter 3). So, do policy design characteristics matter? The 
following sections summarise the pertinent findings202 as well as the achievements and limitations of 
this study and outline avenues for further research. 
Evidence on the relevance of policy design characteristics 
Due to empirical constraints arising from the small number of policies analysed and their similarities 
in design, this study could not fully elicit the role that policy design characteristics play in innovation 
choices. Nevertheless, its results suggest that they matter in at least in one respect: Policy design 
characteristics apparently moderate the weight that interdependent decision making among peer 
governments holds for innovation decisions. Concretely, the analyses show that the Swiss cantons are 
more likely to adopt complex and high-cost innovative policies in the area of public health when other 
governments that belong to the same regional conference of cantonal ministers of public health have 
done so before. In contrast, adoptions of simple and low-cost policies are unaffected by such regional 
diffusion effects, being driven exclusively by internal determinants (and point-source diffusion) 
instead. Thus, governments apparently pay attention to other states’ previous policy choices when 
they seek to minimise the risks associated with innovations that pose high resource requirements, but 
not otherwise. Whether the perceived risks of such innovations arise from the complexity of policy 
designs and/or the level of implementation costs still has to be established. In short, the study attests 
to the significance of design characteristics in the sense of the Policy Characteristics and Diffusion 
Hypothesis.  
Moreover, it yields some evidence in favour of the Policy Characteristics and Adoption Hypothesis, 
suggesting that design characteristics shape the probability of states adopting an innovative policy at 
all: For “designated beneficiaries” and “policy type”, i.e. the combination of degree of intervention, 
complexity of policy design and implementation costs, exhibit statistically significant effects on the 
likelihood that the Swiss cantons adopt the six public health policies studied. However, the research 
design neither allows to disentangle the individual effects of degree of intervention, complexity and 
costs (due to multicollinearity) nor to ascertain the direct impact of designated beneficiaries with a 
sufficient degree of certainty (due to the inability to completely control for unobserved heterogeneity 
among policies). Hence, for the time being, we cannot conclude with sufficient certainty that policy 
design characteristics matter for the likelihood of innovation. 
The study marshals no evidence as to design characteristics affecting the importance of internal 
determinants for the likelihood of policy adoption – i.e. that degree of intervention shapes the 
importance of ideological preferences, that complexity moderates the impact of policy-making 
capacity, and that the impact of state fiscal situation is contingent on implementations costs. The small 
sample size, the use of a proxy variable for policy-making capacity and the rather blunt measurement 
of implementation costs might conceal existing effects. While the results do not unequivocally refute 
the Policy Characteristics and Internal Determinants Hypothesis, they certainly do not lend support 
to it. 
                                                          
202 This study also provides insights into the factors that drive the adoption of individual public health policies by 
the Swiss cantons. The relevant findings are summarised in Chapter 7.5.  
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In all, it seems justified to state that policy design characteristics matter for innovation choices and 
constitute a category of explanatory factors in their own right. Further research is required to convey 
more comprehensive insights on the difference that design characteristics make, though. 
Contributions and limitations 
This study addresses the core questions of policy innovation research, i.e. whether and when states 
adopt innovative policies. In doing so, it highlights an issue that has thus far received little attention, 
but is of substantial interest to diffusion scholars: Do policies matter? The theoretical framework that 
it develops in response to this question links policy characteristics to three issues of key interest to 
scholars – the likelihood of innovation as well as the relevance of specific state characteristics and of 
interdependent decision making among peer governments for innovation decisions. To the author’s 
knowledge, it is the first endeavour to address these aspects simultaneously. 
Previous works on the impact of policy characteristics on innovation and diffusion (e.g. Mooney/Lee 
1995; Nicholson-Crotty 2009; Boushey 2010) mostly focus on characteristics of the issue that an 
innovative policy addresses, such as salience, complexity or fragility. In contrast, this study explores 
what difference attributes that pertain to the solution that an innovative policy entails make. In doing 
so, it joins the strands of research on policy diffusion and design for the time ever. This innovative 
research agenda promises important theoretical insights as aspects related to design elements of 
innovative policies are likely to matter to policy makers when deciding about the adoption of such 
policies. What is more, from the point of view of practitioners, findings on the effects of design 
characteristics could be particularly relevant. Since such characteristics are amenable to change, an 
understanding of their impact on innovation decisions allows for the purposive crafting of innovative 
policies by pioneering governments or diffusion agencies in a way that increases their chances of 
diffusion. By comparison, the manipulation of policy issue characteristics poses much higher demands 
on political actors who sponsor a particular policy innovation.  
It contributes an important finding to this research agenda: Policy innovations that combine complex 
designs and high implementation costs spread differently from simple and low-cost innovations. In the 
case of the former, previous adoptions by peer governments encourage other states to follow suit. In 
contrast, when the policy at stake is simple and inexpensive, previous adoptions do not shape the 
innovation decisions of potential adopters. As a consequence, we may conclude that the endeavour to 
minimise technical and/or financial risks drives interdependent decision making on policy innovations. 
Based on somewhat different operational definitions of complexity, two former studies looked at how 
the latter affects the weight of diffusion effects: In Brooks’ (2007) study, the contingency of peer 
effects does not apply generally, but is limited to a subset of the countries studied (i.e. lower-income 
as well as Latin American and Eastern European countries; see page 21). In Makse and Volden’s (2011) 
study, the effects of neighbour-based diffusion are the same for low and high complexity policies. 
In addition to the conceptual work and empirical insights on the effects of policy design characteristics, 
this study introduces several novel aspects to policy innovation research, including the handling of 
fuzzy transitions between the stages of policy formulation, adoption and implementation arising from 
pilot testing and time-limited policies, the inclusion of policies with very few adopters into the analysis 
through multiple events models, and complementing the analysis of top-down diffusion with a new 
factor, i.e. the provision of technical assistance. 
Regarding the policy field studied, this study offers a comprehensive description of public health policy 
making in Switzerland and detailed evidence on the diffusion of four individual policies. 
As mentioned before, the limitations of this study arise from its empirical basis. Because of difficulties 
encountered in identifying suitable cantonal policies, the resultant sample comprised too few policies. 
As a result, some sub-hypotheses of interest could not be tested at all. When testing the remaining 
sub-hypotheses, the small sample size disallowed to completely control for other differences among 
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policies than those captured through the policy characteristics variables. What is more, the small 
number of policies also compromises the statistical power of tests, implying that existing effects might 
not be detected. 
In sum, while this study laid the foundation for a potentially very fruitful research agenda, it could not 
pursue this agenda in full. In the following section, a number of ideas on how to advance on this agenda 
are presented. 
Avenues for further research 
In view of the empirical limitations of this study, the most evident avenue for further research is to 
replicate the analyses on the basis of a sample that comprises a larger number of policies and provides 
for sufficient variation on the policy design attributes of interest. A larger sample would also allow for 
a more nuanced measurement of degree of intervention, complexity and implementation costs than 
the dichotomous classifications used in this study and thus increase theoretical leverage (see footnotes 
55, 56 and 59). 
For such a replication, it seems advisable to focus on a more confined policy subfield than public health, 
either within public health or another issue area. Such an approach is likely to facilitate not only the 
identification of appropriate policies, but also model specification. For certain internal determinants, 
e.g. problem severity or producer pressures, are the more easily defined in a comparative way across 
policies, the smaller the policy subfield analysed. Besides the considerations detailed in Chapter 4.2, 
the availability of data on internal determinants that are relevant from a theoretical point of view (such 
as policy-making capacity) should govern the choice of the issue area to be studied. 
Replicating the analyses in such a way would allow for a sound empirical test of all sub-hypotheses of 
interest, including those related to the Policy Characteristics and Adoption Hypothesis. It would also 
allow for separate tests of the sub-hypotheses that form part of the Policy Characteristics and Diffusion 
Effects Hypothesis, thus revealing if complex designs and/or high implementation costs motivate 
interdependent decision making on policy innovations. 
Other promising avenues for future research are exploring the impact of policy design characteristics 
on the substance of innovation decisions (see footnote 39), on the diffusion mechanisms at work (cf. 
the remarks on the “black-box-approach” adopted in this study on page 64) and on point-source 
diffusion (see Chapter 4.3). Hence, future studies might want to address the following research 
questions: 
▪ Depending on the specific set of characteristics that the original policy entails, are states more or 
less likely to reinvent the policy, to retain the idea, but to devise a different policy design (“principle 
diffusion”), or to introduce the policy on a trial basis first (pilot testing)? 
▪ Do policy characteristics condition what type or types of diffusion mechanisms are at work? 
▪ Do policy characteristics trigger certain types of point-source diffusion? 
To the author’s knowledge, none of these issues has been systematically investigated into thus far. 
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11 Appendix 
Table 49: Cantonal health acts (as of December 2015) 
Canton Cantonal health act 
AG Gesundheitsgesetz vom 20. Januar 2009 (Stand 1. Juli 2015) (GesG; SAR 301.100) 
AI Gesundheitsgesetz vom 26. April 1998 (GS 800.000) 
AR Gesundheitsgesetz vom 25. November 2007 (Stand 1. Januar 2015) (bGS 811.1) 
BE Gesundheitsgesetz vom 2. Dezember 1984 (GesG; BSG 811.01) 
BL Gesundheitsgesetz vom 21. Februar 2008 (Stand 1. Januar 2015) (GesG; SGS 901) 
BS Gesundheitsgesetz vom 21. September 2011 (Stand 10. Mai 2015) (GesG; SG 300.100) 
FR Gesundheitsgesetz vom 16. November 1999 (GesG; SGF 821.0.1) 
GE Loi sur la santé du 7 avril 2006 (LS; RSG K 1 03) 
GL Gesetz über das Gesundheitswesen vom 6. Mai 2007 (Stand 1. Juli 2014) (Gesundheitsgesetz; GS 
VIII A/1/1) 
GR Gesetz über das Gesundheitswesen des Kantons Graubünden vom 2. Dezember 1984 (Stand 1. 
Januar 2013) (Gesundheitsgesetz; BR 500.000) 
JU Loi sanitaire du 14 décembre 1990 (RSJU 810.01) 
LU Gesundheitsgesetz vom 13. September 2005 (Stand 1. Juli 2014) (SRL 800) 
NE Loi de santé du 6 février 1995 (Etat au 1er janvier 2015) (LS; RSN 800.1) 
NW Gesetz zur Erhaltung und Förderung der Gesundheit vom 30. Mai 2007 (Gesundheitsgesetz, GesG; 
NG 711.1) 
OW Gesundheitsgesetz vom 20. Oktober 1991 (Stand 1. Januar 2011) (GDB 810.1) 
SG Gesundheitsgesetz vom 28. Juni 1979 (Stand 1. Januar 2014) (GesG; sGS 311.1) 
SH Gesundheitsgesetz vom 21. Mai 2012 (GesG; SHR 810.100) 
SO Gesundheitsgesetz vom 27. Januar 1999 (Stand 1. Januar 2014) (BGS 811.11) 
SZ Gesundheitsgesetz vom 16. Oktober 2002 (GesG; SRSZ 571.110) 
TG Gesetz über das Gesundheitswesen vom 5. Juni 1985 (Stand 1. September 2015) 
(Gesundheitsgesetz, GG; RB 810.1) 
TI Legge sulla promozione della salute e il coordinamento sanitario del 18 aprile 1989 (Legge 
sanitaria; RL 6.1.1.1) 
UR Gesundheitsgesetz vom 1. Juni 2008 (Stand am 1. Januar 2013) (GG; RB 30.2111) 
VD Loi sur la santé publique du 29 mai 1985 (Etat au 01.09.2015) (LSP; RSV 800.01) 
VS Gesundheitsgesetz vom 14. Februar 2008 (SGS 800.1) 
ZG Gesetz über das Gesundheitswesen im Kanton Zug vom 30. Oktober 2008 (Stand 1. Oktober 2013) 
(Gesundheitsgesetz, GesG; BGS 821.1) 
ZH Gesundheitsgesetz vom 2. April 2007 (GesG; LS 810.1) 
Sources: LexFind (Schweizerische Staatsschreiberkonferenz 2016), cantonal websites. 
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Table 50: Ban on tobacco billboard advertising: cantonal legal basis and dates of adoption and of entry into force, 
2000-2015 
Canton Statutory basis Date of 
adoption 
Date of entry 
into force 
AR Cantonal health act and corresponding ordinance: 
▪ Art. 16 Abs. 2 Gesundheitsgesetz vom 25. November 2007 
(Stand 1. Januar 2015) (bGS 811.1) 
▪ Art. 16 Abs. 1 Verordnung zum Gesundheitsgesetz vom 
11. Dezember 2007 (Stand 24. April 2015) (bGS 811.11) 
25.11.2007 01.01.2008 
BE Cantonal trade and commerce act and corresponding 
ordinance: 
▪ Art. 15 Abs. 1, 3 Gesetz über Handel und Gewerbe vom 4. 
November 1992 (HGG; BSG 930.1) 
▪ Art. 6, 8 Verordnung über Handel und Gewerbe vom 24. 
Januar 2007 (HGV; BSG 930.11) 
12.06.2006 01.01.2007 
BL Cantonal alcohol and tobacco act: 
▪ § 3 Kantonales Alkohol- und Tabakgesetz vom 22. Juni 
2006 (Stand 1. Januar 2013) (KaATG; SGS 905) 
24.09.2006203 01.01.2007 
BS Cantonal penal law and billboard advertising ordinance: 
▪ § 22a) Übertretungsstrafgesetz vom 15. Juni 1978 (Stand 
28. Dezember 2014) (SG 253.100) 
▪ § 7d) Plakatverordnung vom 7. Februar 1933 (Stand 6. 
Februar 2011) (SG 569.500) 
10.11.2004 01.07.2005 
FR204 - - - 
GE Cantonal advertising act and corresponding ordinance: 
▪ Art. 9, alinéa 2 Loi sur les procédés de réclame du 9 juin 
2000 (LPR; RSG F 3 20) 
▪ Art. 1 Règlement d'application de la loi sur les procédés de 
réclame du 11 octobre 2000 (RPR; RSG F 3 20.01) 
09.06.2000 20.10.2000 
GR Cantonal health act and corresponding ordinance: 
▪ Art. 15 Abs. 1, 3 Gesetz über das Gesundheitswesen des 
Kantons Graubünden vom 2. Dezember 1984 (Stand 1. 
Januar 2013) (Gesundheitsgesetz; BR 500.000) 
▪ Art. 3 Verordnung zum Gesundheitsgesetz vom 16. 
Dezember 2008 (Stand 1. Januar 2014) (BR 500.010) 
19.10.2005 01.07.2006 
OW Cantonal health act: 
▪ Art. 70 Abs. 1 Gesundheitsgesetz vom 3. Dezember 2015 
(Stand 1. Februar 2016) (GDB 810.1) 
03.12.2015 01.02.2016 
SG Cantonal health act: 
▪ Art. 52bis Gesundheitsgesetz vom 28. Juni 1979 (Stand 1. 
Januar 2014) (GesG; sGS 311.1) 
01.08.2006 01.10.2006 
SO Cantonal health act: 
▪ § 6bis Abs. 3 Gesundheitsgesetz vom 27. Januar 1999 
(Stand 1. Januar 2014) (BGS 811.11) 
26.11.2006 01.07.2007 
TG Cantonal act on tobacco and alcohol billboard advertising and 
on tobacco sales to minors: 
▪ § 1 Gesetz über das Verbot der Plakatwerbung für 
Tabak und Alkohol sowie über den Jugendschutz 
beim Verkauf von Tabakwaren vom 21. Juni 2006 (Stand 1. 
Januar 2007) (RB 812.4) 
21.06.2006 01.01.2007 
                                                          
203 The cantonal parliament of BL passed the relevant act in June 2006, while the people approved of it in a 
referendum held in September 2006. Since “date of adoption” reflects the date when the policy was finally 
decided upon, the date provided in this column is not identical to the date designated by the title of the act. 
204 FR has not adopted advertising restrictions that pertain to the public space in general. It prohibits tobacco 
and alcohol advertising in educational and health facilities and their direct surroundings, though. 
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Table 50: Ban on tobacco billboard advertising: cantonal legal basis and the dates of adoption and of entry into 
force, 2000-2015 (continued) 
Canton Statutory basis Date of 
adoption 
Date of entry 
into force 
TI Cantonal advertising act and corresponding ordinance: 
▪ Art. 4 alinea 2 Legge sugli impianti pubblicitari del 26 
febbraio 2007 (RL 7.4.2.5) 
▪ Art. 1 Regolamento d'esecuzione della Legge sugli impianti 
pubblicitari del 24 settembre 2008 (RL 7.4.2.5.1) 
17.02.2009 01.05.2009 
UR Cantonal health act: 
▪ Art. 17 Abs. 2a) Gesundheitsgesetz vom 1. Juni 2008 
(Stand am 1. Januar 2013) (GG; RB 30.2111) 
27.06.2008205 01.09.2009 
VD Cantonal advertising act and corresponding ordinance: 
▪ Art. 5a Loi sur les procédés de réclame du 6 décembre 
1988 (Etat au 01.06.2013) (LPR; RSV 943.11) 
▪ Art. 2 Règlement d'application de la loi du 6 décembre 
1988 sur les procédés de réclame du 31 janvier 1990 (Etat 
au 01.07.2007) (RLPR; RSV 943.11.1) 
13.12.2006 01.07.2007 
VS Cantonal health act and ordinance on second-hand smoke 
and the tobacco advertising ban: 
▪ Art. 111 Gesundheitsgesetz vom 14. Februar 2008 (SGS 
800.1) 
▪ Art. 11-13 Verordnung über den Schutz der Bevölkerung 
vor Passivrauchen und das Tabakwerbeverbot vom 1. 
April 2009 (SGS 818.120) 
14.02.2008 01.07.2009 
ZG Cantonal health act: 
▪ § 49 Gesetz über das Gesundheitswesen im Kanton Zug 
vom 30. Oktober 2008 (Stand 1. Januar 2013) 
(Gesundheitsgesetz, GesG; BGS 821.1) 
30.10.2008 01.03.2009 
ZH Cantonal health act and ordinance on misuse of psychoactive 
substances: 
▪ § 48 Abs. 2 Gesundheitsgesetz vom 2. April 2007 (GesG; LS 
810.1) 
▪ § 1 Verordnung über die Bekämpfung des 
Suchtmittelmissbrauchs vom 21. Mai 2008 (LS 818.25) 
02.04.2007 01.07.2008 
Sources: Website of FOPH (BAG 2016a), LexFind (Schweizerische Staatsschreiberkonferenz 2016), cantonal 
websites, e-mail correspondence with cantonal authorities. 
  
                                                          
205 The act was adopted in a referendum held on 27 June 2008. 
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Table 51: Ban on tobacco billboard advertising: related legislative activities at the federal level, 1990-2015 
Popular initiatives 
1992-
1993 
92.031 Popular initiative entitled “Volksinitiative zur Verminderung der Tabakprobleme”206 [popular 
initiative on the mitigation of tobacco-related problems]; rejected (no-votes: 1°521°885; yes-votes: 
521°433). 
Policy proposed: Comprehensive ban on tobacco advertising. 
Indirect counterproposal by FC; not pursued. 
Policy proposed: Ban on tobacco advertising on billboards and in cinemas. 
Parliamentary initiatives, motions and postulates 
1998 98.3351 Motion NC entitled “Bekämpfung des Tabakkonsums” [abatement of tobacco 
consumption], submitted by Christian Grobet (GE); motion made into a postulate at the request of 
the FC; status: accepted. 
Policy proposed: Ban on tobacco advertising in the public space. 
2000 00.432 Parliamentary initiative NC entitled “Tabak. Bekämpfung der tödlichen Folgen” [abatement 
of the lethal consequences of tobacco], submitted by Christian Grobet (GE); not pursued; status: 
terminated. 
Policy proposed: Comprehensive ban on tobacco advertising. 
2000 00.3435 Motion NC entitled “Verbot der Tabakwerbung” [ban on tobacco advertising], submitted 
by Pierre Tillmanns (VD); motion made into a postulate at the request of the FC; status: accepted. 
Policy proposed: Comprehensive ban on tobacco advertising. 
2002 02.466 Parliamentary initiative NC entitled “Verbot der Tabakwerbung” [ban on tobacco 
advertising], submitted by Christian Grobet (GE); not pursued; status: terminated. 
Policy proposed: Ban on tobacco advertising on public ground and in all areas visible from public 
ground, in places accessible to the public (such as public transport facilities, sports and cultural 
venues), in publications that target the public; ban on sponsoring of sports, cultural and 
entertainment events. 
2003 02.3784 Motion NC entitled “Verbot von Tabakwerbung auch in der Schweiz” [ban on tobacco 
advertising also in Switzerland], submitted by Ursula Wyss (BE); not pursued; status: terminated. 
Policy proposed: Ban on tobacco advertising in print media, on billboards and in cinemas. 
2006 06.420 Parliamentary initiative NC entitled “Verbot der Tabakwerbung und des Verkaufs von 
Tabakprodukten an Minderjährige” [ban on tobacco advertising and on tobacco sales to minors], 
submitted by Marianne Huguenin (VD); not pursued; status: terminated. 
Policy proposed: Comprehensive ban on tobacco advertising. 
2015 15.3548 Motion CS entitled “Frankenstärke. Verzicht auf ungerechtfertigte Werbeverbote im 
Tabakproduktegesetz“ [abandoning unjustified sales bans in the Tobacco Products Act in view of 
the strong swiss franc], submitted by Hans Hess (OW); withdrewn; status; terminated. 
Policy proposed: Eliminating the new restrictions on tobacco advertising from the draft legislation 
on the Tobacco Products Act. 
Source: Curia Vista (Bundesversammlung 2016b). 
  
                                                          
206 Simultaneously, a second initiative that entailed a ban on alcohol advertising was voted on by the Swiss people 
and rejected. 
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Table 52: Ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents: cantonal legal basis and dates of adoption and of 
entry into force, 2005-2015207 
Canton Statutory basis Date of 
adoption 
Date of entry 
into force 
AG Cantonal health act and corresponding ordinance: 
▪ § 37 Gesundheitsgesetz vom 20. Januar 2009 (Stand 1. 
Juli 2015) (GesG; SAR 301.100) 
▪ §§ 16-22 Verordnung zum Gesundheitsgesetz vom 11. 
November 2009 (Stand 1. September 2014) (GesV; SAR 
301.111) 
20.01.2009 01.01.2010 
AR Cantonal health act: 
▪ Art. 16 Abs. 3 Gesundheitsgesetz vom 25. November 
2007 (Stand 1. Januar 2015) (bGS 811.1) 
25.11.2007 01.01.2008/ 
01.01.2009 
 
BE Cantonal trade and commerce act and corresponding 
ordinance; cantonal penal law208: 
▪ Art. 16-18a Gesetz über Handel und Gewerbe vom 4. 
November 1992 (HGG; BSG 930.1) 
▪ Art. 9 Verordnung über Handel und Gewerbe vom 24. 
Januar 2007 (HGV; BSG 930.11) 
▪ Art. 13 Abs. 1 Gesetz über das kantonale Strafrecht vom 
9. April 2009 (KStrG; BSG 311.1) 
12.06.2006 01.01.2007/ 
01.01.2010 
BL Cantonal alcohol and tobacco act: 
▪ § 2 Kantonales Alkohol- und Tabakgesetz vom 22. Juni 
2006 (Stand 1. Januar 2013) (KaATG; SGS 905) 
24.09.2006209 01.01.2007/ 
31.12.2009 
BS Cantonal penal law: 
▪ § 35a) Übertretungsstrafgesetz vom 15. Juni 1978 (Stand 
28. Dezember 2014) (SG 253.100) 
18.10.2006 01.08.2007/ 
31.12.2009 
FR Cantonal trade act: 
▪ Art. 31 Gesetz vom 25. September 1997 über die 
Ausübung des Handels (SGF 940.1) 
26.06.2008 01.01.2009 
GL Cantonal trade and commerce act: 
▪ Art. 19 Gesetz über die Handels- und Gewerbetätigkeiten 
vom 5. Mai 2013 (Stand 1. September 2014) (GS IX 
B/25/1) 
05.05.2013 01.01.2014 
GR Cantonal health act: 
▪ Art. 15 Abs. 2, 3 Gesetz über das Gesundheitswesen des 
Kantons Graubünden vom 2. Dezember 1984 (Stand 1. 
Januar 2013) (Gesundheitsgesetz; BR 500.000) 
19.10.2005 01.04.2006/ 
01.01.2008 
JU Cantonal health act and ordinance on solaria and tobacco 
sales: 
▪ Art. 6b Loi sanitaire du 14 décembre 1990 
(RSJU 810.01) 
▪ Art. 6-8 Ordonnance concernant les appareils de 
bronzage et la vente des produits du tabac du 17 juin 
2014 (RSJU 810.015) 
26.09.2012 01.01.2013/ 
01.09.2014 
LU Cantonal health act: 
▪ § 48 Gesundheitsgesetz vom 13. September 2005 (Stand 
1. Juli 2014) (SRL 800) 
13.09.2005 01.01.2006/ 
01.01.2008 
  
                                                          
207 In many cantons, a transitional period was to allow operators of tobacco vending machines to implement the 
required technical adjustments. If the column “date of entry into force” provides two dates, the first one pertains 
to the minimum age, the second one to the vending machine regulations of the cantonal law. 
208 The cantonal penal law contains a prohibition of providing minors with tobacco. Being adopted in 2009, it 
complements the ban on tobacco sales to minors. 
209 The act was adopted in a referendum held on 9 September 2004. 
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Table 52: Ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents: cantonal legal basis and dates of adoption and of 
entry into force, 2005-2015 (continued) 
Canton Statutory basis Date of 
adoption 
Date of entry 
into force 
OW Cantonal health act: 
▪ Art. 68 Gesundheitsgesetz vom 3. Dezember 2015 (Stand 
1. Februar 2016) (GDB 810.1) 
03.12.2015 01.02.2016/ 
31.01.2017 
NE Cantonal commercial inspectorate act and corresponding 
ordinance: 
▪ Art. 25 Loi sur la police du commerce du 18 février 2014 
(Etat au 1er janvier 2015) (LPCom; RSN 941.01) 
▪ Art. 54-56 Règlement d'exécution des lois sur la police du 
commerce et sur les établissements publics du 17 
décembre 2014 (Etat au 1er mai 2015) (RELPComEP; RSN 
941.010) 
18.02.2014 01.01.2015/ 
01.01.2016 
NW Cantonal health act: 
▪ Art. 72 Gesetz zur Erhaltung und Förderung der 
Gesundheit vom 30. Mai 2007 (Gesundheitsgesetz, GesG; 
NG 711.1) 
28.09.2008210 01.03.2009 
SG Cantonal health act: 
▪ Art. 52ter Gesundheitsgesetz vom 28. Juni 1979 (Stand 1. 
Januar 2014) (GesG; sGS 311.1) 
01.08.2006 01.10.2006/ 
01.10.2008 
SH Cantonal health act: 
▪ Art. 31 Abs. 1-2 Gesundheitsgesetz vom 21. Mai 2012 
(GesG; SHR 810.100) 
21.05.2012 01.01.2013/ 
01.01.2014 
SO Cantonal health act: 
▪ § 6bis Abs. 1-2 Gesundheitsgesetz vom 27. Januar 1999 
(Stand 1. Januar 2014) (BGS 811.11) 
26.11.2006 01.01.2007/ 
01.01.2009 
TG Cantonal act on tobacco and alcohol billboard advertising and 
on tobacco sales to minors: 
▪ § 2 Gesetz über das Verbot der Plakatwerbung für Tabak 
und Alkohol sowie über den Jugendschutz beim Verkauf 
von Tabakwaren vom 21. Juni 2006 (Stand 1. Januar 2007) 
(RB 812.4) 
21.06.2006 01.01.2007/ 
31.12.2009 
TI Cantonal ordinance on protection from smoking: 
▪ Art. 5-6 Regolamento concernente la protezione contro il 
fumo del 24 aprile 2013 (RL 6.1.1.1.8) 
24.03.2013 01.09.2013/ 
01.06.2014 
UR Cantonal health act: 
▪ Art. 17 Abs. 2b)-c) Gesundheitsgesetz vom 1. Juni 2008 
(Stand am 1. Januar 2013) (GG; RB 30.2111) 
01.06.2008 01.09.2009 
VD Cantonal act on economic activities: 
▪ Art. 66h-i, 98a-c Loi sur l'exercice des activités 
économiques du 31 mai 2005 (Etat au 01.11.2014) (LEAE; 
RSV 930.01) 
31.05.2005 01.01.2006/ 
01.01.2008 
VS Cantonal commercial inspectorate act and corresponding 
ordinance: 
▪ Art. 4 Abs. 5, Art. 10 Abs. 2 Gesetz über die 
Gewerbepolizei vom 8. Februar 2007 (SGS 930.1) 
▪ Art. 2 Verordnung betreffend das Gesetz über die 
Gewerbepolizei vom 16. August 2007 (SGS 930.100) 
08.02.2007 01.01.2008/ 
01.07.2008 
ZG Cantonal health act: 
▪ § 50 Gesetz über das Gesundheitswesen im Kanton Zug 
vom 30. Oktober 2008 (Stand 1. Januar 2013) 
(Gesundheitsgesetz, GesG; BGS 821.1) 
30.10.2008 01.03.2010 
 
                                                          
210 The act was adopted in an obligatory referendum on 28 September 2009. 
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Table 52: Ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents: cantonal legal basis and dates of adoption and of 
entry into force, 2005-2015 (continued) 
Canton Statutory basis Date of 
adoption 
Date of entry 
into force 
ZH Cantonal health act and ordinance on misuse of psychoactive 
substances: 
▪ § 48 Abs. 5 Gesundheitsgesetz vom 2. April 2007 (GesG; LS 
810.1) 
▪ § 4 Verordnung über die Bekämpfung des 
Suchtmittelmissbrauchs vom 21. Mai 2008 (LS 818.25) 
02.04.2007 01.07.2008/ 
01.07.2009 
Sources: Website of FOPH (BAG 2016a), LexFind (Schweizerische Staatsschreiberkonferenz 2016), cantonal 
websites, e-mail correspondence with cantonal authorities. 
Table 53: Ban on tobacco sales to children and adolescents: related legislative activities at the federal level, 1990-
2015 
Parliamentary initiatives, motions and postulates 
1996 96.3493 Postulate NC entitled “Verbot des Verkaufs von Tabakwaren an Jugendliche unter 16 
Jahren” [ban on tobacco sales to young people aged less than 16 years], submitted by Otto Zwygart 
(BE); status: accepted. 
Policy proposed: Ban on tobacco sales to adolescents aged less than 16 years. 
2000 00.432 Parliamentary initiative NC entitled “Tabak. Bekämpfung der tödlichen Folgen” [abatement 
of the lethal consequences of tobacco], submitted by Christian Grobet (GE); not pursued; status: 
terminated. 
Policy proposed: Ban on tobacco sales to adolescents aged less than 16 years. 
2005 05.3618 Motion CS entitled “Koordination der kantonalen Tabakpräventionsmassnahmen” 
[coordination of cantonal tobacco prevention measures], submitted by Hans Hess; rejected; status: 
terminated. 
Policy proposed: Standardisation of cantonal minimum age provisions for tobacco purchases. 
2006 06.420 Parliamentary initiative NC entitled “Verbot der Tabakwerbung und des Verkaufs von 
Tabakprodukten an Minderjährige” [ban on tobacco advertising and on tobacco sales to minors], 
submitted by Marianne Huguenin (VD); not pursued; status: terminated. 
Policy proposed: Ban on tobacco sales to minors. 
2006 06.3845 Motion NC entitled “Schutz der Jugendlichen gegen Tabak” [protection of young people 
against tobacco], submitted by Maurice Chevrier (VS); withdrawn; status: terminated. 
Policy proposed: Ban on tobacco sales to minors. 
2011 11.3637 Motion NC entitled “Gesamtschweizerisch einheitliches Abgabealter für Tabakprodukte” 
[Swiss-wide uniform minimum age for purchasing tobacco products], submitted by Ruth Humbel 
(AG); status: accepted. 
Policy proposed: Stipulation of a minimum age for purchasing tobacco products. 
Source: Curia Vista (Bundesversammlung 2016b). 
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Table 54: Restrictions on alcohol sales at petrol stations: cantonal legal basis and dates of adoption and of entry 
into force, 1998-2015 
Canton Statutory basis Date of 
adoption 
Date of entry 
into force 
BL Cantonal hotel and restaurant industry act: 
▪ § 18 Abs. 4 Gastgewerbegesetz vom 5. Juni 2003 (Stand 1. 
Januar 2015) (SGS 540) 
30.11.2003 01.01.2004 
FR Cantonal trade act: 
▪ Art. 7b Abs. 3 Gesetz vom 25. September 1997 über die 
Ausübung des Handels (HAG; SGF 940.1) 
14.10.2004 01.07.2005 
GE Cantonal act on the cash purchase of alcoholic beverages: 
▪ Art. 4 alinéa 1 Loi sur la vente à l'emporter des boissons 
alcooliques du 22 janvier 2004 (LVEBA; RSG I 2 24) 
26.09.2004 01.01.2005 
JU Cantonal act on hotel and restaurant industry and on trade in 
alcoholic beverages and corresponding ordinance: 
▪ Art. 6 Loi sur l'hôtellerie, la restauration et le commerce 
de boissons alcooliques du 18 mars 1998 (Loi sur les 
auberges; RSJU 935.11) 
▪ Art. 6 Ordonnance sur l'hôtellerie, la restauration et le 
commerce de boissons alcooliques du 30 juin 1998 
(Ordonnance sur les auberges; RSJU 935.111) 
18.03.1998 01.07.1998 
VD Cantonal act on inns and alcohol sales: 
▪ Art. 5 Loi sur les auberges et les débits de boissons 
du 26 mars 2002 (Etat au 01.01.2007) (LADB; RSV 935.31) 
26.03.2002 01.01.2003 
Sources: Website of FOPH (BAG 2016b), LexFind (Schweizerische Staatsschreiberkonferenz 2016), cantonal 
websites. 
Table 55: Ban on takeout alcohol sales at night: cantonal legal basis and dates of adoption and of entry into force, 
2004-2015 
Canton Statutory basis Date of adoption Date of entry 
into force 
GE Cantonal act on takeout sales of alcoholic beverages: 
▪ Art. 11 Loi sur la vente à l'emporter des boissons 
alcooliques du 22 janvier 2004 (LVEBA; RSG I 2 24) 
26.09.2004 01.01.2005 
Sources: Website of FOPH (BAG 2016b), LexFind (Schweizerische Staatsschreiberkonferenz 2016), cantonal 
websites. 
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Table 56: Breast cancer screening programmes: timing of adoption, type of adoption decision and onset of 
implementation, 1993-2015 
Canton Year of 
adoption 
Description of adoption decision Year 
screenings 
started 
BE 2008 
 
Authorisation of pilot project (Jura bernois) 
[appropriation of funds for canton-wide project in 2011] 
2009 
BS 2013 Appropriation of programme funds 2014 
FR 2002 Appropriation of programme funds 2004 
GE 1998 Authorisation of programme 1999 
GR 2009 Adoption of statutory basis 2011 
JU 2001 Appropriation of programme funds 2005 
NE 2006 Authorisation of programme 2007 
SG 2008 Adoption of statutory basis 2010 
TG 2009 Authorisation of programme 2011 
TI 2013 Authorisation of programme 2015 
VD 1993 Authorisation of pilot project 
[appropriation of funds for canton-wide project in 1998] 
1993 
VS 1998 Authorisation of programme 1999 
Sources: Website of swiss cancer screening (2015a), cantonal websites, LexFind (Schweizerische 
Staatsschreiberkonferenz 2016). 
Table 57: Restaurant food nutrition labelling: timing of adoption, type of adoption decision and onset of 
implementation, 1993-2014 
Canton Year of 
adoption 
Description of adoption decision Year first 
label(s) 
awarded 
AG 2011 Policy adoption during cantonal action programme 2012 
BE 2007 Authorisation of pilot project (Jura bernois) 
[authorisation of canton-wide policy in 2008] 
2008 
BL 2007 Authorisation of pilot project 
[adoption of cantonal action programme in 2008] 
2008 
BS 2011 Adoption of cantonal action programme 2013 
FR 2001 Appropriation of funding 2001 
GE 1993 Design and development of label 1994 
GR 2011 Adoption of cantonal action programme 2014 
JU 2002 Adoption of cantonal programme on sustainable development 2004 
LU 2009 Policy adoption during cantonal action programme 2011 
NE 2001 Appropriation of funding 2001 
SG 2011 Adoption of cantonal action programme 2013 
SO 2008 Adoption of cantonal action programme 2011 
TG 2008 Adoption of cantonal action programme 2011 
TI 1996 Design and development of label 1997 
UR 2011 Adoption of cantonal action programme 2013 
VD 1997 Design and development of label 1998 
VS 2003 Appropriation of funding 2003 
ZG 2011 Adoption of cantonal action programme 2013 
Legend: Cantons highlighted in grey have adopted s&d; cantons in white have adopted FV. 
Sources: Fourchette verte Suisse (FV-CH 2003-2015), Radix (2015c), cantonal websites, e-mail correspondence 
with cantonal representatives. 
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Table 58: Standardised logit models on the adoption of four individual public health policies 
  (5a) 
Ban on tobacco billboard 
advertising 
(5b) 
Ban on tobacco sales to 
minors 
(5c) 
Breast cancer screening 
programmes 
(5d) 
Restaurant food nutrition 
labelling 
Regional diffusion Regional diffusion 2 (implementers) 
(t-1) 
-2.330 
(2.632) 
-1.209 
(2.671) 
3.332** 
(1.035) 
6.755*** 
(1.164) 
Point-source diffusion Financial incentives - - 9.467# 
(5.338) 
2.851* 
(1.259) 
Ideological preferences Strength of left parties in 
parliament 
6.388# 
(3.838) 
5.749# 
(3.440) 
-2.712 
(3.947) 
-1.953 
(3.718) 
Interest group pressures Strength of public health 
organisations (t-1) 
11.00*** 
(3.143) 
1.045 
(1.130) 
1.054 
(1.379) 
1.889# 
(0.992) 
Policy-making capacity Density of administration (t-1) 0.254** 
(0.088) 
-0.078 
(0.061) 
-0.133* 
(0.059) 
0.031 
(0.052) 
State interventionism Size of public sector (t-1) 0.046 
(0.072) 
0.048 
(0.110) 
0.676*** 
(0.134) 
0.219 
(0.156) 
State fiscal situation Relative budget surplus/deficit (t-1) -0.190* 
(0.092) 
-0.004 
(0.053) 
0.145** 
(0.046) 
-0.030 
(0.045) 
Producer pressures Tobacco production (t-1) -8.120*** 
(2.066) 
-0.141# 
(0.081) 
- - 
Radiology industry (t-1) - - 42.02** 
(13.02) 
- 
Restaurant sector (t-1) - - - -0.055 
(0.047) 
Controls t -7.508** 
(2.330) 
1.708* 
(0.821) 
-3.161# 
(1.815) 
-0.342 
(0.498) 
t2 2.605** 
(0.802) 
-0.553* 
(0.234) 
0.214 
(0.154) 
0.018 
(0.057) 
t3 -0.185** 
(0.059) 
0.047* 
(0.020) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
Constant --19.00** 
(6.243) 
-3.362# 
(1.970) 
-12.13*** 
(2.219) 
-5.342# 
(2.860) 
 N 261 124 448 410 
Years 14 9 21 21 
Wald Chi2 34.70*** 11.77 56.56*** 152.6*** 
McFadden’s R2 0.607 0.115 0.377 0.287 
AIC 67.09 121.8 92.82 129.4 
Legend: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by canton; # p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
